Why counterinsurgency fails : the US in Iraq and Afghanistan

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• 1 How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq = 1
• Close, but Not to Be = 2
• The Hook : Iraq's Governance Assessment Team, March 2008 = 5
• Back in Washington : The Wrap-Up Briefing = 13
• 2 Reflections on Iraq, 2008 = 19
• Development, Iraq Style = 19
• What Can Outsiders Do When the Fighting Stops? = 21
• Were the Right People Doing Development in Iraq in the Right Way and in the Right Places? = 27
• Conflicting Time Horizons = 34
• Conflicting Constituencies = 34
• Inexperience-Or Wrong Experience = 35
• Accountability-Or a Lack Thereof = 35
• Can You Help Governments with Development if You Can't See Them? = 36
• What Does Iraq Tell Us about US Foreign Assistance? = 38
• The Big Takeaways from Iraq = 41
• 3 On to Afghanistan = 45
• The CENTCOM Assessment Team = 46
• What Sort of War in Afghanistan? = 48
• The 173rd Airborne Brigade Going to Afghanistan = 49
• Signing Up = 50
• Training at Hohcnfels, Germany = 50
• Caserma Ederle = 53
• Heading Downrange = 54
• Bagram, 1 December 2009 = 55
• Bagram, 2 December = 57
• Bagram, 3 December = 58
• Bagram, 4 December = 60
• Darulaman, 5 December = 61
• Kabul, 6 December = 62
• Shank, 6 December = 64
• Shank, 7 December = 65
• Darulaman, 8 December = 67
• Darulaman, 9 December = 70
• The Second Visit, March 2010 = 71
• Third Visit, May-June 2010 = 76
• Fourth Visit, July-August 2010 = 80
• Last Visit, September 2010 = 81
• 4 Reflections on Afghanistan = 85
• Why We Were in Afghanistan = 86
• What the United States Knew When It Went in, or Should Have Known... = 88
• …About Afghanistan = 88
• …About the Neighborhood = 90
• …About State-Building = 92
• …About Counter insurgency = 93
• What the United States Did in Afghanistan = 94
• A Brief History of the Buildup = 94
• The Money = 96
• How Aid to Afghanistan Stacks Up = 97
• In Afghanistan Stability Is the Aim, Governance the Game = 99
• The Vicious Cycle of Bypassing Local Government = 100
• What Should the United States Have Done? = 103
• Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan = 103
• Whole of Government-An Essential Concept = 104
• The National Solidarity Program : A Possible Afghan Civilian Parmer for Counterinsurgency = 105
• The People's Development Fund : A Capacity-Building Counterinsurgency Program That Works = 107
• The People's Development Fund : What It Is and What It Is Not = 107
• The Experience as of Late 2010 = 111
• Early Lessons = 114
• Annex : Questions and Answers for the People's Development Fund = 116
• 5 Postscript, 2018 : Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed = 121
• Why Did We Go to War in Iraq and Afghanistan! = 122
• Has My Mind Changed? = 123
• Update : Afghanistan = 123
• Update : Iraq = 124
• Insurgencies Versus Civil Wars = 124
• 2018 Lessons = 126
• Implications for the Counterinsurgency Manual = 127
• Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Now ISIS = 130
• International Development Work in Fragile States : Many of the Same Problems as in Counterinsurgency = 132
• References = 135
• Index = 139