작품 해석에 있어서의 온건한 의도주의 = Moderate Intentionalism in Interpretation

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The merit of intentionalism in aesthetics is to suggest the standard for determination of work-meaning in interpretation. Intentionalism has been criticized for many problems, namely intentional fallacy. Absolute intentionalism will be vulnerable for this typical criticism, but moderate intentionalism can overcome that weakness by considering textual evidences and contextual/conventional aspects as to serve artistic interpretation relevantly. Moderate intentionalism is based on Grice`s pragmatics so that it counts artworks as utterance analogously and claims that the primary purpose of interpretation is to find the work-meaning in question. This essay discusses two typical forms of moderate intentionalism, that is, hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual intentionalism. Those two have the points of the intention of author, textual evidence, context and convention, communication in community and audience`s understanding in common. Interpretation and artistic evaluation are quite distinct matters for purpose and moderate intentionalism puts the determination of meaning before evaluation but allows various purposes of interpretation and multiple values so that those two ideals are compatible in this theory. This essay concludes moderate actual intentionalism can be the more preferable one, for hypothetical intentionalism faces the dilemma between value-maximizing theory and actual intentionalism, and its point of view on actual intention can seem to be inappropriate for intentionalism.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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