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    비상장기업에서 실제 이익조정이 타인자본비용과 미래 경영성과에 미치는 영향

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of real earnings managements (hereafter, REM) on cost of debt and future performance measured as earnings and cash flows from operations in non-listed companies. In addition, this paper examines a relative effect of REM and AEM (accruals-based earnings managements) on cost of debt and future performance, collectively. Earnings management can be classified into two categories: accruals-based earnings management and real activity manipulation. AEM involves within-GAAP accounting choices that try to obscure or mask true economic performance. Schipper (1989) defines AEM as purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with a view to obtaining private gain for stockholders or managers. REM is defined as management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury 2006, 336). REM occurs when managers undertake actions that change the timing or structuring of an operation, investment, and/or financing transaction in an effort to influence the output of the accounting system. Specifically, these abnormal real activities distort not only the fundamentals of the business but also the quality of reported earnings, and thus increase information asymmetries between managers and outside investors with respect to a firm`s true earnings performance. This increases information risk, and creates an adverse selection problem, on the part of outside investors. Rational debt-holders therefore demand a premium for bearing this REM-related information risk, which in turn leads us to observe a positive relation between the intensity of REM and the cost of debt. Given the scarcity of evidence on the above issue, we are motivated to test whether REM is an additional factor which increases information risk, and thus the association between the intensity of REM and the cost of equity is positive, even after controlling for the cost of debt effect of AEM and other firm-specific risk factors including size, debt ratio, and growth ratio. Meanwhile, prior research provides limited evidence that REM has a negative impact on subsequent operating performance (Gunny 2005; Xu 2007; Leggett et al. 2009; Gunny 2010). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that REM is costly and directly reduces firm value. Cohen et al. (2008) state REM is likely to be more costly to shareholders than AEM. The Graham et al. (2005) indicates managers think all companies should use REM to manage earnings as long as the real sacrifices are not too large. We examine whether the value implications are different depending on the type of earnings management employed REM and AEM. Further, we examine the extent to which REM and AEM affects subsequent operating performance. We expect that all else being equal, REM and AEM negatively affect future operating performance. In particular, a negative impact is greater for REM activities than for AEM activities. To do this, we measure REM using Roychowdhury (2006)`s method, three type of real earnings management are considered : unusually large sales discounts to boost earnings temporarily; overproduction in order to lower the cost of goods sold; and abnormal cuts in discretionary expenses (including advertising expenses and selling, general and administrative expenses) to boost earnings, and AEM using ROA performance-adjusted discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005)`s method. For a dependent variable, cost of debt is estimated as a average value from three variables of borrowing yield spread. The borrowing yield spread is calculated as deducting a 3-year treasury bond from loan interest rate. Observations of this paper are 40,216 firm-years in non-listed companies which are not listed in Korea security market from 2004 to 2009. Findings of this paper are following. First, this paper finds a positive relationship between a abnormal cash flows from operations,
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    The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of real earnings managements (hereafter, REM) on cost of debt and future performance measured as earnings and cash flows from operations in non-listed companies. In addition, this paper examines a...

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of real earnings managements (hereafter, REM) on cost of debt and future performance measured as earnings and cash flows from operations in non-listed companies. In addition, this paper examines a relative effect of REM and AEM (accruals-based earnings managements) on cost of debt and future performance, collectively. Earnings management can be classified into two categories: accruals-based earnings management and real activity manipulation. AEM involves within-GAAP accounting choices that try to obscure or mask true economic performance. Schipper (1989) defines AEM as purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with a view to obtaining private gain for stockholders or managers. REM is defined as management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury 2006, 336). REM occurs when managers undertake actions that change the timing or structuring of an operation, investment, and/or financing transaction in an effort to influence the output of the accounting system. Specifically, these abnormal real activities distort not only the fundamentals of the business but also the quality of reported earnings, and thus increase information asymmetries between managers and outside investors with respect to a firm`s true earnings performance. This increases information risk, and creates an adverse selection problem, on the part of outside investors. Rational debt-holders therefore demand a premium for bearing this REM-related information risk, which in turn leads us to observe a positive relation between the intensity of REM and the cost of debt. Given the scarcity of evidence on the above issue, we are motivated to test whether REM is an additional factor which increases information risk, and thus the association between the intensity of REM and the cost of equity is positive, even after controlling for the cost of debt effect of AEM and other firm-specific risk factors including size, debt ratio, and growth ratio. Meanwhile, prior research provides limited evidence that REM has a negative impact on subsequent operating performance (Gunny 2005; Xu 2007; Leggett et al. 2009; Gunny 2010). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that REM is costly and directly reduces firm value. Cohen et al. (2008) state REM is likely to be more costly to shareholders than AEM. The Graham et al. (2005) indicates managers think all companies should use REM to manage earnings as long as the real sacrifices are not too large. We examine whether the value implications are different depending on the type of earnings management employed REM and AEM. Further, we examine the extent to which REM and AEM affects subsequent operating performance. We expect that all else being equal, REM and AEM negatively affect future operating performance. In particular, a negative impact is greater for REM activities than for AEM activities. To do this, we measure REM using Roychowdhury (2006)`s method, three type of real earnings management are considered : unusually large sales discounts to boost earnings temporarily; overproduction in order to lower the cost of goods sold; and abnormal cuts in discretionary expenses (including advertising expenses and selling, general and administrative expenses) to boost earnings, and AEM using ROA performance-adjusted discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. (2005)`s method. For a dependent variable, cost of debt is estimated as a average value from three variables of borrowing yield spread. The borrowing yield spread is calculated as deducting a 3-year treasury bond from loan interest rate. Observations of this paper are 40,216 firm-years in non-listed companies which are not listed in Korea security market from 2004 to 2009. Findings of this paper are following. First, this paper finds a positive relationship between a abnormal cash flows from operations,

