비대칭정보하에서 계약법의 모습 = The Role of Contract Law under Asymmetric Information

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

  Most of Economists have assumed that the market is the best institution for efficient reallocation of resources. Other scholars believe that the market is not always the best one for it because transactions costs have never been zero in most of areas or real world. Even the market does not work well at all under certain circumstances. In response, political science scholars have emphasized the governmental role to cure market failures. However, the political process has even faced governmental failures sometimes. Many law and economic scholars have focused on some connection between the market and law. They have provided the principles of law as alternative solutions under some limited situations of market failure. I have tried to use a game theory to show how the principles of law work under those.<BR>  ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is very famous to every economist and political science people. It explains why a reasonable market participant makes unreasonable behaviors. In other words, Prisoner"s Dilemma explains when and why reasonable choices produce worst outcomes in market or society. I used ‘Prisoner"s Dilemma’ to explain the fundamental role of contract law and the limit of contract law under asymmetric information. I refined the contract law under this situation by showing the role of implied warranty and its effects.<BR>  The principles of law have played important but limited roles under market failures. Especially, their true value comes from solving problems of market failures such as asymmetric information and externalities. Contract law is limited to play in improving the problems of asymmetric information because the best solution may impose legally sellers on the duty to provide information. Other legal principles may be more suitable under asymmetric information. However, I explored that the doctrine of implies warranty contributes to improve asymmetric information by ex post facto.<BR>  This article studied only the role of contract law in the point of economic view. Next time, I wish to have another opportunity to introduce law in other areas by connecting externalities.<BR>

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
  Ⅱ. 효율성
  Ⅲ. 계약법 부존재 상황
  Ⅳ. 계약법의 필요성
  Ⅴ. 결론
  【참고문헌】
  [Abstract]
  

참고문헌 (Reference)

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