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    기업의 소송제기 공시에 대한 시장반응과 감사인의 대응 = The Response from Auditor and Market on Corporate Lawsuit Disclosures

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A100325483

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    The situation of a company facing a lawsuit due to a case in litigation serves as an unfavorable factor for a corporation. Therefore, it is expected that a case in litigation, once publicly disclosed, will have a negative impact. However, the filing of a lawsuit merely means that a lawsuit has just started, not that a company will necessarily have a financial loss because of the lawsuit. Once a lawsuit has been disclosed, it is difficult to anticipate whether the company will win or lose the lawsuit. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the lawsuit can be dismissed or that charges won``t be filed. So, the uncertainty the company faces often leads to an immediate response from market. Also, a lawsuit against a company is within the scope of a confirming audit, which analyzes the influence the lawsuit will have on a company, and it should be included in an audit opinion. The influence on the financial statement can also be figured out. This study has been conducted on companies, which were listed on the securities market from 2005 to 2010, in the case of their facing a lawsuit during the lawsuit disclosures(application). We manually collect data of lawsuit disclosures from Korea Investor``s Network for Disclosure System(KIND). To verify a hypothesis 1, we use a total of 527 firm-year observations, of which 303 firm-year sample faced defendant. Also, we separate the 303 firm-year sample into monetary lawsuits(N=123) and non-monetary(N=180) lawsuits if the firms announces the amount of lawsuits. For analyses, we used the cumulative abnormal return(CAR) measured by market model around the event day(=announcement of lawsuit disclosures) and the cumulative abnormal return measured by market adjusted model(MCAR). To verify a hypothesis 2, we use a total of 3,359 firm-year observations. Among them, 4.7 percent of firms(about 159 samples) are under lawsuit and 1 percent of firms(about 35 samples) had the respective lawsuits mentioned in the audit report. As a result of this study is that there is more likely to be a negative reaction from the market when the company with a lawsuit and was provoked from monetary lawsuits than to non-monetary lawsuits. In other words, it is interpreted that the market acutely responds to monetary lawsuits directly having an impact on the company value. Most of the non-monetary lawsuits are related to the right of management and the right of controlling a company, so it is expected that the direct and indirect costs from lawsuits and agent costs caused by the inefficiency from the dispute over management rights are unavoidable. But, when it comes to non-monetary lawsuits, it is difficult to estimate the influence of the visible loss and judgment on company value. Therefore, it is believed that they do not make immediate response and defer value judgment until the time of ruling on lawsuits. The response from auditors on corporate lawsuits showed conflicting results. Considering only the corporate lawsuits themselves, audit fees and audit efforts are increased. Auditors are much more willing to carry out performance audits when listed on the report of Auditors as a special case. However, as a result of analyzing both monetary lawsuits and non-monetary lawsuits divided from corporate lawsuits, active audit responses increasing audit fees and putting extra audit effort were found. Monetary lawsuits directly having an impact on financial statements, and inactive responses not merely giving lower audit fees but also not putting extra audit effort were found to non-monetary lawsuits And, it raises doubts about whether auditors severely underestimate non-monetary lawsuits which do not have an impact on financial statements but quite a little on a company. Prior studies report that audit risks are reflected in determining audit fees and audit hours. The studies measure audit risk mostly by financial variables collected from financial statement(for instance, leverage ratio) and the audit report(for instance, going-concern uncertainty opinion). Unlike prior studies, this study use a direct measure of audit risk, the litigation risk of client firms. The risk measured by three different variables: (1) the existence of litigation for the client firms, (2) classify the sample between monetary lawsuits and non-monetary lawsuits, (3) explanatory paragraph in audit report about the sue. This paper extends prior literature by examining client firms facing lawsuits instead of proxy measures. This study expects influence of disclosure policy according to lawsuit types to examine market effect. This study provide valuable insights to market participant, firms, regulators.
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    The situation of a company facing a lawsuit due to a case in litigation serves as an unfavorable factor for a corporation. Therefore, it is expected that a case in litigation, once publicly disclosed, will have a negative impact. However, the filing o...

