가격고정에 대한 미국 판결에 나타난 당연위법과 합리의 원칙 = Per Se Illegal and Rule of Reason drawn from the U. S. Cases on Price Fixing

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Section 1 of the Sherman Act regulates the concerted action and Section 2 of The Sherman Act regulates the unilateral act. the Regulation scope of Section 1 is broader than Section 2 because Section 2 is applied in the case of monopolization or attempting to monopolize. Antitrust law is interpreted and applied by a judgment from the court, due to general and comprehensive meaning of Section 1. At first he Court judged the agreement in restraining trade as per se illegal, without considering unreasonableness of the agreement in restraining trade, from literal interpretation of Section 1. However method of judging reasonableness of restraining trade, the rule of reason, originated through the Standard Oil case. In the case that the characteristics and the effects of the agreement are apparently anticompetitive, the Supreme Court of the United States judged the agreement as per se illegal without proving market power and actual anticompetitiveness. In the other case, the rule of reason is developed by analyzing the peculiar facts of the corporate and the reason of restraining trade. The Main problem that price-fixing is regarded as per se illegal, is that the requirements of price-fixing is not clear. Interpreting price-fixing comprehensively causes the efficient act to be regarded as per se illegal, so that predictability and reliability could be lost. Therefore per se illegal and the rule of reason should be applied on a case by case basis rather than deciding a uniform standard for judging illegality of price-fixing. In the case that the rule of reason is applied to price-fixing, the market power is a important factor, and it is required that the agreement is likely to have the anticompetitive effects, which mean price increase, reduction in output, and the deterioration of the quality of goods and services.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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