In February 2016, the South Korean government completely shut down the Gaesong Industrial Complex (“GIC”), which had been operated since early 2000s as part of the inter-Korean economic cooperation. This was an economic sanction that the South Kor...
In February 2016, the South Korean government completely shut down the Gaesong Industrial Complex (“GIC”), which had been operated since early 2000s as part of the inter-Korean economic cooperation. This was an economic sanction that the South Korean government independently imposed with regard to the North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile tests. However, with an increased expectation for resumption of the GIC after a new administration took power in South Korea, more attention has been recently paid to how the sanctions against North Korea, which have been promulgated at the international level to date, would have an impact on the resumption.
The legal framework for such sanction comprises, among other authorities, a series of resolutions by the U.N. Security Council and independent sanctions by the U.S. government. The provisions of the U.N. Security Council that can affect the resumption of the GIC would be about, among other measures, (i) mandatory inspection of cargoes transferred between the two Koreas, (ii) prohibition on transfer of bulk cash into North Korea, (iii) prohibition on establishing a representative office of a financial institution in North Korea, and (iv) prohibition on financial support for trade with North Korea. In reviewing relevant U.N. Security Council’s resolutions, sanctions related to the first two categories were already contained in the resolutions passed before the shut-down of the GIC; and such sanctions have not become more stringent even after the shut-down. However, those passed after the shut-down seem to include stronger measures about a financial institution’s representative office and the financial support for trade with North Korea; accordingly, these measures are more likely to be obstacles to preparing various institutional devices necessary to resume and operate the GIC (e.g., the economic cooperation insurance for Korean companies in the GIC, etc.).
On the other hand, since the Bush administration, various independent sanctions against North Korea have been imposed by the U.S. through a series of executive orders, regulations, and congress legislation (such as North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016). However, such sanctions were applicable only to those within the U.S. jurisdiction; therefore, these are less likely to affect the resumption of the GIC.
Under the circumstances, to fully reopen the GIC, it seems necessary for the South Korean government (with clear understanding on the legal framework of the international sanctions against North Korea) to seek a consensus at an international level that the GIC has important implications for peace and economic cooperation in the Korean peninsula. Also, the South Korean government should attempt to seek approval from the North Korea Sanction Committee in the U.N. Security Council concerning financial support for trade with North Korea and/or establishment of a bank office, both of which would be required in order to resume and operate the GIC.