RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      Detecting code injection attacks at TLB miss

      한글로보기

      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T13541483

      • 0

        상세조회
      • 0

        다운로드
      서지정보 열기
      • 내보내기
      • 내책장담기
      • 공유하기
      • 오류접수

      부가정보

      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

      This paper presents a user transparent protection against binary code injection attacks. Code injection is a major vehicle for carrying out software attacks. Using the TLB (Translation Lookahead Buffer) that is usually split between data (D-TLB) and instructions (I-TLB) as found in modern processors, a simple protection can be developed based on an observation that activating an injected code causes I-TLB miss for a memory page modified by code injection. If program execution from a modified page is disallowed, injected code cannot start. However, such protection is of limited use unless the protection can handle legitimate runtime generated codes, which would trigger false-alarms due to the same translation trace as that of code injection attacks. Modern systems often utilize runtime-generated code for extensibility and flexibility. In order to prevent such false-alarms, the presented protection identifies the source of the code injected – from external I/O or not and refers to the privilege level of the process at runtime. This paper introduces a scheme that determines whether the code injected is legitimate. By identifying memory pages modified by external I/O operations, the scheme provides software transparent data execution prevention in processors with and without NX-bit support. The experimental results show that the proposed protection can detect all the code injection attacks tested on the two Linux operating systems out of the box and that the performance impact incurred by this protection is insignificant.
      번역하기

      This paper presents a user transparent protection against binary code injection attacks. Code injection is a major vehicle for carrying out software attacks. Using the TLB (Translation Lookahead Buffer) that is usually split between data (D-TLB) and i...

      This paper presents a user transparent protection against binary code injection attacks. Code injection is a major vehicle for carrying out software attacks. Using the TLB (Translation Lookahead Buffer) that is usually split between data (D-TLB) and instructions (I-TLB) as found in modern processors, a simple protection can be developed based on an observation that activating an injected code causes I-TLB miss for a memory page modified by code injection. If program execution from a modified page is disallowed, injected code cannot start. However, such protection is of limited use unless the protection can handle legitimate runtime generated codes, which would trigger false-alarms due to the same translation trace as that of code injection attacks. Modern systems often utilize runtime-generated code for extensibility and flexibility. In order to prevent such false-alarms, the presented protection identifies the source of the code injected – from external I/O or not and refers to the privilege level of the process at runtime. This paper introduces a scheme that determines whether the code injected is legitimate. By identifying memory pages modified by external I/O operations, the scheme provides software transparent data execution prevention in processors with and without NX-bit support. The experimental results show that the proposed protection can detect all the code injection attacks tested on the two Linux operating systems out of the box and that the performance impact incurred by this protection is insignificant.

      더보기

      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • 1 Introduction 1
      • 2 Background 5
      • 2.1 Code Injection Attack 5
      • 2.2 Related Works 6
      • 2.3 Address Translation and TLB 13
      • 1 Introduction 1
      • 2 Background 5
      • 2.1 Code Injection Attack 5
      • 2.2 Related Works 6
      • 2.3 Address Translation and TLB 13
      • 3 TLB Monitor 18
      • 3.1 Basic Idea 18
      • 3.2 Legitimate Code Injection 23
      • 3.3 Missing TLB entries 26
      • 3.4 With NX-bit support 28
      • 4 Evaluation 31
      • 4.1 Evaluation of the TLB-Mon's the Efficacy 31
      • 4.1.1 Simulation Environment 32
      • 4.1.2 Simulation Results 34
      • 4.2 Evaluation of the TLB-Mon's the Performance Impact 37
      • 4.2.1 Performance Factors 37
      • 4.2.2 Performance Impact 39
      • 5 Discussion 42
      • 6 Conclusion 47
      • A Testing and Evaluation of TLB-Mon with bochs 50
      더보기

      분석정보

      View

      상세정보조회

      0

      Usage

      원문다운로드

      0

      대출신청

      0

      복사신청

      0

      EDDS신청

      0

      동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

      더보기

      주제

      연도별 연구동향

      연도별 활용동향

      연관논문

      연구자 네트워크맵

      공동연구자 (7)

      유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

      이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

      나만을 위한 추천자료

      해외이동버튼