Chinese Enterprises' Outward Investment in the Era of Globalization : Location Selection, Investment Patterns, and Corporate Performance = 글로벌화 시대의 중국 기업들의 해외 투자: 위치 선정, 투자 패턴 및 기업 성과

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation investigates the determinants and outcomes of Chinese outward foreign direct investment （OFDI） from 2010 to 2020, focusing on how institutional distance, host-country governance, ownership structure, and firm characteristics jointly shape investment strategy and performance. Drawing upon the Eclectic Paradigm （Dunning, 1988）, the Institution-Based View （Peng et al., 2008）, and the Springboard Perspective （Luo ＆ Tung, 2007）, the study develops an integrated framework explaining how Chinese multinational enterprises （MNEs） navigate institutional diversity across global markets.
Using a mixed-method quantitative design, the research examines firm-level and country-level data across 35 major host economies. The analysis explores three interrelated dimensions of Chinese OFDI: location choice, entry-mode strategy, and post-investment performance. The results reveal that institutional distance significantly influences investment behaviour. Firms tend to avoid extremely dissimilar institutional environments but strategically engage in moderately distant contexts that offer learning and diversification opportunities. This finding highlights the adaptive logic of Chinese internationalisation, where firms transform institutional differences into strategic opportunities through experiential learning and policy-backed risk management.
Ownership structure emerges as a critical moderator. State-owned enterprises （SOEs） exhibit higher tolerance for political and institutional risk due to policy alignment and diplomatic support, whereas private firms display a more market-oriented approach by prioritising transparent governance, contractual security, and institutional compatibility. The Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） further mitigates perceived institutional distance by institutionalising policy diplomacy and enhancing cross-border trust.
Entry-mode analysis demonstrates that greenfield investment predominates in high- uncertainty environments, allowing firms to maintain operational control, while mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are more common in developed markets, enabling faster access to strategic assets, technologies, and established market networks. OFDI is shown to yield positive long-term effects on total factor productivity （TFP）, although short-term financial returns vary with institutional compatibility, ownership structure, and managerial experience.
Theoretically, the study proposes a state-enabled entrepreneurship model, integrating state coordination with entrepreneurial agency to explain the hybrid nature of Chinese globalisation. Practically, it offers implications for managers, policymakers, and host governments to align institutional strategies, promote sustainable investment, and strengthen governance mechanisms.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 2010년부터 2020년까지 중국의 해외직접투자（OFDI） 결정 요인과 결과를 분석하며, 제도적 거리, 수용국의 거버넌스, 소유 구조 및 기업 특성이 투자 전략과 성과에 어떻게 공동으로 영향을 미치는지에 초점을 맞춘다. 이 연구는 다국적기업（MNE）이 세계 시장의 다양한 제도 환경 속에서 어떻게 대응하는지를 설명하기 위해, 척색 패러다임（Dunning, 1988）, 제도 기반 관점（Peng 등, 2008）, 스프링보드 관점（Luo ＆ Tung, 2007）을 종합하여 통합적인 이론적 프레임워크를 구축한다.
혼합 방법론을 활용한 양적 설계를 통해, 본 연구는 35개 주요 수용국 경제를 대상으로 기업 수준과 국가 수준의 데이터를 분석한다. 분석은 중국의 OFDI와 관련된 세 가지 상호 연관된 차원—투자 지역 선택, 진입 방식 전략, 투자 후 성과—을 다룬다. 분석 결과, 제도적 거리는 투자 행동에 유의미한 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 기업들은 극도로 다른 제도 환경을 회피하는 경향이 있지만, 학습 기회와 다각화 가능성을 제공하는 중간 정도의 거리감 있는 환경에서는 전략적으로 참여하는 것으로 드러났다.이 연구 결과는 중국 기업의 국제화 전략에서 관습적 학습과 정책 기반 리스크 관리를 통해 제도적 차이를 전략적 기회로 전환하는 적응적 논리를 강조한다.
소유 구조는 중요한 조절 변수로 나타난다. 국유기업（SOE）은 정책 일치성과 외교적 지원 덕분에 정치적·제도적 리스크에 대해 더 높은 내성을 보이는 반면, 민간 기업은 투명한 거버넌스, 계약 보안 및 제도적 호환성을 우선시함으로써 시장 중심의 접근 방식을 보인다. 일대일로 이니셔티브（BRI）는 정책 외교를 제도화하고 국경 간 신뢰를 강화함으로써 인지된 제도적 거리감을 더욱 완화시킨다.
