Development of banking law in the greater China area : PRC and Taiwan

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = ⅴ
• Acknowledgements = ⅶ
• Table of contents = ⅸ
• Legislation = xix
• Cases cited = xxv
• Abbreviations = xxvii
• Introduction = xxix
• Chapter One: THE INTERNATIONALISATION AND LIBERALISATION OF BANKING, AND SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS AS THE CORE VALUE OF BANKING LAW
• Ⅰ. Internationalisation = 1
• Ⅱ. Liberalisation = 4
• Ⅲ. Recent examples of the ongoing trend toward 'internationalisation' and 'liberalisation' = 6
• A. US Enforcement of Free Trade = 6
• B. The Efforts of OECD to Carry Out Liberalisation = 7
• C. The Contributions of the Basle Committee = 9
• D. GATT Uruguay Round and the Establishment of GATS = 9
• E. European Community and Completion of its 1992 Programme = 10
• 1. The Community in the 1992 Initiative = 11
• 2. The Second Banking Directive = 11
• F. Impact of External Internationalisation on Chinese Economic Circle = 14
• 1. Vulnerability to the Pressure of Special 301 and Super 301 = 14
• 2. World Trade Organization Membership = 15
• 3. Increased Contacts with European Union = 17
• 4. Direct Investment in South-east Asia = 17
• 5. Major Domestic Development Plans = 18
• G. Liberalisation through Innovation = 19
• Ⅳ. Introduction to the nature of 'core value' = 20
• Ⅴ. 'Core Value' in Banking Laws in the Western World' = 21
• A. 'Prudence' as Core Value of UK Banking Law = 21
• 1. Lombard Street's Success = 21
• 2. Prudential Supervision by the Bank of England = 22
• 3. 'Prudence' as the Core Value of the Banking Act 1979 = 23
• 4. Improvement of the Core Value Framework = 24
• (a) Self-Regulation Versus Statutory Supervision = 25
• (b) The Prudential Safety Net under the Banking Act 1987 = 26
• (1) Capital Adequacy = 26
• (2) Adequate liquidity = 27
• (3) Adequate Provisions = 28
• (4) Adequate Accounting Records and Internal Controls = 28
• (5) General Prudent Conduct = 28
• (c) Reinforced Discretionary Power = 29
• (d) Remedial Procedures for the Abuse of Discretion = 30
• B. 'Safety and Soundness' within the US Banking System = 32
• C. 'Prudential Supervision' in Basle Committee and EU Banking Laws = 41
• 1. Second Banking Directive Prudential-Related Provisions = 42
• 2. Ancillary Prudential Directives = 42
• Ⅵ. Summary Observations = 43
• Chapter Two: THE PRE-1912 PERIOD OF CHINESE BANKING: FAILURE TO RECOGNISE A CORE VALUE
• Ⅰ. Banks in China before 1912 = 45
• A. Concept of 'Law' in Traditional China = 45
• B. Traditional Banks in China = 47
• 1. Piao Hao = 47
• 2. Chien Chuang = 49
• Ⅱ. Foreign Banks = 51
• A. Foreign Concessions and Extraterrioriality = 51
• B. Expansion of Foreign Banks in China = 53
• 1. British Banks in China = 53
• 2. Banks of Other Nationality in China = 54
• C. Domination of Foreign Banks in China = 55
• 1. Issuance of Bank Notes = 55
• 2. Control of Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange = 56
• 3. Control of the Chinese Financial Structure = 57
• 4. Control of Chinese Savings = 58
• 5. Acting as Government Agent to Exploit the Resources = 58
• Ⅲ. Three Major Financial Crises before 1912 = 59
• A. Bad Debt Crisis in 1883 = 59
• B. Note Discount Crisis in 1897 = 60
• C. Rubber Boom Crisis in 1910 = 61
• Ⅳ. Banking Reform during the Ching Dynasty = 64
• A. Establishment of the Imperial Bank of China = 65
• B. Emergence of Chinese Government-owned Banks = 67
• 1. Establishment of Hu Pu Bank = 67
• 2. Establishment of Bank of Communications = 67
• C. The First Banking Law-General Banking Statute = 68
• Chapter Three: THE 1912-1949 PERIOD OF CHINESE BANKING: CONTINUING FAILURE TO RECOGNISE A CORE VALUE
• Ⅰ. Banking Development in Peking Government Era = 71
• A. Foreign Bank Dominance and Abuse of Banks (1912-1916) = 71
• B. Banking Developments in the Warlords Era (1916-1928) = 73
• 1. Trust-Exchange Crisis and Rise of the Trust Company in 1921 = 73