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

    2 김지홍, "실제 이익조정이 장기 경영성과에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 34 (34): 31-70, 2009

    3 김진배, "실제 영업활동을 통한 이익조정과 시장반응" 한국경영학회 38 (38): 1185-1211, 2009

    4 이화득, "산업별 실제 이익조정 수단과 미래 경영성과의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국세무학회 11 (11): 69-94, 2010

    5 최종서, "비상장 중소기업의 발생액 및 실물활동을 통한 이익조정실태" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 37-76, 2010

    6 김확열, "감사보수가 재무제표 보수성과 자본비용에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 10 (10): 81-111, 2010

    7 Gunny,K, "What are the consequences of real earnings management? Working paper" University of California at Berkeley 2005

    8 Gebhardt, W., "Toward an implied cost of capital" 39 : 135-176, 2001

    9 Gunny,K, "The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmark" 27 (27): 855-888, 2010

    10 Dechow, P. M., "The relation between earnings and cash flows" 25 : 133-168, 1998

    1 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

    2 김지홍, "실제 이익조정이 장기 경영성과에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 34 (34): 31-70, 2009

    3 김진배, "실제 영업활동을 통한 이익조정과 시장반응" 한국경영학회 38 (38): 1185-1211, 2009

    4 이화득, "산업별 실제 이익조정 수단과 미래 경영성과의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국세무학회 11 (11): 69-94, 2010

    5 최종서, "비상장 중소기업의 발생액 및 실물활동을 통한 이익조정실태" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 37-76, 2010

    6 김확열, "감사보수가 재무제표 보수성과 자본비용에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 10 (10): 81-111, 2010

    7 Gunny,K, "What are the consequences of real earnings management? Working paper" University of California at Berkeley 2005

    8 Gebhardt, W., "Toward an implied cost of capital" 39 : 135-176, 2001

    9 Gunny,K, "The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmark" 27 (27): 855-888, 2010

    10 Dechow, P. M., "The relation between earnings and cash flows" 25 : 133-168, 1998

    11 Francis, J., "The market pricing of accruals quality" 39 (39): 295-327, 2005

    12 Graham, J. R., "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting" 40 : 3-73, 2005

    13 Subramanyam,K.R, "The Pricing of discretionary accruals" 22 : 249-281, 1996

    14 Fama, E. F, "Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns" 50 : 131-155, 1995

    15 Kim, J. B, "Real versus accrual-based earnings management and implied cost of equity capital. Working paper" City University of Hong Kong 2009

    16 Leggett , D., "Real earnings management and subsequent operating performance. Working paper" University of Alabama 2009

    17 Ge, W, "Real earnings management and cost of debt. Working paper" City University of Manitoba 2010

    18 Cohen, D., "Real and accrual-based earnings management in the Pre and Post-Sarbanes Oxley periods" 82 (82): 757-787, 2008

    19 Bhattacharya, S, "Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and research incentives" 4 : 328-357, 1995

    20 Kothari, S. P., "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures" 39 : 163-197, 2005

    21 Kasznik,R, "On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management" 37 : 57-81, 1999

    22 Gode, D, "Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner model" 8 : 399-431, 2003

    23 Diamond,D.W, "Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring" 51 : 393-414, 1984

    24 Zang,A, "Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accruals manipulation. Working paper" Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 2007

    25 Petersen,M.A, "Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing approaches" 22 : 435-480, 2009

    26 Claus, J, "Equity premia as low as three percent? Evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts for domestic and international stock markets" 56 : 1629-1666, 2001

    27 Ewert, R, "Economic effects of tightening accounting standards to restrict earnings management" 80 : 1101-1124, 2005

    28 Roychowdhury,S, "Earnings management through real activities manipulation" 42 : 335-370, 2006

    29 Kim, J. B., "Earnings management through real Activities and Bank loan contracting. Working paper" City University of Hong Kong 2010

    30 Jones,J.J, "Earnings management during import relief investigations" 29 : 193-228, 1991

    31 Prevost, A. K., "Earnings management and the cost of debt. Working paper" Ohio University 2008

    32 Sloan,R.G, "Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings" 71 (71): 289-315, 1996

    33 Ashbaugh, H., "Do Non-Audit Services Compromise Auditor Independence" 78 : 611-639, 2003

    34 Kim, B. H., "Debt covenant slack and real earnings management. Working paper" American University 2010

    35 Francis, J., "Costs of equity and earnings attributes" 79 (79): 967-1010, 2004

    36 Xu,R, "Consequences of REM to meet analyst earnings forecasts on subsequent operating performance" University of Alabama 2007

    37 Ahmed, A. S., "Audit quality, alternative monitoring mechanism, and cost of capital: An empirical analysis. Working Paper" Texas A&M University 2008

    38 Easton, P, "An evaluation of accounting-based measures of expected returns" 80 : 501-538, 2005

    39 Cohen, D, "Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings" 50 (50): 2-19, 2010

    40 Bharath, S. T., "Accounting quality and debt contracting" 83 (83): 1-28, 2008

    41 Hand,R.M, "A test of the extended functional fixation hypothesis" 65 (65): 740-763, 1990

    42 Newey, W. K., "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix" 55 (55): 703-708, 1987

    43 Guay, W. R., "A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models" 34 (34): 83-115, 1996

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