탈세의 동태이론모형과 정책 시사점 = Dynamic Models of Tax Evasion and Policy Implications

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The analytic literature on tax evasion mostly focuses on the static framework and abstracts noneconomic factors including psychological aspects. Supplementing such shortcomings, this paper analyzes tax evasion decision of heterogeneous taxpayers regarding tax morale and practice based on comparative statics, steady state equilibria, and phase lines from two-period models. Several conclusions of the standard static models with a representative taxpayer are modified as follows. ➀ Tightening enforcement in one period alone may encourage cheating in the other period due to the intertemporal substitution effect and the income effect. ② As the time preference (discount factor) inversely affects tax compliance, tighter liquidity constraints induce tax evasion. ③ In a steady state, the proportion of tax evaders is composed of taxpayers at two extremes alone: those who never cheat and those who always cheat. It declines with an increase in nonmonetary costs of tax evasion, penalties, and the intensity of monitoring. ④ The minimum penalty to achieve full compliance in a steady state diminishes with the audit probability at a decreasing rate and vice versa. Hence, a mixed bundle of the two measures is desirable as long as both are costly. ⑤ The possibility of multiple stable equilibria in the spread of tax evasion arises due to externalities generated through psychic disutility of tax evasion. As a result, a modest policy change could not reverse the situation once positioned at either equilibrium and a temporary overshooting or big-bang policy is required to get out of the social trap, which contradicts to the conclusion drawn without externalities.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

탈세에 관한 이론적인 선행연구는 탈세의 동태적 측면과 납세의무자의 이질성을 소홀히 다룬다. 따라서 이 논문은 2기 동태모형을 기초로 소득 원천이나 도덕성 등이 이질적인 납세의무자의 탈세 의사결정을 비교정학과 ‘정상상태’의 균형에 의해 분석했다. 분석결과 정책시사점은 다음과 같다. ➀ 대표적인 납세의무자의 동태모형에서는 어느 한 시기에 정책수단을 강화하면 탈세를 억지하지만, 시제 대체효과와 소득효과로 인해 다른 시기의 탈세를 부추길 수 있다. 정상상태에서 탈세 수준은 유일한 안정균형으로 수렴하기 때문이다. ② 할인요소는 탈세를 억지한다. 곧 ‘유동성 제약’이 빠듯할수록 탈세 유혹을 강하게 느끼므로 자본시장 발전이 탈세 억지에 도움이 된다. ③ 정직성 수준이 이질적인 납세의무자는 정상상태에서 늘 탈세하거나 언제나 성실 납세하는 2가지 극단 유형으로만 구성된다. 아울러 탈세의 심리적 비용, 벌칙과 세무조사확률이 각각 증가할수록 탈세는 감소할 가능성이 높다. ④ 탈세를 척결할 수 있는 최소한의 적발확률 또는 벌칙은 다른 정책수단이 강화될수록 감소할 뿐만 아니라 감소 속도도 체감하므로 일벌백계보다 적당한 벌칙과 적발확률의 조합이 탈세 억지에 더 효과적이다. ⑤ 납세의무자의 정직성 차이, 사회적 탈세수준의 외부성 및 규범 중성화 과정을 반영한 동태모형에서는 탈세가 만연하거나 반대로 거의 없는 복수의 안정균형이 나타날 수 있다. 그러므로 대표적인 납세의무자 모형과 달리, 특정 부문 또는 시기 등에 탈세가 만연한 경우 일시적인 강경책이 효과를 거둘 수 있다.

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