• 2. Bond Market Speculation = 75
• 3. General Banking Law of 1924 = 76
• 4. Continued Dominance of Foreign Banks = 76
• Ⅱ. National Government Period (1928-1949) = 77
• A. Central Bank of China and Financial Autonomy - 77
• B. Banking Law of 1931 = 78
• C. Speculative Practice in Shanghai (1937-1945) = 80
• 1. Foreign Exchange Speculation (1937-1941) = 80
• 2. Encouragement of Speculation by Japan = 80
• D. Gold Crisis in 1947 = 81
• E. The Banking Law of 1947 = 82
• F. National Government's Hatred of Private Banks = 83
• Ⅲ. Summary Observations = 84
• Chapter Four: THE 1949-1989 PERIOD OF CHINESE BANKING IN TAIWAN: LOSS OF CHANCE TO RECOGNISE A CORE VALUE
• Ⅰ. Structure of the Banking System in Taiwan in the pre-1895 Era = 87
• Ⅱ. The Banking System in Taiwan under Japanese Control = 88
• A. The Establishment of a Western-style Banking System = 88
• B. Establishment of the Fringe Banking Industry = 90
• 1. Emergence of the Credit Cooperative Society = 90
• 2. Evolution of Credit Departments = 91
• 3. The Rise of the Mutual Loans and Savings Association Industry = 91
• Ⅲ. Establishment of a Provincial Banking System after the Japanese Surrender = 92
• A. Bank of Taiwan and New Taiwan Dollar = 93
• B. Land Bank of Taiwan = 94
• C. First Commercial Bank of Taiwan = 94
• D. Chang Hua Commercial Bank = 94
• E. Hua Nan Commercial Bank = 94
• F. Cooperative Bank of Taiwan = 95
• G. Small and Medium Business Bank of Taiwan = 95
• Ⅳ. Reactivation of the Government Banks of Taiwan = 95
• A. The Restoration of the Central Bank of China = 96
• B. The Reinforcement of the Government Banking System = 96
• 1. Central Trust of China = 97
• 2. Bank of Communications = 97
• 3. The Bank of China = 97
• 4. The Farmers Bank of China = 98
• Ⅴ. Fringe Banking Crises in 1966-1972 = 98
• A. Readjustment of the Credit Cooperative Industry = 98
• B. Recurring Failures of the Credit Cooperative Industry = 99
• 1. Eighth Credit Crisis = 99
• 2. Banana Scandal = 100
• C. Enhancement of Supervision over the Credit Cooperative Industry = 101
• D. Constitutional Disputes over Supervisory Rights = 102
• Ⅵ. Insider Lending Crises in the 1980s = 103
• A. Insider Lending Episodes = 104
• 1. Asia Trust Crisis = 104
• 2. Tenth Credit Crisis = 107
• 3. Cathay Trust Crisis = 113
• 4. Overseas Chinese Trust Crisis = 116
• B. Legal Framework to Prevent Insider Lending = 116
• C. Limitation of Investment Power of Trust Company = 118
• D. Crisis Management Power versur Risk Preventive Power = 118
• 1. Increase of Crisis Management Power = 118
• 2. Is Article 62 a Risk Preventive Power? = 119
• 3. Necessity for Wide Discretionary Power-Reflections from the BCCI Scandal = 120
• Ⅶ. The Underground Investment Company Crises = 122
• A. Investment Rash = 122
• B. Too Big to Fail? = 123
• C. Amendment of ROC Banking Law in 1989 = 125
• D. Epilogue = 126
• Ⅷ. Summary Observations = 127
• Chapter Five: THE COMING ERA OF INTERNATIONALISATION AND LIBERALISATION IN TAIWAN AFTER 1989
• Ⅰ. Moving towards Financial Internationalisation = 130
• A. ACCT Recommendations of 1985 = 131
• B. ACCT Proposals of 1987 = 132
• 1. Saving and Trust Licences = 132
• 2. Removal of Discriminatory Restrictions = 133
• (a) Deposit Ceilings = 133
• (b) Restriction of Additional Branches = 133
• (c) Credit Limit = 134
• (d) Restriction on ATM Networks = 134
• 3. Market Development = 135
• C. ROC Banking Law Amendment in 1989 = 136
• 1. Significant Amendments towards Internationalisation and Liberalisation = 137
• (a) Scope of Business = 137
• (b) Financing Bonds = 138
• (c) Interest Rate Control = 138
• (d) Capital Adequacy = 139
• (e) Delegation to the MOF = 139
• 2. Remaining Issues Unaddressed in the Amendment of 1989 = 141
• (a) Deposit Ceiling = 141
• (b) Branches = 141
• (c) Single Customer Credit Exposure = 142
• (d) Access to Short-Term Market = 142
• D. US Bank Memorandum in 1991 = 142
