In a society where personal information has become a sensitive and serious issue, filing complaints and accusations is becoming easier than ever before. This has led to an increase in cases where personal information processors or those who have proce...
In a society where personal information has become a sensitive and serious issue, filing complaints and accusations is becoming easier than ever before. This has led to an increase in cases where personal information processors or those who have processed or processed personal information file complaints or accusations against third parties with investigative authorities based on personal information they learned through their work. In this context, cases are frequently occurring where the scope of use of personal information by those who have processed or processed personal information differs from that of the personal information processor, and thus, complaints or accusations using their personal information constitute violations of the Personal Information Protection Act. This has led to confusion in practice. The ruling at issue in this article is a prime example. The ruling held that the act of filing a complaint or accusation by a person who has processed or processed personal information constitutes “leakage” as defined by the Personal Information Protection Act. However, the ruling's stance is questionable. While it is not an incorrect judgment if we consider only the dictionary definition, it raises questions about whether all acts, or even all actions, should be considered “leakage.” In other words, it may not be appropriate to consider the provision of personal information for public interest purposes, such as filing a complaint or accusation, as “leakage.” Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the act of someone who processes or has processed personal information, or who files a complaint or accusation against a third party with investigative authorities based on personal information learned through their work, in a way that does not constitute “leakage” under the Personal Information Protection Act. A reconsideration of the meaning of “leakage” is necessary. Legislators, researchers, and practitioners must all work to ensure that this interpretation is reflected in legislation.