태평양전쟁기 이승만-중경임시정부의 관계와 연대 강화 = Strengthened Partnership between Syngman Rhee and Korea Provisional Government (KOPOGO) during the Pacific War period

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Syngman Rhee was spelled from his KOPOGO presidency in 1925 by the Korean Congress. In 1941, he was elected as the chief of the Korean Commission(KORIC), which was the sub-organ of Diplomatic Department, KOPOGO and in charge of the diplomatic mission in United States. After then, he had a very close relations with the key members of KOPOGO, especially with Kim Koo. The recovery and strengthened partnership with KOPOGO was one of his major political assets for his political success after returning to Korea. He returned to Seoul as an Commissioner of KORIC, but he pretended to represent the whole KOPOGO for some time because KOPOGO was then in China.
He became the Commissioner of KORIC by the decision of United Korean Committee(UKC) that was an united body of whole Korean people lived in U.S. mainland and Hawaii for the cause of Korean independence. His diplomatic mission was to get the allied power's diplomatic approval of KOPOGO and military aid according to the Lend Lease Act. He had done his best but did not get the diplomatic approval. Then he turned his diplomatic efforts to anti-Soviet and anti-communist agitation. Also he blamed the U.S. Department of State and Chinese government for their assistance to the Russian plot to take whole Korean peninsula. It was so called Yalta conspiracy argument by Syngman Rhee during the San Francisco Conference for United Nations. It was against the will and hope of KOPOGO which eagerly wanted the approval of Allied Powers.
Kim Koo and key leaders of KOPOGO thought Syngman Rhee had some influence within U.S. military and intelligence fields, because his followers and U.S. agencies like C.O.I and O.S.S. field units appeared at Chungking several times in 1942 and used military communications channels for Chungking-Washington D.C. communication. So KOPOGO overestimated Syngman Rhee's military and diplomatic ability and believed his lobbying activity to win the U.S. government and congress support.
The critical dispute was arisen between Syngman Rhee and UKC for the control over the Koreans in U.S. In 1944, KOPOGO instructed the UKC and Koreans in U.S. to reorganize the KORIC according to the will of majority. But KOPOGO rejected the decision by the majority because Syngman Rhee did not participated. Then the Korean society in U.S. was utterly disrupted, but KOPOGO decided to support Synman Rhee side. KOPOGO choose Syngman Rhee instead of UKC and Korean society in U.S.
Syngman Rhee's wartime diplomatic activities brought KOPOGO unwanted results, i.e., the decline of support from Korean society in U.S., and negative recognition to KOPOGO by the allied powers. It was an misfortune to KOPOGO. But Syngman Rhee got his backers and followers in U.S. military and intelligence fields because of his anti-Soviet and anti-communist agitation as well as the title of key members of KOPOGO. It was happened during the early 1940s and gave us a clue for the myth of Syngman Rhee's sudden political success after Korean liberation.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 머리말
• Ⅱ. 이승만과 임정의 관계회복
• Ⅲ. 이승만의 대미외교와 임정 연대
• Ⅳ. 이승만-재미한인사회의 갈등과 임정의 선택
• Ⅴ. 맺음말
• 〈ABSTRACT〉