• 1. Additional Branches = 143
• 2. Deposit Ceiling = 144
• 3. Credit Limit on Single Customers = 145
• 4. Operational Support for Credit Card = 146
• 5. Dealing in Short-Term Money Market Instruments = 146
• E. Impacts of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury's Visit to Taiwan = 146
• 1. Fall's Comments on Taiwan = 146
• 2. Increase of Credit Limit on Single Customers = 147
• 3. Amendment of ROC Banking Law in 1992 = 147
• (a) New Financial Products = 147
• (b) ATMs = 148
• (c) Securities Investments = 148
• (d) Corrective Measures = 148
• 4. Further Liberalisation of Establishment Criteria = 149
• 5. MOF Rulemaking = 149
• Ⅱ. The Liberalisation of Government-owned Banks = 150
• A. The Bureaucratic of Control of the Government-owned Banks = 151
• B. Legal Infrastructure of the Bureaucratic Control = 153
• 1. The 'Good Administrator's Statutory Standard' = 153
• 2. 'Public Official Status' = 154
• 3. 'Bad Debt Treatment' = 155
• 4. Profit Target = 156
• 5. Lack of Employee Incentives = 156
• 6. Political Influence = 156
• C. Growth of Underground Money Market = 157
• D. Temporary Relief under the ROPUMS = 158
• E. Privatisation of Government-Owned Banks = 161
• F. Overcoming a Constitutional Barrier = 163
• Ⅲ. Establishment of New Private Commercial Banks = 165
• Ⅳ. Summary Observations = 167
• Chapter Six: POST-1949 BANKING DEVELOPMENT OF MAINLAND CHINA
• Ⅰ. Banking Industry Under Communism from 1949 to 1978 = 169
• A. Establishment of People's Bank of China as 'Monobank' = 170
• B. Transformation of the Private Banking Industry = 172
• C. Treatment of Foreign Banks = 174
• Ⅱ. Banking Reform from 1978 to 1993 = 175
• A. Specialisation of the PBC as the Central Ban = 176
• B. Establishment of a Specialised Banking System = 177
• 1. The Bank of China = 177
• 2. The Agricultural Bank of China = 179
• 3. The People's Construction Bank of China = 180
• 4. The Industrial and Commerce Bank of China = 180
• 5. The China Investment Bank = 181
• 6. The Export-Import Bank of China = 181
• C. Establishment of Other Financial Institutions = 182
• 1. Establishment of Trust and Investment Companies = 182
• (a) The China International Trust and Investment Corp = 182
• (b) Other Trust and Investment Companies = 183
• (c) The Interim Regulations on Administration of Financial Trust and Investment Institutions = 183
• (1) Ordinary Trust and Investment Company = 184
• (2) Renminbi Trust and Investment Company = 184
• (3) Foreign Exchange Trust and Investment Company = 184
• 2. System of Rural Credit Cooperative Societies = 184
• 3. System of Urban Credit Cooperative Societies = 186
• 4. Other Financial Institutions Approved by the PBC = 186
• (a) The Bank of Communications = 186
• (b) Regional Banking System = 188
• (c) Notice on Enhancement of Administration of Newly Established Banks = 188
• D. Foreign Banks = 189
• 1. Regulations on Administration of Foreign Banks in Special Economic Zones of 1985 = 190
• (a) Establishment Procedure = 190
• (b) Business Scope = 191
• (c) Lending Limit and Investment Ceiling = 191
• (d) Disciplinary Power = 192
• 2. Rules on Administration of Foreign and Joint Venture Financial Institutions in Shangai of 1990 = 192
• (a) Establishment Procedure = 192
• (b) Business Scope = 193
• (1) Business Scope for Foreign Banks = 193
• (2) Business Scope for Other Foreign Financial Institutions = 194
• (c) Safety and Soundness Requirements = 195
• (d) Supervision and Inspection = 196
• 3. Rules on Administration of Foreign Bank Representative Office of 1991 = 196
• (a) Establishment Procedures = 196
• (b) Business Scope = 197
• (c) Officers = 197
• (d) Supervision = 198
• Ⅲ. Banking Reconstruction after 1994 = 198
• A. Regulations on Adminstration of Financial Institutions = 199
• 1. Definition of Financial Institution = 199
• 2. Establishment Procedures = 200
• 3. Termination of a Financial Institution = 201
