Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology has given great vitality to the discipline of sociobiology. The work in this field ranges across a wide range of species. Some of the most interesting work in sociobiology deals with the question of whether particular...
Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology has given great vitality to the discipline of sociobiology. The work in this field ranges across a wide range of species. Some of the most interesting work in sociobiology deals with the question of whether particular species are selfish or altruistic. To some extent disagreements among professionals with respect to this question depend upon their definitions of selfishness or the test or experimental conditions they establish in order to elicit what they define as selfish or altruistic responses. Unfortunately, a radical wing of this discipline, which is exemplified by Richard Dawkins, treats its findings with a philosophical looseness that may damage the entire discipline. Dawkins, in brief, essentially argues that animals are merely vehicles for the perpetuation of genes. It is the ruthless selfishness of these genes according to this exposition, that allows them to survive in a ruthlessly competitive world. In a reductionist fit, Dawkins then argues that because the genes are selfish the individual is also selfish.
Most sociobiologists would reject the equation of individual selfishness with gene perpetuation. Many, however, would accept the argument that evolution does perpetuate genetic structure and that the individual primarily is a vehicle in this process.
In either the radical form exposited by Dawkins or the more modest form that has substantially more support, these propositions primarily impose a metatheoretical position upon evidence, for individual accounts of particular evolutionary patterns cannot sustain them. We will demonstrate how both the stronger and weaker forms of this position misuse language and how they fail to take account of the existing framework of knowledge.