지방공공재의 분권적 공급과 경제적 효율성에 관한 이론적 고찰 : 지방자치다체 간 슈타겔버그적 상호반응모델을 중심으로 = Economic Efficiency , and Decentralized Provision of a Local Public Good under Stackelberg Fiscal Interactions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper in vestigates whether strategically competing municipalities can ensure efficient provision of local public goods when they behave as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower. After providing the implications of equilibrium under the assumption of free mobility of consumers and a Stackelberg structure, this paper shows that municipalities acting as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower may over-provide or under-provide local public goods, that is, the efficiency in the provision of public goods is not guaranteed. A theory for testing the Tiebout hypothesis has been developed from the decision rules for both a leading and following municipalities. Efficiency would be obtained only if property value is invariant to the level of public service.