Theory of public finance in a federal state|RISS 상세보기

목차 (Table of Contents)

CONTENTS
1 Fiscal Decentralization : Benefits and Problems = 1
1.1 Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility = 1
1.1.1 Assignment of Government Functions = 1
1.1.2 Mobility and Taxation : Empirical Facts = 3

CONTENTS
1 Fiscal Decentralization : Benefits and Problems = 1
1.1 Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility = 1
1.1.1 Assignment of Government Functions = 1
1.1.2 Mobility and Taxation : Empirical Facts = 3
1.2 Purpose, Justification, and Limits of the Study = 9
1.2.1 Purpose of the Book = 9
1.2.2 Justification of the Study = 10
1.2.3 Limits of the Study = 13
1.3 Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization = 14
1.3.1 Sensitivity to Diverse Regional Preferences = 14
1.3.2 Preference Revelation by Household Mobility = 15
1.3.3 Protecting the Interests of Future Generations = 15
1.3.4 Restraining the Leviathan = 16
1.4 Problems of Fiscal Decentralization = 17
1.4.1 Inefficient Interregional Resource Allocation = 17
1.4.2 Destructive Tax Competition for Mobile Factors = 18
1.4.3 Tax Export and Spillover Effects = 19
1.4.4 Suboptimal Income Distribution within Regions = 19
1.4.5 Suboptimal Income Distribution across Regions = 20
1.4.6 Suboptimal Stabilization Policy = 21
1.4.7 Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization = 22
1.5 Outline of the Book = 22
2 Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems = 27
2.1 Efficient Locational Pattern = 28
2.1.1 The Model = 28
2.1.2 First-Order Conditions = 30
2.1.3 Efficient Interregional Resource Distribution = 32
2.2 Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems = 35
2.2.1 Private Behavior = 35
2.2.2 Efficient Taxation = 37
3 Perfect Interregional Competition = 40
3.1 Fiscal Decentralization with a Complete Tax Instrument Set = 42
3.1.1 Private Behavior = 43
3.1.2 Local Government Behavior = 45
3.2 Fiscal Decentralization with an Incomplete Tax Instrument Set = 46
3.2.1 A Direct Household Tax Is Not Avaliable = 47
3.2.2 A Direct Firm Tax Is Not Avaliable = 48
3.2.3 An Undistortive Tax Is Not Avaliable = 50
3.3 Appendix = 53
3.3.1 First-Order Conditions and Migration Responses = 53
3.3.2 Distortionary Taxation = 55
4 Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital = 58
4.1 Underprovision of Local Public Goods = 60
4.1.1 Private Behavior = 60
4.1.2 Regional Government Behavior = 63
4.1.3 Central Government Intervention = 66
4.2 Tax Competition and Regional Size = 69
4.3 The Advantage of Small Regions = 71
4.4 Restraining the Leviathan by Interregional Tax Competition = 74
4.4.1 Government Behavior = 75
4.4.2 Fiscal Decentralization with Undistortive Taxes = 76
4.4.3 Fiscal Decentralization with Interregional Tax Competition = 77
4.5 ProPerty Tax Incidence and Land Taxation = 79
4.5.1 The Traditional View = 79
4.5.2 The New View = 81
4.5.3 The Benefit View = 82
4.5.4 Land Taxation = 85
4.6 Appendix = 86
5 Optimal Structure of Local Governments = 88
5.1 Tiebout and the Theory of Clubs = 90
5.2 The Henry George Theorem = 92
5.3 Overlapping Market Areas of Local Public Goods = 95
5.3.1 The Optimal Allocation = 95
5.3.2 Private Behavior = 98
5.3.3 Decentralization through Competing Metropolitan Governments = 99
5.3.4 Decentralization with Smaller Jurisdictions = 100
5.4 Appendix = 102
5.4.1 Optimal Allocation with Overlapping Market Areas = 102
5.4.2 Optimal Decentralization through Metropolitan Governments = 103
6 Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility = 105
