이사회 인력단층과 애널리스트의 이익예측오차 = Cracks in the Boardroom: How Director Faultlines Distort Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We test whether internal board segmentation affects the quality of firms’ external information environment. Using a large panel of U.S. listed firms from 2000 to 2019, we construct a continuous measure of board faultlines—latent subgroup alignment across directors’ age, gender, tenure, independence, and financial expertise—and relate it to analyst forecast bias. Firms with stronger board faultlines exhibit significantly larger absolute forecast bias, consistent with lower information quality and weaker oversight. The effect is concentrated in high-uncertainty environments and remains robust across alternative model specifications, sub-sample analyses, and instrumental- variable estimation addressing endogeneity. Additional tests show that the results are driven by social-category faultlines, which are more likely to generate identity-based conflict and impair board cohesion. We interpret these findings as evidence that internal board divisions undermine monitoring effectiveness and increase information asymmetry in capital markets. The study reframes board diversity as a configuration issue rather than a compositional count, highlighting the role of intra-board dynamics in shaping disclosure quality and market transparency.