    The situation of a company facing a lawsuit due to a case in litigation serves as an unfavorable factor for a corporation. Therefore, it is expected that a case in litigation, once publicly disclosed, will have a negative impact. However, the filing of a lawsuit merely means that a lawsuit has just started, not that a company will necessarily have a financial loss because of the lawsuit. Once a lawsuit has been disclosed, it is difficult to anticipate whether the company will win or lose the lawsuit. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the lawsuit can be dismissed or that charges won``t be filed. So, the uncertainty the company faces often leads to an immediate response from market. Also, a lawsuit against a company is within the scope of a confirming audit, which analyzes the influence the lawsuit will have on a company, and it should be included in an audit opinion. The influence on the financial statement can also be figured out. This study has been conducted on companies, which were listed on the securities market from 2005 to 2010, in the case of their facing a lawsuit during the lawsuit disclosures(application). We manually collect data of lawsuit disclosures from Korea Investor``s Network for Disclosure System(KIND). To verify a hypothesis 1, we use a total of 527 firm-year observations, of which 303 firm-year sample faced defendant. Also, we separate the 303 firm-year sample into monetary lawsuits(N=123) and non-monetary(N=180) lawsuits if the firms announces the amount of lawsuits. For analyses, we used the cumulative abnormal return(CAR) measured by market model around the event day(=announcement of lawsuit disclosures) and the cumulative abnormal return measured by market adjusted model(MCAR). To verify a hypothesis 2, we use a total of 3,359 firm-year observations. Among them, 4.7 percent of firms(about 159 samples) are under lawsuit and 1 percent of firms(about 35 samples) had the respective lawsuits mentioned in the audit report. As a result of this study is that there is more likely to be a negative reaction from the market when the company with a lawsuit and was provoked from monetary lawsuits than to non-monetary lawsuits. In other words, it is interpreted that the market acutely responds to monetary lawsuits directly having an impact on the company value. Most of the non-monetary lawsuits are related to the right of management and the right of controlling a company, so it is expected that the direct and indirect costs from lawsuits and agent costs caused by the inefficiency from the dispute over management rights are unavoidable. But, when it comes to non-monetary lawsuits, it is difficult to estimate the influence of the visible loss and judgment on company value. Therefore, it is believed that they do not make immediate response and defer value judgment until the time of ruling on lawsuits. The response from auditors on corporate lawsuits showed conflicting results. Considering only the corporate lawsuits themselves, audit fees and audit efforts are increased. Auditors are much more willing to carry out performance audits when listed on the report of Auditors as a special case. However, as a result of analyzing both monetary lawsuits and non-monetary lawsuits divided from corporate lawsuits, active audit responses increasing audit fees and putting extra audit effort were found. Monetary lawsuits directly having an impact on financial statements, and inactive responses not merely giving lower audit fees but also not putting extra audit effort were found to non-monetary lawsuits And, it raises doubts about whether auditors severely underestimate non-monetary lawsuits which do not have an impact on financial statements but quite a little on a company. Prior studies report that audit risks are reflected in determining audit fees and audit hours. The studies measure audit risk mostly by financial variables collected from financial statement(for instance, leverage ratio) and the audit report(for instance, going-concern uncertainty opinion). Unlike prior studies, this study use a direct measure of audit risk, the litigation risk of client firms. The risk measured by three different variables: (1) the existence of litigation for the client firms, (2) classify the sample between monetary lawsuits and non-monetary lawsuits, (3) explanatory paragraph in audit report about the sue. This paper extends prior literature by examining client firms facing lawsuits instead of proxy measures. This study expects influence of disclosure policy according to lawsuit types to examine market effect. This study provide valuable insights to market participant, firms, regulators.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 윤순석, "횡령 및 배임사건 공시기업의 시장반응과 이익조정" (하계) : 2010

    2 최종학, "피감사기업의 소송위험이 감사인의 감사보수 결정에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 54 (54): 343-380, 2012

    3 박종일, "피감사기업의 소송위험이 감사인의 감사노력에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 22 (22): 41-76, 2013

    4 최원욱, "집단소송제의 도입이 보수주의에 미친 영향 - 임원배상책임보험 가입 여부에 따라" 한국회계학회 20 (20): 225-258, 2011

    5 강내철, "지분법 감사위험이 감사보수와 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 18 (18): 35-56, 2009

    6 우용상, "지급보증이 감사보수 및 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (49) : 43-74, 2009

    7 권혜진, "증권집단소송법과 회계개혁법안의 도입이 이익조정수준에 미친 영향에 대한 연구" 한국공인회계사회 (52) : 163-195, 2010

    8 박종성, "증권관련 집단소송제 도입 이후 감사인의 보수성 변화" 한국회계학회 22 (22): 299-325, 2013

    9 정재현, "조세소송에 따른 주식시장반응" 한국조세연구포럼 11 (11): 140-167, 2011

    10 지현미, "소송위험이 감사시간과 감사인의 보수주의 성향에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (43) : 311-336, 2006

    1 윤순석, "횡령 및 배임사건 공시기업의 시장반응과 이익조정" (하계) : 2010

    2 최종학, "피감사기업의 소송위험이 감사인의 감사보수 결정에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 54 (54): 343-380, 2012

