성공보수에 의한 도덕적 해이의 통제 = 위험기피를 고려한 쌍방대리인 경합 모형의 혼합보수(HYBRID-FEE) 구조에서

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

While the majority of existing literature in delegated contests assumes that moral hazard is controlled by contingent fees, we turn this proposition into a null hypothesis and test it. For this we set up a bilateral-delegation contest model with risk-averse clients, where contingent fees are a portion of prize and fixed fees payable for hours worked. We explore, in a two-stage game, how delegates’ compensation schemes are affected by the optimization strategies of clients and delegates. Results are as follows: First, whether contingent fees can control moral hazard depends on the interrelationship of prize, reservation fees, and degree of risk-aversion, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. Second, moral hazard is found controllable under limited circumstances. With this as a watershed, cases are halved into a zone where moral hazard takes place and the other where delegates end up working more hours than solicited by clients thus giving a rise to the namesake of “moral fortress”. Third, moral hazard is aggravated by increasing prize, decreasing reservation fees, and decreasing degree of risk-aversion.