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      적자회피 및 이익감소회피 이익조정과 타인자본비용: 비상장기업의 실증적 증거 = Research Articles : Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases, and the Cost of Debt: Some Empirical Evidence on Non-listed Firm

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      This study examines how the earnings management behavior of nonlisted firms affects the level of firms` cost of debt. More specifically we investigate whether the creditors price when the borrowers report the small positive earnings or the small earnings increases as identified in Burgstahler and Dichev (B&D, 1997). B&D document that firms manage their reported earnings to avoid the earnings decreases or the losses, thus increasing the incidence of producing the small earnings increases and the small positive earnings. The purpose of this study is to reexamine the earnings management perspective of B&D targeting the non-listed firms in the debt market in Korea. We explore whether the creditors penalize the non-listed firms reporting the small earnings increases and the small earnings, thus increasing the costs of debt. In addition, we compare the two groups: the firms having small positive earnings and the firms having small earnings increases, and test whether there are any significant differences in the effect on the levels of cost of debt between the two different earnings management area. Following the prior studies (e.g., Jiang 2008, etc.), we employ the average interest rates and the average spread of interest rates as proxies for the cost of debt. As B&D show the cross-sectional discontinuity of earnings distribution around zero, we identify the regions with small earnings increases and small positive earnings. This study uses the total 40,362 firm-year observations for the period from 2004 to 2009. Our empirical results present the evidence that when the firms reporting small positive earnings and small earnings increases show significantly higher cost of debt respectively, than firms not falling into the regions, after controlling for other correlated variables. It suggests that creditors perceive that firms report the small positive earnings in order to avoid losses and the small earnings increases to avoid earnings decreases. In other words, when firms report the B&D`s earnings regions the creditors regard it as a result of managers` opportunistic behavior, and thus penalize by increasing the costs of debt. This OLS results are qualitatively similar to the results under the Newey and West (1984)`s test controlling for the heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation problems as well as the clustering methodology to control for time-series dependency. Despite the robustness, however, when fixed effects are considered, the results of non-listed firms with small earnings increase show not significant but those of firms with small positive earnings are still significant. Furthermore, we find that the firms reporting small positive earnings to avoid losses show significantly higher cost of debt effect than the firms reporting small earnings increases to avoid earnings decreases. It implies that creditors are more concerned about the firms reporting losses than the firms reporting negative earnings changes, and thus more severely penalize the firms reporting the small positive earnings to avoid losses than the firms reporting small earnings increases to avoid earnings decrease. In other words, creditors value more highly information risk of firms reporting small positive earnings than firms reporting small earnings increase. In sum, we conclude that the earnings management regions identified in the crosssectional discontinuity of earnings distribution around zero presented by B&D have negative impact on the non-listed firms` costs of debt compared to the firms not falling into the regions. Creditors believe that earnings in the two regions are manipulated due to the managers` opportunism rather than earnings are highly realizable in the future. Thus, creditors impose a penalty rather than give a reward in terms of the costs of borrowings. In this regard, our findings suggest that although the firms opportunistically manage earnings in order to report positive earnings and earnings changes and thus anticipate any other substantial benefits from the earnings management behavior, it is highly probable that they rather suffer from the increases in the cost of debts. On the other hand, the debt market perceives the firms reporting small positive earnings or earnings changes as those which manipulate earnings to avoid losses and earnings decreases. This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it is the first study to examine the earnings management behaviors identified by B&D (1997) of the non-listed firms, more specifically the effect of earnings management regions of B&D on the level of cost of debt. There exist not many prior studies regarding the non-listed private firms in Korea despite the relative importance of non-listed firms in the capital market in Korea. Second, this study tests the efficiency hypothesis in the debt market as a joint hypothesis. It is notable that the earnings management behavior of non-listed firms documented in this study is likely to adversely affect the efficient resource allocation in the capital market. Thus, our findings provide a crucial insight to various stakeholders of non-listed firms in Korea, such as managers, banks, financial analysts, auditors, government etc., in the sense that the earnings management behaviors of non-listed firms identified by B&D are priced in the private debt market.
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      This study examines how the earnings management behavior of nonlisted firms affects the level of firms` cost of debt. More specifically we investigate whether the creditors price when the borrowers report the small positive earnings or the small earni...

