Fiscal decentralization has a great impact on efficiency and governance in the public sector. According to fiscal federalism theory, fiscal decentralization may improve economic efficiency, cost efficiency, accountability, and resource mobilization(Bi...
Fiscal decentralization has a great impact on efficiency and governance in the public sector. According to fiscal federalism theory, fiscal decentralization may improve economic efficiency, cost efficiency, accountability, and resource mobilization(Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998), and may also increase transparency and decrease corruption(Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003).
At the same time, some argue that fiscal decentralization may lead to negative results. Only developed countries provide successful examples of economic growth due to fiscal decentralization, while developing countries provide negative examples of macroeconomic instability due to fiscal decentralization(Davoodi and Zou, 1998). Prud`homme(1995) has suggested that fiscal decentralization is not a panacea but a potent drug. He explains that fiscal decentralization has the desired salutary effect when prescribed for the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment and in the correct dose. However, in the wrong circumstances, it can harm rather than heal.
The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the public sector with five dependent variables: government effectiveness, government size, economic growth, corruption, and regional imbalance. This study utilizes two analytical methods. First, a variety of time-series regression techniques are used with a multi-year dataset of 20 countries including developed and developing ones, in an effort to assess its impact on five dependent variables.
Second, a case-study method is used to describe important fiscal decentralization policies which have taken place in 13 countries.
Major findings from the statistical analyses are as follows. For developed countries, the government budget size and economic growth rate increase as fiscal decentralization proceeds. For developing countries, the government budget size increases as fiscal decentralization proceeds, and the degree of corruption and regional imbalance worsen as fiscal decentralization proceeds. One implication from the current findings is that fiscal decentralization does not always result in desirable effects, and rule of law plays an important role in implementing fiscal decentralization policies.
Major findings from the case study are as follows. First, ambiguous and unprepared decentralization reforms are not successful, especially in traditionally centralized countries. Second, fiscal decentralization reforms with certain political intentions do not result in fiscal decentralization. Third, every country does not pursue fiscal decentralization.
Since fiscal decentralization is an effective means to reinforce local autonomy, it should be achieved to a certain degree. However, pursuing such policy without careful consideration has higher costs than benefits. Therefore, policy implications for Korean decision-makers are as follows. First, the rule of law should precede fiscal decentralization.
Second, it should be remembered that fiscal decentralization can have either positive or negative results. Third, the capacity of local governments should be increased. Lastly, responsibility for local expenditure should be clearly defined.