6.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects with Household Mobility = 106
6.1.1 Private Behavior = 106
6.1.2 Regional Government Behavior = 108
6.2 Tax Competition and Household Mobility = 111
6.2.1 Private Behavior = 111
6.2.2 Regional Government Behavior = 113
6.3 Appendix = 115
6.3.1 Tax Export and Spillover Effects = 115
6.3.2 Tax competition = 116
7 Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility = 118
7.1 Efficient Allocation = 120
7.1.1 The Model = 120
7.1.2 First-Order Conditions = 122
7.2 Decentralized Nash Equilibrium = 124
7.2.1 Private Behavior = 124
7.2.2 Regional Government Behavior = 126
7.2.3 Transfer-Constrained Region = 127
7.3 Different Degrees of Household Mobility = 129
7.3.1 Perfect Household Mobility = 129
7.3.2 Perfect Immobility of Households = 130
7.3.3 Imperfect Household Mobility = 131
7.4 Appendix = 133
7.4.1 First-Order Conditions = 133
7.4.2 Expressions of a Transfer-Constrained Region = 136
8 Decentralized Redistribution Policy = 137
8.1 Uncoordinated Regional Redistribution Policy = 139
8.1.1 Private Behavior = 139
8.1.2 Socially Optimal Allocation = 141
8.1.3 Regional Government Policy = 142
8.2 Internalizing Fiscal Externalities = 146
8.2.1 Central Government Intervention = 146
8.2.2 Corrected Equilibrium = 148
8.3 Appendix = 149
8.3.1 Derivation of Welfare Effects = 149
8.3.2 Central Government Intervention = 150
9 Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems = 152
9.1 Efficient Allocation = 155
9.1.1 The Model = 155
9.1.2 First-Order Conditions = 156
9.2 Decentralized Environmental Policy = 158
9.2.1 Private Behavior = 158
9.2.2 Local Government Behavior = 160
9.3 Local Public Debt = 162
9.3.1 Private Behavior = 163
9.3.2 Local Government Behavior = 164
9.4 Appendix = 166
9.4.1 Decentralized Environmental Policy = 166
9.4.2 Nonneutrality of Local Public Debt = 168
10 Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and the Center = 170
10.1 Optimal Redistribution with Complete Information = 172
10.1.1 Private Behavior = 172
10.1.2 Regional Government Behavior = 175
10.1.3 Socially Optimal Allocation = 176
10.2 Incomplete Information, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Redistribution = 177
10.2.1 Incentive Compatibility Constraints = 177
10.2.2 Central Government Policy = 179
10.3 Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard = 181
10.3.1 Private Behavior = 181
10.3.2 Regional Government Behavior = 183
10.3.3 Optimal Policy with Incomplete Information = 183
10.4 Appendix = 187
10.4.1 First-Order Conditions of the Central Government Problem = 187
10.4.2 First-Best Optimum = 188
10.4.3 Optimum with Incomplete Information and Adverse Selection = 188
10.4.4 Optimum with Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard = 188
11 Conclusions = 191
11.1 Efficiency and Decentralization = 191
11.2 Redistribution and Decentralization = 193
11.3 Policy Applications = 194
11.3.1 Tax Autonomy of Local Governments = 195
11.3.2 Interregional Tax Competition = 195
11.3.3 Restructuring of Jurisdictional Boundaries = 196
11.3.4 Degree of Higher Governmental Intervention = 197
11.3.5 Redistribution Policy within the Regions of a Federal State = 198
11.3.6 Redistribution Policy across the Regions of a Federal State = 198
11.3.7 Harmonization of Debt and Pension Policies in the EU = 199
References = 201
Index = 211

서점명	서명	판매현황	종이책			전자책 구매링크
서점명	서명	판매현황	정가	판매가(할인율)	포인트(포인트몰)	전자책 구매링크
	Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State	판매중	298,370원	298,370원 (0%)	8,960포인트 (3%)

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