19세기 후반 沿邑의 砲契 설치와 운영 = The Establishment and Operation of Local Firearms Associations (Pogye) in Coastal Counties of Late 19th Century Korea

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 19세기 후반 서구 열강의 침입과 그에 따른 砲軍 증설의 추이 속에서, 지방의 포군 운영책 모색 중에 출현한 砲契를 분석하고자 하였다. 포계는 당시 중앙 정부가 전국적인 포군 증설에 필요한 막대한 재원을 일괄 조달할 수 없는 여건 속에서, 지방의 자구적 대응 차원에서 조성되었다. 이러한 포계 시행의 핵심은 안정적인 군사 재정과 병력 운영 구조를 확립하는데 있었다. 현전하는 沿邑의 포계 관련 사료에 따르면, 포계는 官의 磁場 속에서 民의 참여로운영되는 향촌 공동체로서, 유사시 지역 방어를 전담하는 군사 조직으로 기능하였다. 지방 연읍에서의 포계 운영 실태를 규명하는 작업은, 洋擾가 빈번했던 19세기 후반 조선의 지역 방어 체제와 지방 차원의 군사력 운영 방식을 이해하는 데 중요한 단서를 제공한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article analyzes the nature and operational practices of local firearms associations (Pogye) established in coastal counties of Korea during the late nineteenth century, a historical period marked by repeated foreign incursions and the expansion of local musketeers (Pogun). Under structural constraints that prevented the central government from fully financing the nationwide increase of musketeers, Pogye emerged as a locally initiated military management mechanism adopted by rural society. The core function of Pogye lay in mobilizing village-based communities to accumulate capital (Ipbon), generate interest revenue (Sikli), and thereby secure a stable supply of manpower and financial resources necessary for the mobilization, payment, training, and rewarding of musketeers. In this respect, Pogye represented an attempt to establish a system of permanent military finance, distinct from temporary extraction methods such as extraordinary levies or voluntary contributions.
To examine this process in detail, the article focuses on the case of Incheon County, a strategic coastal stronghold critical to the defense of the capital and the western maritime routes. During the crisis of the 1871 Sinmi Yangyo, Incheon provides a rare opportunity to observe the concrete implementation and operation of Pogye. Based on military records from Soseong Gunjung Ilgi and related documents such as Pogye regulations, this study demonstrates that Pogye functioned as an integrated military management system that combined command structures, troop organization, fiscal administration, and training. By linking firearms training to monetary incentives and opportunities for official appointment, Pogye encouraged voluntary participation in military service without relying solely on coercive mobilization, revealing its character as a pragmatic alternative grounded in local participation.
In addition, the article examines Pogye-related account books from Goeup-myeon in Jangheung County as a supplementary case, confirming that Pogye was not an isolated experiment confined to Incheon but a military management strategy recognized across coastal localities. Although these records do not directly describe organizational regulations, they provide concrete evidence of village-level capital distribution and interest-based financing for firearms operations. The tendency toward the fiscalization of interest collection observed by the 1880s further indicates that Pogye gradu ally lost its initial momentum as military tensions subsided.
Such changes should be understood not as institutional failure but as the result of shifting political and military conditions following the fall of Heungseon Daewongun and the transformation of domestic and international circumstances. Pogye was thus a flexible and adaptive mechanism whose function and intensity varied in accordance with external threats. Nevertheless, it played a crucial role in enabling local society to compensate for the fiscal limitations of the state and to sustain regional defense capabilities.
In sum, Pogye illustrates a transitional form of military organization in which late nineteenth-century regional defense moved away from a purely state-driven, centralized mobilization system toward a more flexible structure mediated by village communities. Rather than a unilateral imposition of central policy, the operation of Pogye reveals a process through which military institutions were reconfigured within local fiscal and social conditions. As such, Pogye can be understood as a practical solution and negotiated compromise between the state and rural society in the management of military power in late Chosŏn Korea.