The Politics of the Kaesong Industrial Complex Products’ Rules of Origin in the Context of Korea’s FTAs with the U.S. and the EU = 개성공단 제품 원산지 규정의 정치 : 한미 및 한·EU 자유무역협정(FTA) 체결과정을 중심으로|RISS 상세보기

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This research aims to examine the reasons underlying the international discrepancies in the recognition of the rules of origin for outward processing of products originating from North Korea’s Kaesong Industrial Complex, following the implementation of the Korea-United States (U.S.) and the Korea-European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The study primarily concentrates on the cases of these FTAs, which were the first to establish the Committee on Outward Processing Zones, and scrutinizes in detail the motivations of a number of special interest groups among South Korea’s trade partners that successfully opposed their inclusion. This study contests the assumption that South Korea’s FTA negotiation counterparts regarded the Kaesong issue as a unique aspect of inter-Korean relations rather than as an economic aspect. During this period, the U.S. and the EU showed an increasing preference for FTAs, while various sectors showed growing opposition to unregulated imports from underdeveloped countries that paid low wages to workers. This research elucidates the significant role played by various government, civil society, and economic actors, including the U.S. Congress and interest groups, in opposing low-cost Kaesong textiles, the European Parliament and civil society emphasizing labor and human rights in trade negotiations, and Italian stakeholders striving to safeguard their national textile industry in shaping domestic decision-making and international negotiations. This thesis further explores the enduring factors contributing to the non-recognition of the rules of origin for outward processing and the continuing uncertain status of products originating from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a North Korean-based collaboration between North and South Korea.

번역하기

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 한미 및 한·EU 자유무역협정(FTA) 발효 이후 북한 개성공단 생산제품의 역외가공 원산지 규정의 인정 여부가 한국의 협상 상대국에 따라 국제적 찬성과 반대의 차이를 보이는 원인을 최초 ‘역외가공위원회’를 설립했던 한미, 한·EU FTA 사례를 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 한미 FTA 이전 한국은 싱가포르, EFTA, ASEAN, 인도, 페루와 FTA 협상을 체결하며 개성공단 역외가공을 인정받았다. 논문은 한미 FTA를 기점으로 한국의 FTA 협상 파트너들이 개성공단 문제를 경제 관점이 아닌 남북관계의 특수한 측면으로 다뤘다는 주장에 대해 의문을 제기한다. 이 시기에는 미국과 유럽 모두 FTA에 대한 선호도가 높아지면서 국내에서는 저임금 저개발국으로부터의 무분별한 수입에 대한 반대가 커지고 있었다. 연구는 개성의 값싼 섬유제품에 반대하는 미국 의회와 이익 단체, 무역 협상에서 노동과 인권을 강조하는 유럽 의회와 시민사회, 자국 섬유산업을 보호하려는 이탈리아 국내 이해관계자 등 다양한 정부 및 시민사회 그리고 경제 행위자들이 국내 의사결정과 국제 협상 과정에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지 주목한다. 연구는 또한 개성공단 제품의 역외가공 원산지 규정의 불인정과 지속적 불확실한 지위를 초래했던 요인들을 분석한다.

번역하기

본 연구는 한미 및 한·EU 자유무역협정(FTA) 발효 이후 북한 개성공단 생산제품의 역외가공 원산지 규정의 인정 여부가 한국의 협상 상대국에 따라 국제적 찬성과 반대의 차이를 보이는 원인�...

목차 (Table of Contents)

Abstract = ⅰ
Table of Contents = ⅲ
CHAPTER Ⅰ Introduction = 1
1. Research Purpose = 1
2. Review of Previous Research = 3