      This study examines how the earnings management behavior of nonlisted firms affects the level of firms` cost of debt. More specifically we investigate whether the creditors price when the borrowers report the small positive earnings or the small earnings increases as identified in Burgstahler and Dichev (B&D, 1997). B&D document that firms manage their reported earnings to avoid the earnings decreases or the losses, thus increasing the incidence of producing the small earnings increases and the small positive earnings. The purpose of this study is to reexamine the earnings management perspective of B&D targeting the non-listed firms in the debt market in Korea. We explore whether the creditors penalize the non-listed firms reporting the small earnings increases and the small earnings, thus increasing the costs of debt. In addition, we compare the two groups: the firms having small positive earnings and the firms having small earnings increases, and test whether there are any significant differences in the effect on the levels of cost of debt between the two different earnings management area. Following the prior studies (e.g., Jiang 2008, etc.), we employ the average interest rates and the average spread of interest rates as proxies for the cost of debt. As B&D show the cross-sectional discontinuity of earnings distribution around zero, we identify the regions with small earnings increases and small positive earnings. This study uses the total 40,362 firm-year observations for the period from 2004 to 2009. Our empirical results present the evidence that when the firms reporting small positive earnings and small earnings increases show significantly higher cost of debt respectively, than firms not falling into the regions, after controlling for other correlated variables. It suggests that creditors perceive that firms report the small positive earnings in order to avoid losses and the small earnings increases to avoid earnings decreases. In other words, when firms report the B&D`s earnings regions the creditors regard it as a result of managers` opportunistic behavior, and thus penalize by increasing the costs of debt. This OLS results are qualitatively similar to the results under the Newey and West (1984)`s test controlling for the heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation problems as well as the clustering methodology to control for time-series dependency. Despite the robustness, however, when fixed effects are considered, the results of non-listed firms with small earnings increase show not significant but those of firms with small positive earnings are still significant. Furthermore, we find that the firms reporting small positive earnings to avoid losses show significantly higher cost of debt effect than the firms reporting small earnings increases to avoid earnings decreases. It implies that creditors are more concerned about the firms reporting losses than the firms reporting negative earnings changes, and thus more severely penalize the firms reporting the small positive earnings to avoid losses than the firms reporting small earnings increases to avoid earnings decrease. In other words, creditors value more highly information risk of firms reporting small positive earnings than firms reporting small earnings increase. In sum, we conclude that the earnings management regions identified in the crosssectional discontinuity of earnings distribution around zero presented by B&D have negative impact on the non-listed firms` costs of debt compared to the firms not falling into the regions. Creditors believe that earnings in the two regions are manipulated due to the managers` opportunism rather than earnings are highly realizable in the future. Thus, creditors impose a penalty rather than give a reward in terms of the costs of borrowings. In this regard, our findings suggest that although the firms opportunistically manage earnings in order to report positive earnings and earnings changes and thus anticipate any other substantial benefits from the earnings management behavior, it is highly probable that they rather suffer from the increases in the cost of debts. On the other hand, the debt market perceives the firms reporting small positive earnings or earnings changes as those which manipulate earnings to avoid losses and earnings decreases. This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it is the first study to examine the earnings management behaviors identified by B&D (1997) of the non-listed firms, more specifically the effect of earnings management regions of B&D on the level of cost of debt. There exist not many prior studies regarding the non-listed private firms in Korea despite the relative importance of non-listed firms in the capital market in Korea. Second, this study tests the efficiency hypothesis in the debt market as a joint hypothesis. It is notable that the earnings management behavior of non-listed firms documented in this study is likely to adversely affect the efficient resource allocation in the capital market. Thus, our findings provide a crucial insight to various stakeholders of non-listed firms in Korea, such as managers, banks, financial analysts, auditors, government etc., in the sense that the earnings management behaviors of non-listed firms identified by B&D are priced in the private debt market.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 송인만, "적자보고를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계학회 13 (13): 29-52, 2004

      2 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

      3 이은철, "재량적 발생액을 이용한 횡단면적 분포도상의 적자회피 이익조정에 대한 재조명" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 61-87, 2007

      4 곽수근, "외부감사가 타인자본비용에 미치는 효과 -비상장기업을 중심으로-" 한국세무학회 12 (12): 365-394, 2011

      5 남혜정, "상장여부 및 감사인 규모가 회계정보의 질적 특성에 미치는 영향 - 중소기업을 대상으로 -" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 55-82, 2010

      6 박종일, "비상장기업에서 실제 이익조정이 타인자본비용과 미래 경영성과에 미치는 영향" 한국경영학회 40 (40): 1375-1413, 2011

      7 최종서, "비상장 중소기업의 발생액 및 실물활동을 통한 이익조정실태" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 37-76, 2010