진입 방식 분석 결과, 불확실성이 높은 환경에서는 신규 투자（greenfield investment）가 주를 이루며 기업이 운영 통제력을 유지할 수 있는 반면, 선진 시장에서는 인수합병（M＆A）이 더 일반적이어서 전략적 자산, 기술 및 기존 시장 네트워크에 보다 빠르게 접근할 수 있다.OFDI는 제도적 호환성, 소유 구조 및 경영 경험에 따라 단기적인 재정 수익은 달라지지만, 총요소생산성（TFP）에 긍정적인 장기적 효과를 가져온다는 것이 밝혀졌다. 이론적으로 본 연구는 중국의 글로벌화가 지닌 혼합적 성격을 설명하기 위해 국가 주도의 기업가 정신 모델을 제안하며, 국가의 조정과 기업가 행위를 통합한다. 실질적으로는 관리자, 정책 입안자 및 수혜국 정부가 제도 전략을 일치시키고, 지속 가능한 투자를 촉진하며, 거버넌스 메커니즘을 강화하는 데 시사점을 제공한다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 15
• 1.1 Background 15
• 1.2 Problem Statement 17
• 1.3 Research Aims 19
• 1.4 Research Questions 20
• 1.5 Significance of the Study 21
• 1.6 Scope and Limitations 22
• 1.7 Operational Definitions 24
• 1.8 Dissertation Structure 26
• CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 29
• 2.1 Introduction 29
• 2.2 Theoretical Foundations 30
• 2.2.1 The Eclectic Paradigm (OLI Model) 30
• 2.2.2 Institutional Theory and the Institution-Based View 32
• 2.2.3 Springboard and Latecomer Perspectives 34
• 2.2.4 Integrating Perspectives: State-Enabled Entrepreneurship in Chinese OFDI 36
• 2.3 Determinants of Chinese OFDI Location Choice 39
• 2.3.1 Economic Determinants 39
• 2.3.2 Institutional Distance and Formal Institutions 41
• 2.3.3 Cultural and Informal Institutions 43
• 2.3.4 Firm-Level Moderators in Location Decisions 45
• 2.4 Entry Mode Strategies: Greenfield, M&A, and JVs 47
• 2.5 OFDI and Firm-Level Performance Outcomes 51
• 2.5.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 53
• 2.5.2 Return on Investment (ROI) and Financial Impacts 55
• 2.5.3 ESG, Environment and Social Impact 57
• 2.6 Heterogeneity, Moderators, and Emerging Themes 63
• 2.6.1 Recent Shocks: COVID-19 and Geopolitical Fragmentation 66
• 2.7 Gaps in the Literature and Justification for the Study 68
• 2.8 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 71
• 2.8.1 Conceptual Framework 71
• 2.8.2 Hypotheses Development 73
• CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 79
• 3.1 Chapter Overview and Introduction 79
• 3.2 Research Philosophy and Approach 79
• 3.3 Research Design and Strategy 80
• 3.4 Data Sources and Collection 82
• 3.5 Variable Definitions and Measurement 83
• 3.5.1 Dependent Variables 84
• 3.5.2 Institutional Distance (Inst_Dist) 85
• 3.5.3 Control Variables 86
• 3.5.4 Summary Table of Variables 87
• 3.6 Econometric Modelling Strategy 89
• 3.6.1 Logit Model of OFDI Choice 89
• 3.6.2 Multinomial Logit Model for Entry Mode 90
• 3.6.3 Fixed-Effects and OLS Models for Performance 91
• 3.6.4 Interaction and Moderation Effects 92
• 3.6.5 Estimation Processes and Assumption Testing 93
• 3.7 Endogeneity and Robustness Tests 94
• 3.8 Ethical Considerations 95
• 3.9 Methodological Limitations 96
• 3.10 Overview of the Chapter 97
• CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF OFDI LOCATION CHOICE 98
• 4.1 Introduction 98
• 4.2 Descriptive Analysis 100
• 4.2.1 Sample Overview 100
• 4.2.2 Host-Country Distribution and Institutional Context 101
• 4.2.3 Variable Patterns 102
• 4.2.4 Check of Correlation and Multicollinearity 103
• 4.2.5 Preliminary Results 103
• 4.3 Multinomial Logit Results for Location Choice 104
• 4.3.1 Model Specification Summary 105
• 4.3.2 Baseline Results 106
• 4.3.3 Extended Models 110
• 4.3.4 Institutional Distance & Marketisation Effects 113
• 4.3.5 Summary of Key Results 114
• 4.4 Discussion 115
• 4.4.1 Institutional Quality and Location Choice 116
• 4.4.2 Industry Characteristics and Location Patterns 117
• 4.4.3 SOEs versus Private Firms 118
• 4.4.4 Theoretical Implications 118
• 4.4.5 Practical Implications 119
• 4.4.6 Summary 120
• 4.5 Robustness Tests 120
• 4.6 Chapter Summary 121
• CHAPTER 5: ENTRY STRATEGIES AND INVESTMENT MODELS 123
• 5.1 Introduction 123
• 5.2 Entry Strategy Framework 125
• 5.3 Econometric Model and Variables 127
• 5.4 Baseline Analysis: Determinants of Entry Mode Choice 129
• 5.4.1 Institutional Distance and Quality 131
• 5.4.2 Industry Agglomeration and Uncertainty 132
• 5.4.3 Overseas Experience of Executives and Type of Ownership 133
• 5.4.4 Control Variables and Firm Size 133
• 5.4.5 Summary of Baseline Findings 134
• 5.5 Extended Models and Robustness 135
• 5.5.1 Extended Models with Controls 135
• 5.5.2 Split-Sample Analysis: SOEs vs Private Firms 137
• 5.5.3 Split-Sample Analysis: Developed vs Emerging Markets 138
• 5.5.4 Robustness Tests 138
