How do strong actors set war aims against weak opponents? In asymmetric conflicts, the power differential often allows strong actors to be capable of setting a wide range of war aims, spanning from extraction of limited concessions to total victory. T...
How do strong actors set war aims against weak opponents? In asymmetric conflicts, the power differential often allows strong actors to be capable of setting a wide range of war aims, spanning from extraction of limited concessions to total victory. These war aims are integral to the war’s scale, duration, and termination prospect. I posit two necessary conditions that shape a strong actor's war aims. First, the prospect of intervention by the weak actor's patron determines the strong actor's perceived level of escalation risk. Second, the availability of friendly support for the strong actor affects the political and diplomatic capital it can leverage to pursue its aims. I conduct a comparative analysis of Vietnam's total war aim set against the Khmer Rouge in 1978 and China's limited war aim set against Vietnam in 1979, shedding light on the determinants of their war aims. This analysis contributes to the literature on war aims and asymmetric conflicts, thereby deepening our understanding about state’s choices in interstate conflict.