Since Bartley intr˘oduced comprehensively critical rationalism in The retreat to commitment there have been three lines of attack leveled against it. Only one type of rebuttal has come from the few justificationists who bothered to read the book: One...
Since Bartley intr˘oduced comprehensively critical rationalism in The retreat to commitment there have been three lines of attack leveled against it. Only one type of rebuttal has come from the few justificationists who bothered to read the book: One or another attempt and justificational, and thus revives what Bartley called comprehensive rationalism. Trigg's attempt to specify an "absolute" foundation in the framework of language, and thus to avoid the tu quoque, is representative. Such attempts are interesting only in their ingenuity at disguising the problem of induction under the verbiage of conventionalism. Far more interesting are the attacks on CCR from Popperian (and allegedly nonjustificational) authors. Here there are two quite different lines of attack, one "logical" and one practical. The logical line of attack attempts to prove (in rigorous fashion appropriate to logic and mathematics) that CCR is not self-consistent, or that it is hopelessly paradoxical in some fashion. Watkins, Post and Derksen are representative of this strategy. Another attack ,usually alluded to in short but scoffing remarks, claims that CCR(although perhaps trivially tenable from a logical point of view) is so vague as to be useless in practical affairs. While Watkins (and seemingly Popper) resort to this on occasion it was the primary thrust of Lakatos' disparagement of CCR.