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      What makes firms issue death spirals? A control enhancing story

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A101756660

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      In this paper, we study the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country setting where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange during 1998-2006, we find a number of empirical evidences that are not consistent with the last-resort financing hypothesis, but rather consistent with the control enhancing or control transferring hypothesis. First, death spirals are not necessarily issued by firms with poor operating performances. Second, death spiral issuers, where control is preserved within the family, experience an increase of ownership by affiliated firms. Third, this group of death spiral issuers tends to perform better than those in which family loses control.
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      In this paper, we study the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country setting where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in th...

      In this paper, we study the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country setting where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange during 1998-2006, we find a number of empirical evidences that are not consistent with the last-resort financing hypothesis, but rather consistent with the control enhancing or control transferring hypothesis. First, death spirals are not necessarily issued by firms with poor operating performances. Second, death spiral issuers, where control is preserved within the family, experience an increase of ownership by affiliated firms. Third, this group of death spiral issuers tends to perform better than those in which family loses control.

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • Abstract
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Death Spirals in Korea
      • 3. Hypotheses
      • 4. Data
      • Abstract
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Death Spirals in Korea
      • 3. Hypotheses
      • 4. Data
      • A. Sample Construction
      • B. Other Data Sources
      • 5. Results
      • A. Summary Statistics
      • B. Stock Price Movement following the Death Spiral Issue Announcement
      • C. Operating Performance of the Death Spiral Issuers
      • D. Control Enhancing/Reshuffling as an Alternative Motivation behind Death Spiral Issues
      • E. Can there be Two Distinct Groups of Death Spiral Issuers?
      • 6. Conclusions
      • References
      • Table
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