Using a dynamic panel data estimator for panel data from OECD countries, this study empirically analyzes the moderating and marginal effects of bureaucratic quality on the impact of the number of debt rules and national or supranational debt rule on g...
Using a dynamic panel data estimator for panel data from OECD countries, this study empirically analyzes the moderating and marginal effects of bureaucratic quality on the impact of the number of debt rules and national or supranational debt rule on general government debt and presents policy and academic implications. The number of debt rules, as moderated by bureaucratic quality, significantly reduces government debt. The average marginal effect of the number of debt rules on government debt indicates that higher levels of bureaucratic quality lead to a decrease in government debt. The national debt rule, as moderated by bureaucratic quality, significantly reduces government debt, with the average marginal effect of the national debt rule on government debt being a reduction in government debt when bureaucratic quality is high. This study suggests that the interaction effect between debt rules and bureaucratic quality on government debt is greater than their individual effects. Therefore, it is crucial to enhance the quality of the bureaucracy and strengthen the national debt rule. Furthermore, considering the strong path dependence of persistent increases in government debt, it is necessary to devise measures to reduce government debt and employ dynamic panel data estimators.