• B. Law of People's Bank of China = 202
• 1. The PBC as the Central Bank = 203
• 2. PBC as Banking Supervisor = 203
• 3. Disciplinary Power and Judicial Relief = 204
• C. Commercial Banking Law = 205
• 1. Definition of 'Commercial Bank' = 205
• 2. Business Scope = 206
• 3. Establishment Procedures = 206
• 4. Protection of Depositors = 207
• 5. Management of Assets and Liabilities Ratios = 208
• 6. Restrictions on Loans to Related Persons = 209
• 7. Supervisory Administration of Commercial Banks = 209
• 8. Risk Preventive Power = 210
• 9. Anti-Corruption Provisions = 210
• Ⅳ. Summary Observations = 211
• Chapter Seven: CRITIQUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD' FOR AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALISATION AND LIBERALISATION IN THE CHINESE ECONOMIC CIRCLE
• Ⅰ. Taiwan's Status = 214
• A. The Government's Agenda for the Six-year National Reconstruction Plan = 214
• B. Criteria for a Regional Financial Centre = 215
• 1. Fundamental Criteria = 217
• 2. Special Criteria = 217
• C. Evaluations, Critiques and Recommendations of Fundamental Criteria = 218
• 1. Political Stability = 218
• (a) Governmental Position = 218
• (b) Evaluations = 218
• (c) Recommendations = 220
• 2. No Obvious External Threat of Invasion = 220
• (a) Governmental Position = 220
• (b) Evaluations = 220
• (c) Recommendations = 221
• 3. Main Service Area Influenced by Economic Strength = 222
• (a) Governmental Position = 222
• (b) Evaluations = 223
• (c) Recommendations = 223
• 4. Well-established Communication Networks = 224
• (a) Governmental Position = 224
• (b) Evaluations = 225
• (c) Recommendations = 226
• 5. Well-developed Legal System = 226
• (a) Governmental Position = 227
• (b) Evaluations = 227
• (c) Recommendations = 229
• 6. Sound Accounting System = 229
• (a) Governmental Position = 230
• (b) Evaluations = 230
• (c) Recommendations = 230
• 7. High-Calibre Workforce = 231
• (a) Governmental Position = 231
• (b) Evaluations = 231
• (c) Recommendations = 231
• 8. Level of Tax Incidents = 232
• (a) Governmental Position = 232
• (b) Evaluations = 232
• (c) Recommendations = 233
• 9. Reasonable Rental for Business Premises = 233
• (a) Governmental Position = 233
• (b) Evaluations = 234
• (c) Recommendations = 234
• D. Evaluation with Critiques and Recommendations of the Liberalised Financial Market = 234
• 1. Governmental Position = 235
• (a)Release of Interest Control = 235
• (b) Release of Control on Foreign Exchange Rate = 235
• (c) Free Movement of Capital = 236
• (d) Establishment of Foreign Currency Call Loan Market = 236
• (e) Removal of Deposit Ceiling from Foreign Banks = 238
• (f) Permission for Security Underwriting = 238
• 2. Evaluations = 238
• (a) Incomplete Release of Interest Control = 238
• (b) Unwilling Release of Conversion Rate Control = 239
• (c) Forced Free Movement of Capital = 239
• (d) 'Hot Money' Episode in the Foreign Exchange Market = 240
• (1) FX Liability Ceiling = 240
• (2) Calculation of Positions = 241
• (3) Position Limits = 241
• (e) Collapse of Deposit Ceiling Defence = 242
• (f) Accommodation Responsibility of Host Government = 243
• 3. Recommendations = 244
• (a) Clarification of CBC's Control over Interest Rates = 245
• (b) Liberalisation of Entry Requirements = 245
• (c) Liberalisation of Foreign Exchange Restrictions = 246
• (d) Liberalisation of Security Subsidiary = 247
• E. Evaluation with Critiques and Recommendations of Sound Financial Regulatory Framework = 248
• 1. Governmental Position = 248
• 2. Evaluations and Recommendations = 249
• (a) Transparency of the Formation Process = 249
• (b) Standardisation and Simplification of Bank Regulation and Supervision = 252
• (c) Wide Discretionary Risk Preventive Power = 256
• (d) Safeguard for Abuse of Discretionary Powers = 258
• Ⅱ. Concluding observation = 261
• Epilogue = 263
• Selected bibliography = 265
• Index = 293