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    Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104854802

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    I investigate the relation between the structure of CEO compensation and the investment horizons of a firm’s institutional investors and find results consistent with the assertion that short-sighted institutions’ focus on shortterm earnings leads firms to grant more options with higher sensitivity to stock price. In contrast, the percentage holdings of long-term investors are negatively correlated with the use of options and the sensitivity of total CEO equity incentives to changes in stock price. Further results suggest that firms with higher short-term institutional ownership are more concerned about a negative earnings surprise and that when determining annual bonuses, they punish their CEOs more severely. In total, the analyses provide evidence that the investment horizon of institutional investors is associated with firms’ CEO compensation policies.
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    I investigate the relation between the structure of CEO compensation and the investment horizons of a firm’s institutional investors and find results consistent with the assertion that short-sighted institutions’ focus on shortterm earnings leads ...

    I investigate the relation between the structure of CEO compensation and the investment horizons of a firm’s institutional investors and find results consistent with the assertion that short-sighted institutions’ focus on shortterm earnings leads firms to grant more options with higher sensitivity to stock price. In contrast, the percentage holdings of long-term investors are negatively correlated with the use of options and the sensitivity of total CEO equity incentives to changes in stock price. Further results suggest that firms with higher short-term institutional ownership are more concerned about a negative earnings surprise and that when determining annual bonuses, they punish their CEOs more severely. In total, the analyses provide evidence that the investment horizon of institutional investors is associated with firms’ CEO compensation policies.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

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