Emotion, fiction and rationality : cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The focus of this dissertation is on the rationality of emotion directed toward fiction. The launch of the cognitive theory of emotion in philosophy of mind and in psychology provides us with a way to show how emotion is not, by nature, opposed to reason and rationality. However, problems still remain with respect to emotion directed toward fiction, because we are emotionally involved with a story about people that do not exist and events that did not happen. This is called the paradox of fiction.
The current debate in relation to emotion and fiction in aesthetics revolves around the paradox of fiction. I believe that the paradox of fiction consists of two different problems: an explicatory problem and a classificatory problem. The former concerns how we apprehend fiction if we do not believe that what is described in fiction happened, while the latter concerns the problem concerning if our emotional responses toward fiction do not require belief of the relevant sort, how should we classify them? examine four theories on the first issue: the make-believe theory, the simulation theory, the revisionist theory, and the thought theory. I believe that the revisionist theory and the thought theory provide us with the most plausible view on how we apprehend fiction. For the latter issue, I divide cognitivism in general into two different kinds: narrow cognitivism and broad cognitivism. I defend broad cognitivism anginst narrow cognitivism.
However, I believe that cognitivism in general falls short of giving a full account of emotion directed toward fiction, since it neglects the role of non-representational features of fiction in arousing emotion in the reader. In this regard, I attempt to go beyond cognitivism. Last, I examine how we can attribute rationality to emotion directed toward fiction, gi that not all emotional responses are accompanied by cognition, strictly called. By discussing various warranting conditions, I try to show how emotions can be warranted not only in terms of their cognitive component, but also in terms of the perceptual element involved in emotion.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Contents = i
• Acknowledgements = iii
• Abstract = v
• Introduction = 1
• Chapter One Psychology and Aesthetics = 6
• 1. Relation between Empirical Science and Philosophy = 8
• 2. Apsychological Aesthetics = 14
• 3. Theories of Emotion = 21
• 4. Psychology and Aesthetics = 35
• Chapter Two The Paradox of Fiction = 41
• 1. The Make-Believe Theory = 44
• 1.1. Make-Believe Game = 44
• 1.2. Make-Believe Games of Children, Make-Believe Game of the Viewer = 48
• 1.3. Imagination de se and the Concept of "I" = 54
• 2. Simulation Theory = 65
• 3.Revisionist Theory and the Thought Theory = 74
• Chapter Three: Classificatory Problem of Emotion: Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism = 94
• 1. Are we really afraid of slime? = 95
• 2. Noncognitivism: Independence of Emotion from Cognition = 109
• Chapter Four: Emotion and Warrant = 130
• 1. General Warrant = 132
• 1.1. Cognitive Warrant = 132
• 1.2. Perceptual Warrant = 144
• 2. Aesthetic Warrant = 153
• 2.1. The Real-Life Principle = 154
• 2.2. A Correspondence Model = 157
• 2.3. A Functional Model = 162
• Conclusion = 176
• Bibliography = 185