인간의 협조적 행위와 강한 상호성에 대한 문헌연구 = A Survey on Human Cooperative Behavior and Strong Reciprocity

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 강한 상호성을 둘러싼 여러 가지 논쟁들을 소개하고 있다. 강한 상호성 가설은 여러 실험 결과들을 토대로 인간이 이기적 선호 외에도 타인을 고려한 선호를 갖고 있다고 주장한다. 그리고 강한 상호성 가설은 집단선별과 유전자-문화 공진화를 통해서 사회적 선호의 진화적 기원을 설명하고 있다. 그러나 실험실에서 나타나는 협조적 행위가 반드시 사회적 선호에 의해 설명되는 것은 아니라는 반론이 여전히 제기되고 있다. 이에 따르면, 인간의 협조적 행위는 사실상 장기적인 관점에서의 이기심에 의해 설명될 수 있으며, 일회적 상호작용에서 나타나는 협조적 행위는 인간이 과거의 습성을 현대의 변화된 환경에 잘못 적용함으로써 나타나게 된다는 것이다. 이에 대해서 강한 상호성 가설은 이들 반론이 익명적이고 일회적인 상호작용에서도 광범위하게 발견되는 협조적 행위를 설명할 수 없을 뿐만 아니라 인간의 인지 메커니즘은 인류의 생존의 적합성을 높이도록 진화했다는 점에서 부적응 가설은 설득력이 떨어진다고 주장한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article introduces the debate on the concept of strong reciprocity. Based on experimental results, the theory of strong reciprocity claims that humans have other-regarding preferences as well as self-regarding preferences. By using the theories of group selection and gene-culture coevolution, strong reciprocity theory explains the mechanism through which strong reciprocity can evolve. On the other hand, some theorists argue that cooperative behavior observed in experiments is not necessarily associated with social preferences. They hold that human cooperation can be explained on the basis of self-interest, and strong reciprocity represents an evolutionary maladaptation. The strong reciprocity theorists point out that the counter-argument cannot explain cooperation widely observed in anonymous one-shot settings, and the maladaptation hypothesis is not convincing since humans’ recognition mechanism has been evolved for survival.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 국문요약
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 강한 상호성에 대한 실험 결과
• Ⅲ. 이타적/협조적 행동에 대한 근접 설명
• Ⅳ. 강한 상호성의 진화적 기원
• Ⅴ. 강한 상호성 이론 비판과 논쟁점
• Ⅵ. 맺음말
• 참고문헌
• ABSTRACT

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