Abstract = ⅰ
Table of Contents = ⅲ
CHAPTER Ⅰ Introduction = 1
1. Research Purpose = 1
2. Review of Previous Research = 3
CHAPTER Ⅱ Research Methodology = 12
1. Methods Used, Why, and How = 12
2. Rationale behind the Use of the Empirical Approach = 17
CHAPTER Ⅲ Kaesong Industrial Complex and Korea FTAs = 21
1. Kaesong Industrial Complex = 21
1) Background = 21
2) History = 25
3) Political Aspects of the KIC: political confidence building and reunification = 32
4) Economic Aspects of the KIC = 34
2. North Korea's Stance on the KIC = 44
3. Korea's Position on the KIC = 51
1) Korea's FTA Strategies = 52
2) KIC in Korea's FTA Strategy = 57
3) Progress of the Committee on Outward Processing Zone on the Korean Peninsula = 63
4. Classification of the Korea FTAs = 68
1) Outward Processing Zones Under Korea FTAs = 68
2) Establishment a Committee on Outward Processing Zones Under Korea FTAs = 82
CHAPTER Ⅳ Korea-U.S. FTA = 90
1. U.S. Stance on the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 90
2. U.S. FTA Strategies = 92
1) U.S. FTA Before KORUS FTA = 92
2) Ratification by the U.S. Congress Before the KORUS FTA = 96
3) Case 1: U.S.-Israel FTA Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) = 99
3. U.S. Governance in FTAs = 102
1) U.S. Congress = 102
2) U.S. Executive Branch: USTR = 106
3) Case 2: U.S.-Singapore Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI) = 110
4. Progress of the KORUS FTA = 114
1) Negotiations: Key Controversial Issues = 114
2) Ratification: Analyzing the Determinants of Decision-Making Processes = 121
3) Voting Results: Relevance for the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 129
5. U.S. Civil Society and Interest Groups = 134
1) The Outlook of U.S. Civil Society on North Korea = 134
2) U.S. Civil Society and Interest Group Positions on the KORUS FTA = 138
3) U.S. Civil Society and Interest Group Pressure on Kaesong Industrial Complex = 146
6. U.S. Industry and Economic Considerations = 150
1) The Textile Industry in South Korea and the U.S. = 150
2) The U.S. Textile Industry’s View of the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 157
3) Impact on the Industry After the Negotiations = 159
7. Conclusion = 164
CHAPTER Ⅴ Korea-EU FTA = 167
1. EU Stance on the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 167
2. EU FTA Strategies = 169
1) EU FTA Before the Korea-EU FTA = 169
2) EU’s Trade Policy: Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism = 173
3) Case: EC-Israel Euro-Med Association Agreement = 179
3. Governance in EU Trade Policy = 181
1) Foreign Economic Policy-Making Mechanisms = 181
2) European Commission = 190
3) European Parliament and Interest Groups = 194
4. Progress of the Korea-EU FTA = 206
1) Negotiations: Key Controversial Issues = 206
2) Ratification: Analyzing the Determinants of Decision-Making Processes = 211
3) Voting Results: Relevance for the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 220
5. EU Civil Society and Interest Groups = 225
1) The Outlook of EU Civil Society on North Korea = 225
2) EU Civil Society and Interest Group Positions on the Korea- EU FTA = 231
3) EU Civil Society and Interest Group Pressure on the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 236
6. EU Industry and Economic Considerations = 242
1) The Textile Industry in South Korea and the EU = 242
2) The EU and Italy Textile Industry's View on the Kaesong Industrial Complex = 245
3) Impact on Industry After the Negotiations = 249
7. Conclusion = 252
CHAPTER Ⅵ Conclusion = 255
1. Review of the Argument = 255
2. Looking forward: Policy Implications = 260
Bibliography = 266
국문요약 = 303

참고문헌 (Reference)

1. NCTO-AFMA Merger., APN, http://m. apparelnews. c o. kr/news/news_view/?idx=88369, , 2018

2. Regionalism and Asia., Katzenstein, Peter, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 353-368, , 2000

3. The Truth Regarding CAFTA., Walters, Gregory, USTR. 23 June 2004 Washington Post.Senator’s objection Washington Post., , 2011

4. Kaesong Industrial Complex., Park, Sangchul, Vol. 3, , 2015

5. The Move Toward Free Trade Zones., Krugman, Paul, Vol. 76, pp. 5-25, , 1991

6. Interest Group Politics in America, Hrebenar, Ronald J, 3rd edition, , 1997

7. On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places., Starr, Harvey, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2013, pp. 433-439, , 2013

8. Issue of Korea-EU FTA: Rules of origin., Choi, Won-mok, Vol. 6, 2008, pp. 123-137, , 2008

9. AFL, breaking with UAW, opposes trade deal., Smith, Ben., https://www. politico. com/blogs/ben-smith/2010/12/afl-breaking-with-uaw-op poses-trade-deal-031324, , 2010

10. Das System der Politikentscheidung in der EU., Chang, Hwa-Jung, Vol. 21, No. 1, , 2011