트럼프 시대의 북한정책

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Obsessed by the lingering traumas of recent history -- the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the bombing of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York in 2011 -- the Trump administration is confronting the awesome challenge of dealing with the North Korean threat that it would hurl atomic bombs at targets at the continental United States. The US has exhausted all available means over nearly thirty years trying to check Pyongyang’s avowed goal of becoming a member of the world’s “nuclear club,” and is now haunted by the specter of a nuclear attack by North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, a 33-year old paranoid dictator.
Since his inauguration in January 2017, President Trump has announced one ‘Red Line’ -- North Korea’s test launch of an ICBM that could reach Washington, D.C. -- and is anticipating North Korea’s response to the Annual ROK-U.S. Joint Military Exercises, ‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Key Resolve.’ During this time, the argument for preemptive military attack as a last resort to check North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is gaining ground in the United States and elsewhere.
A surprise, surgical preemptive attack against four localities in North Korea by the United States with state-of-the-art non-nuclear precision weapons could disable the final phase of development of nuclear weapons by denying Pyongyang the ability to adapt warheads to delivery means. A preemptive attack would have difficulty being recognized as legitimate under the United Nations Charter since it requires UN Security Council concurrence as provided for in Article 42. However, the UN Charter has an escape clause -- Article 51 -- under which all UN member states are empowered with unrestricted “self-defense” in the case of aggression pending UNSC action under Article 42. While application of the right of “self-defense” under Article 51 to “preemptive strikes” may be subject to legal controversy, “preemptive strikes” have historical precedent.