      8 송인만, "분기별 이익조정의 형태: 적자회피와 반전현상" 한국회계학회 33 (33): 1-28, 2008

      9 전성빈, "부채의 특성에 따른 이익조정" 한국공인회계사회 53 (53): 39-78, 2011

      10 박종일, "부정적인 어닝 서프라이즈를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계정보학회 28 (28): 135-174, 2010

      1 송인만, "적자보고를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계학회 13 (13): 29-52, 2004

      2 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

      3 이은철, "재량적 발생액을 이용한 횡단면적 분포도상의 적자회피 이익조정에 대한 재조명" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 61-87, 2007

      4 곽수근, "외부감사가 타인자본비용에 미치는 효과 -비상장기업을 중심으로-" 한국세무학회 12 (12): 365-394, 2011

      5 남혜정, "상장여부 및 감사인 규모가 회계정보의 질적 특성에 미치는 영향 - 중소기업을 대상으로 -" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 55-82, 2010

      6 박종일, "비상장기업에서 실제 이익조정이 타인자본비용과 미래 경영성과에 미치는 영향" 한국경영학회 40 (40): 1375-1413, 2011

      7 최종서, "비상장 중소기업의 발생액 및 실물활동을 통한 이익조정실태" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 37-76, 2010

      8 송인만, "분기별 이익조정의 형태: 적자회피와 반전현상" 한국회계학회 33 (33): 1-28, 2008

      9 전성빈, "부채의 특성에 따른 이익조정" 한국공인회계사회 53 (53): 39-78, 2011

      10 박종일, "부정적인 어닝 서프라이즈를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계정보학회 28 (28): 135-174, 2010

      11 문상혁, "결산일 차이가 감사보수, 감사시간, 그리고 감사품질에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (42) : 135-165, 2005

      12 박종일, "감사인 교체와 감사품질" 한국공인회계사회 (46) : 191-226, 2007

      13 Dechow, P. M, "Why are earnings kinky? An examination of the earnings management Explanation" 8 : 355-384, 2003

      14 Kim, J. B., "Voluntary audits and the cost of debt capital for Privately held firms: Korean evidence" 28 (28): 585-615, 2011

      15 Dechow, P., "Understanding earnings quality: A review of proxies their determinants and their consequences" 50 : 344-401, 2010

      16 Bhattacharya. U., "The world price of earnings opacity" 78 : 641-678, 2003

      17 Minnis, M., "The value of financial statement versification in debt financing: Evidence from private U.S. Firms" 49 (49): 457-506, 2011

      18 Fortin, S., "The role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms" 24 (24): 859-896, 2007

      19 Bartov, E., "The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations" 33 : 173-204, 2002

      20 Francis, J. E., "The relative importance of firm incentives versus country factors in the demand for assurance services by private entities" 28 (28): 487-516, 2011

      21 Gunny, K., "The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmark" 27 (27): 855-888, 2010

      22 Francis. J., "The market pricing of accruals quality" 39 : 295-327, 2005

      23 Hayn, C., "The information content of losses" 20 (20): 125-153, 1995

      24 Burgstahler, D. C., "The importance of reporting incentives: Earnings management in European private and public firms" 81 (81): 983-1016, 2006

      25 Kim, J. K., "The impact of real earnings management over implied cost of equity capital" 2011

      26 Hansen, J. C., "The effect of alternative goals on earnings management studies: An earnings benchmark examination" University of Illinois at Chicago 2010

      27 Graham, J. R., "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting" 40 : 3-73, 2005

      28 Allee, K. D., "The demand for financial statements in an unreglated environment: An examination of the production and use of financial statements by privately held small business" 84 (84): 1-25, 2009

      29 Subramanyam, K. R., "The Pricing of discretionary accruals" 22 : 249-281, 1996

      30 Habib, A., "Target shooting: Review of earnings management around earnings benchmarks" Auckland University of Technology 2009

      31 Fama, E. F., "Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns" 50 : 131-155, 1995

      32 Kim, J. B., "Real versus accrual-based earnings management and implied cost of equity capital" City University of Hong Kong 2009

      33 Ge, W., "Real earnings management and cost of debt" City University of Manitoba 2010

      34 Cohen, D. A., "Real and accrual-based earnings management in the Pre and post Sarbanes Oxley period" 83 : 757-787, 2008

      35 Tversky, A., "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk" 47 : 263-292, 1979

      36 Bhattacharya, S., "Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and research incentives" 4 : 328-357, 1995

      37 Kothari, S. P., "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures" 39 : 163-197, 2005

      38 Chen, J., "On the use of accounting vs. real earnings management to meet earnings expectations - A market analysis" University of Houston 2010

