정치적 과정을 통한 소득재분배정책과 중산층의 전략적 선택

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 Shughart, Tollison, and Yan(2002) 및 Lupu and Pontusson(2011)의 실증연구 결과에 근거하여 소득불평등 완화를 위한 재분배정책에 대한 여러 소득계층들의 정치적이며 전략적인 대응을 정치경제학적 시각에서 분석한다. Bernhem and Whinston(1986) 및 Grossman and Helpman(1994)의 공동대리인모형에 기초하여 각 소득계층들의 이익집단 정치참여에 따라 결정되는 균형 소득세율을 중간 소득계층의 가능한 전략 선택에 초점을 맞추어 분석하였다. 본 연구에서는 소득 세율 결정과정에서 중간소득계층의 세율 0 하에서의 노동소득이 모든 소득계층의 세전 가중평균 노동소득보다 작은 경우(저소득계층의 세율 0 하에서의 노동소득에 가까운 경우), 두 계층의 협력을 통하여 정책입안자에게 정치적 영향력을 행사하는 것이 중간소득계층의 최선의 선택인 반면, 세전 가중평균 노동소득보다 큰 경우(고소득계층에 상대적으로 가까운 경우)에는 고소득계층과 협력하거나 독자적으로 정치적 영향력을 행사하는 전략이 무차별한 것으로 분석되었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes from a political economy perspective the political and strategic responses of diverse income classes to income redistribution policies pursued to alleviate social inequality according to implications presented by empirical studies such as those of Shughart, Tollison, and Yan(2002) as well as Lupu and Pontusson(2011). The study focuses on the possible strategic choices that can be made by the middle class for the balanced income tax rate decided through the political participation of each income class interest group based on the common agency model of Grossman and Helpman(1994). This study analyzes that when the labor income before taxation of the middle class is smaller than the weighted average of the labor income before taxation of all income classes (when closer to the labor income of the low class before taxation), the two classes cooperating to exercise political influence on policy makers is the best choice for the middle class during decision-making of its income tax rate. On the other hand, when it is greater than the weighted average of the labor income before taxation of all classes (relatively closer to the labor income of the high class), taking the strategy of either cooperating with the high class or independently exercising political influence is indifferent.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 기본 모형
• Ⅲ. 정치경제학적 모형 : 내생적 소득세율의 결정과정에서의 이익집단 정치
• Ⅳ. 요약 및 결어
• 참고문헌
• [Abstract]

참고문헌 (Reference)

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