Association between Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance in Iran

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Purpose Considering corporate companies that are continually growing and bearing in mind the theory of agency, how confident can stakeholders be about their benefits in relation to managers’decisions? Previous research has indicated that the type of corporate governance can have an effective impact on companies’ performance. The current study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange.
Research Design, Data, and Methodology Through use of the correlation coefficient, the results indicate a positive correlation among the percentage of common stock held by board members, the percentage of non-executive board members, and separation of the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and managing director.
Results Based on the return on assets index, only the correlation between the proportion of ownership of the managing director and financial investment company ownership is significant.
Conclusion Managers can potentially make decisions that –benefit themselves but are detrimental to shareholders' interests.
Corporate governance is a factor that can mitigate agency costs. Corporate governance comprises the laws, regulations,structures, processes, cultures, and systems that lead to the achievement of objectives such as accountability, transparency,justice, and stakeholders' rights.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 Moody-Stewart, M., "itigating the effects of the global financial crisis on Africa: the role of governance and sustainable development" 2009

2 Postma, T., "Top management team and board attributes and firm performance in the Netherlands"

3 Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency cists and Ownership Structure" 3 : 305-360, 1976

4 Tesaia, H., "The Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Casino Firm Performance" 26 : 517-530, 2007

5 Yermack, D., "Remuneration retention and reputation incentives for outside directors" 59 : 2281-2308, 2004

6 Cho, M. H., "Ownership Structure, Investment and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis" 47 : 103-121, 1998

7 Demsetz, H., "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance" 7 : 209-233, 2001

8 Fosberg, R., "Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring" 20 (20): 24-32, 1989

9 Beni, L., "Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak" 2004

10 Morck, R., "Management Ownership and Market Valuation" 20 : 293-315, 1988

11 Loderer, C., "Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces" 45 : 223-255, 1997

12 Faccio, M., "Do Occupational Pension Funds Monitor Companies in which they Hold Large Stakes?" 6 : 71-110, 2000

13 Dehaene, A., "Corporate performance and board structure in Belgian companies" 34 : 73-88, 2001

14 Bhagat, S., "Corporate governance and firm performance" 14 : 257-273, 2008

15 Baysinger, B., "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition" 1 (1): 101-124, 1985

16 Mallin, C. A., "Corporate Governance" Oxford University Press 2007

17 Lefort, F., "Board independence, firm performance and ownership concentration : Evidence from Chile" 61 : 615-622, 2008

18 Chidambaran, N. K., "Board Monitoring and Firm Risk" 2005

19 Coles, J., "An examination of the relationship of governance mechanisms to performance" 27 : 23-50, 2001

20 Shleifer, A., "A survey of Corporate Governance" 52 : 737-783, 1997