• 5.6 Institutional Distance, Marketisation & Moderating Effects 138
• 5.7 Discussion of Findings 139
• 5.7.1 Theoretical Integration 140
• 5.7.2 Identity of ownership and the Institutions view 141
• 5.7.3 Strategic Patterns and Practical Implications 142
• 5.8 Chapter Summary 143
• CHAPTER 6: OFDI AND FIRM PRODUCTIVITY 144
• 6.1 Introduction 144
• 6.2 Data and Variable Specification 145
• 6.2.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 145
• 6.2.2 Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 146
• 6.2.3 Key Independent Variable: OFDI Intensity 146
• 6.2.4 Moderating Variables 147
• 6.2.5 Control Variables 147
• 6.2.6 Descriptive Statistics 148
• 6.3 Model Specification and Estimation Strategy 150
• 6.3.1 Baseline Fixed-Effects Model 150
• 6.3.2 Extended Model with Moderation Effects 151
• 6.3.3 Robustness and Dealing with Endogeneity 151
• 6.3.4 Justification of Models 153
• 6.4 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 153
• 6.4.1 Summary Statistics 153
• 6.4.2 Correlation Analysis 154
• 6.4.3 Initial Observations 154
• 6.4.4 Theoretical Implications 154
• 6.5 Empirical Results 155
• 6.5.1 Baseline Fixed-Effects Results 156
• 6.5.2 Moderating Effect of Ownership Type 157
• 6.5.3 Subnational Institutional Environment's Moderating Role 158
• 6.5.4 Robustness Tests 158
• 6.5.5 Model Diagnostics and Interpretation 159
• 6.6 Discussion of Findings 159
• 6.6.1 Theoretical Integration 160
• 6.6.2 Ownership Heterogeneity 161
• 6.6.3 Regional and Institutional Processes 161
• 6.6.4 Productivity Improvement Mechanisms 162
• 6.7 Chapter Summary 163
• CHAPTER 7: OFDI AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 164
• 7.1 Introduction 164
• 7.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 165
• 7.2.1 OFDI and Financial Performance 165
• 7.2.2 Ownership Heterogeneity and Financial Performance 165
• 7.2.3 Institutional Marketization and Financial Performance 166
• 7.3 Data, Variables, and Model 167
• 7.3.1 Data Source and Sample 167
• 7.3.2 Variable Definitions 168
• 7.3.3 Model Specification 169
• 7.4 Results and Analysis 171
• 7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 171
• 7.4.2 Regression Estimates: OFDI and ROI 172
• 7.4.3 Interpretation 175
• 7.5 Discussion of Findings 176
• 7.5.1 Ownership Heterogeneity 177
• 7.5.2 Institutional Moderation 178
• 7.5.3 Comparative Context and Theoretical Implications 179
• 7.6 Conclusion 179
• CHAPTER 8: HETEROGENEITY & MODERATION ANALYSIS 181
• 8.1 Introduction 181
• 8.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 182
• 8.2.1 Ownership as a Moderator. 182
• 8.2.2 Marketization as a Moderator 183
• 8.2.3 Industry Uncertainty and Firm Life-Cycle 184
• 8.3 Data, Variables, and Model Specification 184
• 8.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction 184
• 8.3.2 Key Variables and Moderators 185
• 8.3.3 Model Specification 186
• 8.4 Descriptive Insights and Correlation Patterns 186
• 8.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 186
• 8.4.2 Correlation Patterns 187
• 8.5 Empirical Results: Moderation and Subgroup Effects 189
• 8.6 Discussion 193
• 8.7 Summary 195
• CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 196
• 9.1 Introduction and Reconnection to Research Aims 196
• 9.2 Institutional Context and Location Choice 197
• 9.3 Entry-Mode Strategy and Strategic Adaptation 198
• 9.4 OFDI, Productivity, and Financial Outcomes 200
• 9.4.1 Productivity Effects 200
• 9.4.2 Financial Performance 201
• 9.5 Integrative Theoretical Synthesis and Contributions 202
• 9.6 Implications, Limitations, and Transition 203
• 9.6.1 Policy Implications 204
• 9.6.2 Academic Implications and Limitations 205
• CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 206
• 10.1 Overview 206
• 10.2 Summary of Key Findings 207
• 10.2.1 Institutional Distance and Location Strategy 207
• 10.2.2 Entry-Mode Choice and Strategic Adaptation 208
• 10.2.3 OFDI, Productivity, and Performance 209
• 10.2.4 Integrative Theoretical Contributions 211
• 10.3 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 212
• 10.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 212
• 10.3.2 Empirical Contributions 213
• 10.4 Practical and Policy Implications 214
• 10.4.1 Managerial Implications 214
• 10.4.2 Policy Implications 215
• 10.5 Limitations and Future Research Directions 216
• 10.6 Final Reflection and Closing Remarks 217
• REFERENCES 219