      39 Barth, M., "Market rewards associated with patterns of increasing earnings" 32 (32): 387-413, 1999

      40 Matsumoto, D. A., "Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises" 77 : 483-514, 2002

      41 Burgstahler, D., "Management of earnings and analysts’ forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises" 33 (33): 633-652, 2006

      42 Bhojraj, S., "Making sense of cents: an examination of firms that marginally miss or beat analyst forecasts" 64 : 2361-2388, 2009

      43 Tversky, A., "Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference- dependence model" 106 : 1039-1061, 1991

      44 Coulton, J., "Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management?" 45 : 553-576, 2005

      45 Xue, Y., "Information content of earnings management: Evidence from managing earnings to exceed thresholds" Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2005

      46 Diamond, D. W., "Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring" 51 : 393-414, 1984

      47 Petersen, M. A., "Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets : comparing approaches" 22 : 435-480, 2009

      48 Ball, R., "Earnings quality in UK private firms: Comparative loss recognition timeliness" 39 (39): 83-128, 2005

      49 Durtschi, C., "Earnings management? The shapes of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics are not evidence ipso facto" 43 : 557-592, 2005

      50 Dechow, P., "Earnings management: reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators" 14 : 232-250, 2000

      51 Payne, J. L., "Earnings management: The effect of ex ante earnings expectations" 15 (15): 371-392, 2000

      52 Degeorge, F., "Earnings management to exceed thresholds" 72 (72): 1-33, 1999

      53 Burgstahler, D., "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses" 24 : 99-126, 1997

      54 Roychowdhury, S., "Earnings management through real activities manipulation" 42 : 335-370, 2006

      55 Jones, J. J., "Earnings management during import relief investigations" 29 : 193-228, 1991

      56 Jacob, J., "Earnings management and accounting income aggregation" 43 : 369-390, 2007

      57 Kasznik, R., "Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices" 40 (40): 727-759, 2002

      58 Sohn. B. C., "Do auditors care about real earnings management in their audit fee decision?" City University of Hong Kong 2011

      59 Choi, J. H., "Do abnormally high audit fees impair audit quality" 29 (29): 115-140, 2010

      60 Dechow, P., "Detecting earnings management" 70 : 193-225, 1995

      61 Francis. J., "Costs of equity and earnings attributes" 79 : 967-1010, 2004

      62 Schipper, K., "Commentary on earnings management" 3 (3): 91-102, 1989

      63 Jiang, J., "Beating earnings benchmarks and the cost of debt" 83 (83): 377-416, 2008

      64 Dhaliwal, D. S., "Auditor fees and cost of debt" 23 (23): 1-22, 2008

      65 Pittman, J. A., "Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms" 37 (37): 113-136, 2004

      66 Ahmed, A. S., "Audit quality, alternative monitoring mechanism, and cost of capital: An empirical analysis" Texas A&M University 2008

      67 Caramanis, C., "Audit effort and earnings management" 45 : 116-138, 2008

      68 Coppens, L., "An analysis of earnings management by European private firms" 14 (14): 1-17, 2005

      69 Beaver, W., "An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distribution" Stanford University 2006

      70 Barua, A., "Accruals management to achieve earnings benchmarks: A comparison of pre-managed profit and loss firms" 33 (33): 653-670, 2006

      71 Bharath, S. T., "Accounting quality and debt contracting" 83 (83): 1-28, 2008

      72 Hand, R. M., "A test of the extended functional fixation hypothesis" 65 (65): 740-763, 1990

      73 Brown, L. D., "A temporal analysis of quarterly earnings thresholds: Propensities and valuation consequences" 80 (80): 423-440, 2005

      74 Brown, L. D., "A temporal analysis of earnings surprises: Profits vs. losses" 39 (39): 221-241, 2001

      75 Newey, W. K., "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix" 55 (55): 703-708, 1987

      76 Healy, M., "A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting" 13 (13): 365-383, 1999

      77 White, H., "A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscedasticity" 48 (48): 817-838, 1980

      78 박종일, "3분기말까지 누적소폭이익 기업의 연차보고이익 분포의 특성 -이익유연화를 중심으로-" 한국세무학회 12 (12): 229-264, 2011

      79 박종찬, "0을 전후로 한 이익의 비연속적 분포가 적자회피 이익조정의 결과인가?" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 255-285, 2008

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