The Unintended Dynamics of Foreign Aid at the ‘Conflict-Development’ Nexus: Sub－Saharan African Evidence = 분쟁과 발전 간의 상호작용 상황에서 나타난 원조의 비의도성: 사하라이남아프리카 사례 중심으로

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 분쟁감소 및 평화유도라는 확장된 원조 역할에 대해 논의함에 있어서 해외원조가 무력분쟁 중이거나 종료된 지역에 전달되었을 때 나타날 수 있는 원조역학을 조명하였다. 특히나, 수원국에 원조가 유입되었을 때 두 가지 차원들 - 즉, 다수원조공여자들의 집합적 정책결과로써의 원조의 성격 (비전통/전통원조그룹, 규모, 분야별 배분, 모달리티, 유입시기) 그리고 수원국 정부의 원조활용태도 (조건부원조의 수용과 정부지출 중 군사비용 비율) - 에 주목하고 원조의 본연의 의도가 왜곡될 가능성이 존재하는 상황들을 살펴보았다. 지난 10년(2007~2016) 간 사하라이남아프리카지역에서는 분쟁과 발전 간의 뚜렷한 부정적 상관관계를 보여왔고 무엇보다 분쟁지역은 평화로운 아프리카 국가들에 비해 더 많은 원조를 받아왔다. 그 중 콩고민주공화국과 중앙아프리카공화국이라는 두 취약분쟁국 사례들이 보여주는 것은 상당히 낮은 예측가능성 및 안정성을 가진 원조가 효과적으로 그리고 지속적으로 일정한 발전적 목적을 달성함에 있어 치명적인 한계를 가지고 있었다. 또한 수원국 정부 입장에서 바라본다면, 해외원조재원을 획득 그리고 배분함에 있어서 친빈곤(pro-poor)정책 및 개혁을 위시한 생산적 부문에 대한 투자보다는 재발할 분쟁상황에 대비해 원조를 군사비용으로 유용할 강력한 인센티브를 가지는 것으로 보인다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Can foreign aid work as an inducement for peace? This study highlights the unintended dynamics of aid when provided to fragile and conflict－affected situations. Centrally argued is that the expected aid effects in donors’ mind (namely, the aid－good policy－peace link) might remain wishful thinking without tackling the problems associated with the volatile nature of aid and the security－oriented incentives of governments during war－to－peace or peace－to－war periods. This paper first looks at the recent trends (2007~2016) of armed conflict, aid inflows, and development performance across Sub －Saharan Africa. To provide country－specific insights, two country cases are further examined in terms of their governments’ aid receipts and military spending behavior. This research suggests the external finance might work limitedly for post-war reconstruction and peace－building processes primarily because aid is disbursed in a highly unpredictable and insufficient manner. As aid is conditionally delivered, the governments appear to take ostensible gestures: They tend to favor the required pro－poor reforms in order to secure budget support but are later bound to spend more for their armies once donors’ surveillance lifts.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Methodology and data
• Ⅲ. Literature and overview
• Ⅳ. Country Case Analysis
• V. Conclusion
• References

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