의결권행사자문회사 관련 규제론에 대한 재고 － 주주가치의 확대를 위한 의결권행사자문회사의 역할을 기대하며 － = Reconsideration about Regulation Theories related to Proxy Advisory Firms － Expecting the Roles of Proxy Advisory Firms for Expanding Shareholder Value －

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

While institutional shareholders in Korea don’t seem to vote actively in shareholders’ meeting yet, they might use proxy advisory firms more frequently in the near future when the roles and responsibilities of institutional shareholders as fiduciaries will be emphasized. Maybe the fact itself that institutional shareholders vote by obtaining appropriate helps from proxy advisory firms could prove that they fulfill their fiduciary duties.
Institutional shareholders have not filed any complaints about the policies of ISS which has been a front-runner among many proxy advisory firms. If there had been any potential complaint, competitors of ISS could have used it by highlighting the differences of their policies, which has not happened yet.
Regulation of the proxy advisory firms might not be advantageous to management of issuer who insists such regualtions. Proxy advisory firms, as experts without interests, could add invaluable trust to the management, supporting the insistence of management.
Conclusively, the market could regulate the actions of proxy advisory firms by itself and clients are satisfied with the services of proxy advisory firms. It might be originated from the interests of issuers’ managements who would like to interfere with the effects of proxy advisory service that they insist on enforcement of regulations to proxy advisory firms. Instead, vitalization of proxy advisory service is necessary for expansion of shareholder value. However, new proxy advisory firms are hard to compete with the global companies such as ISS, Class Lewis, etc. in Korea because the entry barrier of proxy advisory service market to new enterers is very high. It should be taken into consideration also that foreign proxy advisory firms might provide the services not apposite to Korean cases. So, the efforts of the Korean government to nurture domestic proxy advisory firms is needed now.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

아직까지 우리나라에서는 기관투자자들이 적극적으로 의결권을 행사하고 있는 것처럼 보이지는 않지만, 앞으로 기관투자자들의 수탁자로서의 역할과 책임이 강조될수록 이들의 의결권행사를 보조하는 의결권행사자문회사를 이용하는 경우가 증가하게 될 것이다. 어쩌면 의결권행사자문회사의 적절한 도움을 얻어서, 의결권을 행사한다는 사실 자체가 기관투자자들의 신인의무 이행에 있어서의 판단기준이 될 수도 있을 것이다.
한국에서든 미국에서든, 기관투자자들은 의결권행사자문회사들 중 선두주자인 ISS의 정책에 대하여 아무런 불만을 제기하지 않고 있다. 만약 잠재적인 불만이 있다면, ISS의 경쟁업체들은 정책적 차이점을 부각시켜 이러한 점들을 이용할 수 있었을 텐데, 지금까지 그런 경우가 없다.
어쩌면 자문회사들의 업무를 규율하는 것은 그러한 규제를 주장하는 투자대상회사의 경영진에게도 이롭지 않을 수 있다. 왜냐하면 어떤 투자자들은 자문회사들이 권고하는 것보다 더 자주 경영진에 반대하는 의결권행사를 하는데, 이는 자문회사들이 가지고 있는 영향력이라는 것이 많은 회사경영진들이 믿는 것보다 그들에게 덜 적대적일 수 있기 때문이다. 의결권행사자문회사는, 이해관계가 없는 전문가로서, 경영진들의 주장을 지지함으로써 그들에게 가치를 평가할 수 없는 신뢰를 더할 수 있다.
결론을 내리자면, 시장은 스스로 의결권자문회사들의 행위를 규율할 수 있고, 고객들은 자문회사의 서비스에 만족하고 있다는 것이다. 아마도 의결권행사자문회사의 규제강화를 요구하는 것은, 오로지 해당 서비스의 효과를 방해하기를 원하는 대상회사의 경영진의 이해관계에서 비롯된 것일 수도 있다. 오히려 주주가치의 확대라는 관점에서, 의결권행사자문서비스의 활성화가 요구된다고 할 수 있다. 하지만 우리나라에서는 신규진입자에 대한 의결권행사자문시장의 진입장벽이 매우 높아서 우리나라의 신생 의결권행사자문회사들이 ISS나 Glass Lewis 등의 글로벌 영리기업과 경쟁하기가 쉽지 않고, 외국계 자문회사들이 우리 실정에 맞지 않게 서비스를 제공할 가능성이 있다는 것을 고려하여, 국내의 의결권행사자문회사의 육성을 위한 정책적 뒷받침이 필요하다고 할 것이다.

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