해외자원개발의 공동운영계약상 비운영자의 보호 방안 = Protective Ways for NonOperators in Goint Operating Agreements for the Overseas Resources Development

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The development businesses of natural resources are risky and require a large amount of funds. Petroleum in particular is a very risky and hardly successful business. Only one or two in ten projects are successful and sustainable in commercial and profitable productions. As a consequence, petroleum development, or more specifically exploration and production(“E&P”) projects in most cases request more than two participants to jointechnologies and monies to hedge associated risks and pool big sized monies. The joint operating agreement(“JOA”) should be necessarily entered into by the participants to meet these features of petroleum E&P projects. It addresses the rights and obligations between the participants in relation to petroleum E&P operations. The participants are largely divided into an operator and non-operators. As we see in traditional JOAs, while the operator exclusively conducts most of petroleum operations on a daily basis, non-operators are passively and indirectly participating in some of operations through the joint operating committee on a irregular basis. As non-operators’ participations and roles are narrowly limited and indirectly performed,non-operators tend to remain mere financial investors and the E&P operations by the operator go without adequate checks and balances. Such unchecked and arbitrary powers of the operator turn the E&P project sour and hurt the participants’ common welfare inthe end. Here is why non-operators should become more interested in operations and take their better inputs into consideration for good operation by which E&P operations may reduce costs and increase returns on investments. There are many ways which enable non-operators to utilize to maximize their function as co-venturers in E&P operations. They may second their employees or agents to the operator in E&P fields and improve their knowledge and involvement directly or otherwise in operations. There should be a variety of voting pass-marks for decision making tailored for each of voting agenda in the joint operating committee to adequately reflect many of non-operators’ voices in operations. The scope of decision-making items in the committee should also be expanded to not fail to cover major issues, by which the operator’s sole and arbitrary decision-makings will be accordingly reduced but nonoperators’ participations by voting would be increased. It is in furtherance of nonoperators’ power to have indemnity regimes to hold the operator liable for its wrongful misconducts because it provides incentives to induce and discipline operators to conduct legitimate and industry-standard operations. It is beneficial to participants as a whole for non-operators to have entitlements to more information on E&P operations and guaranteed involvements in selecting subcontractors such as a drilling company and wide engagement in the process of dispute resolutions. The easier transferability of participating interests byeliminating unnecessary preemption rights and the adoption of sole risk operations would also work well for the protection and benefit of non-operators. All the suggestions above would be, at first sight likely helpful to strengthen the status and power of non-operators only. However, the proactive and affirmative participation inE&P operations by non-operators will eventually build up the whole welfare of all participants including operators as they decrease the inefficiency of the operation and associated costs, and as such increase the productivity of petroleum operations and the amount of profit distributed to investing participants after all. Consequently, it is necessary to incorporate such suggestions into the terms and conditions of the JOA as it guides and controls the conduct of petroleum E&P operations.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

천연자원의 개발 사업은 위험이 크고 많은 자금이 소요되므로, 대부분의 경우 둘 이상의 사업 참여자를 필요로 하는 공동사업 형태를 취하고 있다. 복수의 참여자 중 통상 1개의 회사가 운영자로서 일상적인 업무를 담당하고, 나머지 참여자들은 비운영자로서 공동운영위원회에서 투표권 행사를 통해 주요 의사 결정에 참여하는 등으로 간접적으로만 운영에 관여해 온 것이 자원개발 업계의 일반적 관행이었다. 그로 인해 비운영자는 많은 돈만 투자하고 그 수익을 운영자의 운영에만 전적으로 의존하는 수동적, 소극적 투자자로서만 인식되었고, 반대로 운영자는 많은 권한과 권력을 자의적으로 행사하는 독재적, 비민주적 운영자로 인식되는 문제가 발생하였다.
자원개발 사업이 진정한 공동사업이 되기 위해서는 비운영자도 공동운영자의 일원으로 운영에 적극 참여하여야 하고, 이러한 비운영자의 운영참여가 공동운영계약을 통해 보장되어야 한다. 비운영자의 운영 참여를 통해 운영자의 비효율적 운영을 제거하고 나아가 운영의 이익을 극대화하는 것으로 기능할 수 있기 때문이다. 결국 공동운영계약상 비운영자의 적극적 운영 참여는 비운영자의 이익보호뿐만 아니라 운영자의 이익 증진에도 일조하므로 구체적인 실천 방안들을 마련하여야 한다.
비운영자 직원의 파견 제도를 활용하거나, 비운영자의 운영에 대한 정보 접근권을 확대하거나 공동운영으로 인한 분쟁에 참여할 권한을 강화하는 것은 비운영자를 위한 적극적인 방안들로 유용하다. 잘못된 운영에 대한 운영자의 손해배상책임의 요건을 완화하고, 운영에 따른 사업위험을 부보하거나, 의결권을 여러 형태로 운영하고, 서면투표제를 도입하는 것을 통해 합리적이고 정당한 운영을 담보할 수 있을 것이다. 비운영자에게 계약자 선정에 대해 참여할 권리와 예산지출에 대한 승인권을 부여하여 운영의 절차적, 실체적 정당성을 확보할 수 있을 것이고, 단독의 탐사개발 제도 및 자유로운 지분권 양도 제도를 마련함으로써 비운영자의 이익은 물론 운영자의 이익의 제고도 도모할 수 있다.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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