    3 박종일, "피감사기업의 소송위험이 감사인의 감사노력에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 22 (22): 41-76, 2013

    4 최원욱, "집단소송제의 도입이 보수주의에 미친 영향 - 임원배상책임보험 가입 여부에 따라" 한국회계학회 20 (20): 225-258, 2011

    5 강내철, "지분법 감사위험이 감사보수와 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 18 (18): 35-56, 2009

    6 우용상, "지급보증이 감사보수 및 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (49) : 43-74, 2009

    7 권혜진, "증권집단소송법과 회계개혁법안의 도입이 이익조정수준에 미친 영향에 대한 연구" 한국공인회계사회 (52) : 163-195, 2010

    8 박종성, "증권관련 집단소송제 도입 이후 감사인의 보수성 변화" 한국회계학회 22 (22): 299-325, 2013

    9 정재현, "조세소송에 따른 주식시장반응" 한국조세연구포럼 11 (11): 140-167, 2011

    10 지현미, "소송위험이 감사시간과 감사인의 보수주의 성향에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (43) : 311-336, 2006

    11 이경태, "소송위험이 감사보수에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 16 (16): 53-79, 2007

    12 조용언, "사전적 감사소송위험 및 담보위험과 감사품질" 한국회계정보학회 27 (27): 1-30, 2009

    13 이경태, "기업지배구조가 임원배상책임보험료에 미치는 영향- 외부전문가(보험사)에 의한 기업지배구조 평가" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 53-84, 2006

    14 박종일, "기업지배구조가 비정상 감사보수와 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국세무학회 12 (12): 191-227, 2011

    15 김광록, "기업의 소송위험에 대한 대응책에 관한 연구" 한국기업법학회 19 (19): 231-260, 2005

    16 강내철, "기업실패위험이 감사보수결정에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (41) : 219-239, 2005

    17 박종일, "기업소송과 자본비용" (동계) : 2012

    18 최관, "감사서비스의 생산과 피감사회사의 특성" 28 (28): 609-635, 1999

    19 Bhagat, S., "The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits" 27 (27): 5-27, 1998

    20 Simunic, D, "The Pricing of Audit Service : Theory and Evidence" 18 (18): 161-190, 1980

    21 Lennox, C., "The Informativeness of Earnings and Management's Issuance of Earnings Forecasts" 42 (42): 439-458, 2006

    22 Johnson, M., "The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms" 39 (39): 297-327, 2001

    23 Simunic, D., "The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit Pricing : A Review of The Economics and The Evidence" 15 (15): 119-134, 1996

    24 최종원, "The Effects of Potential Litigation Costs on Accounting Conservatism" 한국회계학회 33 (33): 229-260, 2008

    25 Koku, P., "The Effect of News on Initial Corporate Lawsuits" 53 (53): 49-55, 2001

    26 Johnson, M., "Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" 5 (5): 217-233, 2000

    27 Francis, J., "Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure" 32 (32): 137-164, 1994

    28 Barua, A., "SEC Enforcement Releases and Audit Fees" 28 (28): 161-177, 2013

    29 Dechow, P., "Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements" 28 (28): 17-82, 2011

    30 강선아, "Potential Litigation Risks and Accounting Choice: Evidence from Korea" 대한회계학회 15 (15): 219-249, 2010

    31 Zmijewski. M., "Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models" 22 : 59-82, 1984

    32 Kim, I., "Measuring Securities Litigation Risk" 53 (53): 290-310, 2012

    33 Venkataraman, R., "Litigation Risk, Audit Quality, and Audit Fees : Evidence from Initial Public Offerings" 83 (83): 1315-1345, 2008

    34 Seetharaman, A., "Litigation Risk on Audit Fees : Evidence from U. K. Firms Cross-Listed on U. S Markets" 33 (33): 91-115, 2002

    35 Beneish, M., "Incentives and Penalties related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate GAAP" 74 (74): 425-457, 1999

    36 Bonner, S., "Fraud Type and Auditor Litigation : An Analysis of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases" 73 (73): 503-532, 1998

    37 Hogan, C., "Financial statement fraud : insights from the academic literature" 27 (27): 231-252, 2008

    38 Skinner, D. J., "Earnings Disclosure and Stockholder Lawsuits" 23 (23): 249-282, 1997

    39 Francis, J., "Determinants and Outcomes in Class Action Securities Litigation" 1994

    40 Shu, S., "Clientele Effects and Legal Liability" 29 (29): 173-205, 2000

    41 Dechow, P., "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulations : An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC" 13 (13): 1-36, 1996

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