This study analyzes and typifies the international cooperation and internal reforms revealed in the power sector development processes of Southeast Asian transition countries - Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar - based on the power sector development mo...
This study analyzes and typifies the international cooperation and internal reforms revealed in the power sector development processes of Southeast Asian transition countries - Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar - based on the power sector development model after the transition of the regime. The implications for North Korea are derived from this analysis. The development of the power sector has a significant impact on economic development after the transition of the regime. The speed of power sector development in major transition countries varies externally depending on the direction of international cooperation with each country after the transition of the regime, the method and scale of specific procurement funds, and the degree of technology transfer. Internally, it changes through the release of existing monopoly areas through power regulations, the introduction of market mechanisms through power market reforms, and various forms of private participation in each value chain.
After the transition of the regime, transition countries strive to secure funds through multiple methods such as multilateral ODA, bilateral ODA, and FDI and to utilize various technical supports in the process of normalizing foreign relations for power development. They also seek ways to respond to the demand for power quantity in a short period through project development based on domestic and international private participation and work to stabilize electricity rates.
Vietnam secured funds for power sector development in the former way and Cambodia supplemented urgent funds and power quantity through the latter's expansion of private participation. Since the Doi Moi in 1986, Vietnam has been developing power under state leadership and initially selected Japan as a strategic ODA partner, receiving the necessary funds and technology for power development and actively inducing international cooperation. Through this, Vietnam successfully increased its power generation by carrying out phased projects such as the construction of the Phu My Power Plant.
After the lifting of the U.S. embargo in 1992, Cambodia faced limitations in early international cooperation due to unstable political situations, such as the prohibition of U.S. aid again in 1997. This led to delays in drafting initial power development plans due to delayed financial support and power technology. Myanmar, following its regime transition in 1988, struggled to meet its rapidly increasing power demand within its poor social and economic foundation, but was limited in attracting ODA support in the power sector due to economic sanctions. Consequently, investments in generation and transmission and distribution were delayed, failing to effectively improve the power situation.
Transition countries, alongside international cooperation, also aim to increase the efficiency of power development through internal reforms. They restructured existing monopoly state-owned power entities, reflecting market mechanisms in calculating electricity tariffs, and established power markets. These countries amended laws and regulations to facilitate private participation and carried out BOT contracts with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to procure the infrastructure construction funds needed to meet the rapidly increasing power demand.
Vietnam, through continuous internal reforms, established power regulatory agencies and carried out vertical and horizontal restructuring, progressively reforming power transactions into single-buyer and retail-wholesale markets. It also identified private cooperation projects based on sustainable finances, steadily increasing power generation, achieving the highest per capita power usage among the three countries, applying appropriate electricity tariffs, and is regarded as the most successful power development case.
In Cambodia, during the early stages of regime transition, a situation emerged where small-scale private independent power producers using imported diesel and heavy oil as self-generation materials proliferated without the central government establishing an integrated power grid. The state-owned power company did not restructure the production part of the power and still maintained a vertically integrated model. To respond to the power demand in rural areas and the outskirts of cities where national power grid supply was difficult, participation of small local power supply companies was encouraged. As a result, the fragmented power network by private power producers was substantially integrated, but the country still faces a national power shortage, and citizens bear very high electricity costs.
Myanmar, since before the regime transition, restructured its monopolistic state-owned power enterprise and introduced a single-buyer model in the power market. However, without an independent regulatory agency and intentional reduction in electricity tariffs, it created a challenging situation for private power projects to secure profitability. Consequently, private participation projects were not actively developed, failing to achieve a cyclical increase in power generation, and the country still experiences a severe power shortage.
It is generally predicted that North Korea's regime transition will follow the path of 'Vietnamese-style reform and opening up', and the power sector is also expected to follow the Vietnamese development model. However, according to the typification analysis of this study, it cannot be asserted that North Korea will necessarily achieve successful power development through international cooperation and internal reforms similar to Vietnam. Instead, there is a possibility that power development in North Korea may proceed in a manner similar to Cambodia or Myanmar, showing less notable results.
Specifically, if a regime transition occurs, North Korea has the option of moving away from its current form of very limited cooperation with some countries, actively utilizing multilateral ODA, bilateral ODA, and establishing strategic bilateral ODA partnerships for financial and technical support through stable management of foreign relations. However, due to variables in foreign relations and regime instability, international collaboration in power sector development may be delayed, and if this prolongation occurs, the progress of mid-to-long-term power development could be inevitably limited. The form of North Korea's power market has remained a monopoly model controlled by party agencies, and if the establishment of supervisory agencies is delayed or these agencies function only formally as in Myanmar, it cannot be asserted that they will function independently to maintain production costs in electricity tariffs. Additionally, in terms of reforming the power trading market after the regime transition, it is hard to rule out the possibility that a limited vertical integration model, similar to Cambodia, will be maintained for a significant period to preserve the North Korean government's control over the power sector.
North Korea is likely to supplement its current basic foreign investment laws and private sector participation regulations to address its initial power demand, aiming to expand power supply in a short period by inducing private sector participation in generation, transmission, and distribution, similar to Cambodia's case. Further, if cyclical power development is delayed due to uncertainties in international cooperation and internal reforms, the North Korean government might transfer the obligation of power supply to local enterprise-style power operators or allow entrepreneurs with acquired rights to actively enter the power sector to meet the sudden demand. However, for such private participation to be sustainable, a power tariff system based on market mechanisms, rather than state-controlled power prices, needs to be established, and this will require significant time and the maturity of internal reforms mentioned earlier.
In summary, the development of the power sector in North Korea is more likely to follow the Cambodian model, which relies on private participation due to limited international cooperation and failure in active restructuring of the power sector and establishment of supervisory agencies, rather than the Vietnamese model with successful international cooperation and cyclical internal reforms. Moreover, if the establishment of a power tariff system based on market mechanisms is delayed in North Korea, active private sector participation may be lukewarm, leading to very low levels of power development achievements similar to Myanmar.
Based on these analysis results, this study identifies the options and reform paths for stakeholders in North Korea's power sector and derives various power sector cooperation issues under the premise of political agreements between North and South Korea. Through the development and successful execution of pilot projects, the experience of joint power development can mature, leading to pragmatic outcomes such as the establishment of an inter-Korean cooperation system and the advancement of economic cooperation.