This paper studies on exploring improvements on customer due diligence process in terms of anti-money laundering(AML), focusing on identifying beneficial ownership measures. It analyzes the difficulties faced by financial institutions identifying and ...
This paper studies on exploring improvements on customer due diligence process in terms of anti-money laundering(AML), focusing on identifying beneficial ownership measures. It analyzes the difficulties faced by financial institutions identifying and verifying beneficial ownership, thereby aiming to propose improvements in both institutional and operational aspects to ensure effective implementation of customer due diligence.
Beneficial ownership measures do not pose significant issues against individual customers as they conduct financial transactions under their real names. However, complex legal structures and other characteristics of entity customers make them susceptible to exploitation for money laundering activities.
Procedures for identifying beneficial owners of entity customers are described in the Act of Reporting and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information and its Enforcement Decree. However, if the largest shareholder identified in a step-by-step approach is another entity or if there are multiple individuals, the judgement of the beneficial owner is left to the discretion of financial institutions. Specific criteria and guidelines for identifying beneficial ownership in hierarchical organizational structures and others would help reduce discrepancies in procedures.
Alternative reliable documents could facilitate collecting up-to-date beneficial ownership information and evidential documents. Entities with tax obligations must report changes in shareholder information in a timely manner, and using such materials would enhance reliability of beneficial ownership information.
This study also considers benchmarking beneficial ownership registration systems used in foreign countries and exploring their potential implementation in South Korea. National Tax Service seems suitable for centrally managing beneficial owner information, and financial institutions would then more effectively allocate resources, based on a risk-based approach, to high-risk areas in AML.
Lastly, introduction of an information exchange system between financial institutions is also worth considering. Currently, sharing customers’ information among financial institutions is prohibited by law. However, if suspicious transaction information could be shared between institutions, while complying with the Personal Information Protection Act and the prohibition on disclosing suspicious transaction reports, it would not only improve the quality of suspicious transaction reports, but also contribute to the enhancement of the national anti-money laundering system.
As money laundering techniques continue to evolve in line with financial trends and regulatory changes, financial institutions must conduct on-going customer due diligences and fulfill obligations such as reporting suspicious transactions. And customer due diligence is the first step in anti-money laundering efforts, a base for identifying high-risk individuals, evaluating clients, and determining whether suspicious transactions should be reported. Particularly, the verification of beneficial owners is an area requiring both institutional and operational improvements, but sufficient research has not been conducted to date. With the fifth mutual evaluation scheduled for 2028, it is hoped that further active research will continue, leading to the development of concrete measures for verifying beneficial ownership that are better suited to South Korea’s specific circumstances.