Dynamic policy games in economics : essays in honour of Piet Verheyen

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Foreword = ⅶ
• Preface = ⅸ
• List of Participants = xi
• INTRODUCTION / by Frederick van der Ploeg ; Aart J. de Zeeuw = 1
• TIME CONSISTENCY AND ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAMES / by Tamer Basar = 9
• Introduction = 9
• 1. Time Consistency and Robustness in Single-agent Dynamic Optimization = 11
• 1.1 Deterministic Systems = 11
• 1.1.1 Weak time consistency = 14
• 1.1.2 Strong time consistency = 19
• 1.1.3 Systems with lagged variables = 21
• 1.2 Stochastic Systems = 22
• 1.3 Robustness of Optimal Policies = 27
• 2. Non-cooperative Nash Equilibria in Dynamic Games = 32
• 2.1 Deterministic Games = 32
• 2.2 Stochastic Games = 38
• 2.3 Robust Equilibrium Solutions = 40
• 2.4 Other Ways of Eliminating Non-uniqueness = 43
• 3. Stackelberg Equilibria in Dynamic Games = 44
• 4. Time Consistency in Continuous-time Systems = 46
• 5. Concluding Remarks = 49
• SELF-ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS IN AN N-PLAYER DYNAMIC GAME / by Chaim Fershtman = 55
• Introduction = 55
• 1. Notation and Definitions = 58
• 2. Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston 1987) = 58
• 3. The Communications Game = 60
• 4. Acceptable Nash Equilibria = 62
• 5. Time Consistency and Other Dynamic Aspects = 65
• 6. Concluding Remark = 70
• A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC GAME THEORY MODEL OF AN ARMS RACE / by Michael D. Intriligator ; Dagobert L. Brito = 73
• 1. Arms Race Models versus Defence Decision-making = 73
• 2. The Arms Race = 75
• 3. Heuristic Decision Rules = 76
• 4. Planning and Revisions in Plans = 79
• 5. Sequence of Heuristic Games : the Case of Certainty = 81
• 6. The Case of Uncertainty = 83
• 7. Conclusions = 85
• CONFLICT OVER ARMS ACCUMULATION IN MARKET AND COMMAND ECONOMIES / by Frederick van der Ploeg Aart J. de Zeeuw = 91
• Introduction = 91
• 1. Optimal Dynamic Taxation and the Provision of Arms in a Market-oriented Economy = 94
• 2. The 'Guns versus Butter' Dilemma in a Command Economy = 99
• 3. Cooperative Behaviour = 101
• 4. Competitive Behaviour and the Arms Race = 102
• 4.1 Nash Equilibrium with Open-loop Information Sets = 103
• 4.2 The Subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium = 107
• 4.3 Threats as an Inducement of Cooperative Behaviour = 109
• 5. Consequences of Non-separable Preferences = 110
• 5.1 Nash Equilibrium with Open-loop Information Sets = 111
• 5.2 The Subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium = 113
• 6. Concluding Remarks = 115
• ON GAMES OF CAKE-EATING / by Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan, Jr = 121
• Introduction = 121
• 1. The Quality of Existence : Our Personal View = 123
• 2. Model Description = 130
• 3. Constant-elastic Utility and Linear Strategy = 136
• 3.1 The Two-stage Game Reformulation = 143
• 4. Share-preservation Strategies = 145
• 5. On Robustness = 148
• 6. Remarks on Information Structure = 151
• 7. Conclusion = 152
• GAINS AND LOSSES FROM CARTELIZATION IN MARKETS FOR EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES IN THE ABSENCE OF BINDING FUTURE CONTRACTS / by Alistair Ulph ; David Ulph = 157
• Introduction = 157
• 1. The Model and Equilibrium for Case 1 - Cartel Firms Cooperate and Binding Sales Contracts = 160
• 2. The Equilibrium for Case 2 - Cartel Firms Cooperate and No Binding Sales Contracts = 164
• 3. The Solution for Case 3 - Cartel Firms Non-cooperative and Binding Sales Contracts = 168
• 4. The Solution for Case 4 - Cartel Firms Non-cooperative and No Binding Sales Contracts = 172
• 5. Comparison of the Solutions in the Four Cases = 177
• 6. Conclusions = 180
• STRATEGIC WAGES POLICY AND THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION / by Stephen J. Turnovsky ; Marcelo Bianconi = 191
• Introduction = 191
• 1. The World Economy = 192
• 2. Strategic Wage Indexation under Flexible Exchange Rates = 196
• 2.1 Non-cooperative Behaviour = 198
• 2.2 Cooperative Equilibrium = 202
• 2.3 Comparison between the Cooperative and Non-cooperative Equilibria = 203
• 3. Optimal Strategic Wage Indexation under Fixed Exchange Rates = 207
• 3.1 Non-cooperative Behaviour = 208
• 3.2 Cooperative Equilibrium = 209
• 4. Numerical Analysis = 212
• 5. Monetary Policy as an Alternative = 217
• 6. Conclusion = 218
• OPTIMAL CHOICE OF MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN A SIMPLE TWO-COUNTRY GAME / by Matthew B. Canzoneri ; Dale W. Henderson = 223
• Introduction = 223
• 1. The Money Supply versus the Interest Rate = 225
• 1.1 A Simple Two-country Model = 225
• 1.2 The Two-country Game = 230
• 2. The Great Multiplicity of Potential Nash Solutions and Its Consequences = 232
• 3. Reducing the Multiplicity of Solutions = 233
• 3.1 Coordinating on Efficient Nash Solutions = 234
• 3.2 Restricting the Set of Instruments = 234
• 3.3 Adding Uncertainty = 236
• SERVICING THE PUBLIC DEBT : THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS / by Guillermo A. Calvo = 241
• Introduction = 241
• 1. Debt Repudiation = 244
• 2. Money and Non-indexed Debt = 250
• 3. International Debt : a Short Detour = 258
• 4. Concluding Remarks = 259
• MONETARY POLICY IN MODELS WITH CAPITAL / by Finn E. Kydland = 267
• Introduction = 267
• 1. Time Inconsistency and Monetary Policy = 269
• 1.1 The Inflation-Unemployment Example = 269
• 1.2 A Public-Finance Perspective = 272
• 2. Industry Equilibrium with Tax Policy = 273
• 3. Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium with Government Policy = 277
• 4. Optimizing Government = 282
• 5. Conclusion = 285
• MACROECONOMIC POLICY GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION : SOME EXTENSIONS / by John Driffill = 289
• Introduction = 289
• 1. Differing' Tastes : Two Types, Many Strategies = 293
• 2. Many Types = 302
• 3. Exogenous Uncertainty = 307
• 4. Conclusions = 315
• INDEX = 323