Delegating state powers : the effect of treaty regimes on democracy and sovereignty

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Chapter 1. Can the United States Delegate Aspects of Sovereignty to International Regimes? / Thomas M. Franck = 1
• 1. The Problem of "Democratic Deficit" = 1
• 2. Federalism and Separation of Powers = 3
• 3. Accountability = 10
• 4. Powers of Congress = 11
• 5. Rights of Persons = 14
• 6. A Question of Values = 16
• 7. Conclusion = 17
• Chapter 2. Participation in Treaty Regimes : Putting the Constitutional and Legal Issues in Historical Perspective / Robert E. Dalton = 19
• Chapter 3. The Instance of Environmental Regimes / Diane Bui = 33
• 1. Introduction = 33
• 2. The Ozone Regime = 35
• 3. Law of the Sea Regime = 36
• 4. The Biodiversity Regime = 38
• 5. Federalism and Regime Participation = 39
• 6. Federalism and Regulation of Anadromous Stocks in the UNCLOS Regime = 40
• 7. Federalism and Land Use Regulation in the Biodiversity Convention = 41
• 8. Bases of Federal Jurisdiction = 43
• A. The Treaty Power = 43
• B. The Commerce Clause = 46
• C. The Spending Power = 50
• 9. Implementing International Environmental Regimes : The Practice = 51
• A. Implementing the Ozone Treaties = 51
• B. Implementing UNCLOS and the Biodiversity Convention = 55
• 10. Conclusion = 60
• Chapter 4. The Instance of Commercial Regimes / Eschrat Rahimi-Laridjani = 61
• 1. Introduction = 61
• 2. The Regimes = 63
• A. The World Trade Organization = 63
• B. North American Free Trade Agreement = 68
• C. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards = 72
• 3. Constitutional and Statutory Obstacles to Compliance with the WTO = 73
• A. The Impact on Executive and Legislative Powers = 73
• B. The Impact on the Federal Judiciary = 76
• C. The Impact on Federalism = 77
• D. Sovereignty and Section 301 = 80
• 4. Obstacles to Compliance with NAFTA = 81
• A. The Impact on Executive and Legislative Powers = 82
• B. The Impact on Federalism = 83
• C. Unique Problems Posed by Binational Panels : Individual Due Process Rights, the Encroachment on Article Ⅲ Powers, and the Problem of the Appointments Clause = 83
• ⅰ. The Legislation Implementing Chapter 19 = 83
• ⅱ. Due Process Rights = 84
• ⅲ. The Encroachment on Article Ⅲ Powers = 85
• ⅳ. The Appointments Clause = 88
• 5. The NY Convention = 89
• A. Constitutional Questions Under the NY Convention = 91
• 6. Conclusion = 92
• Chapter 5. The Instance of Chemical Weapons Control / Jeremy B. Zucker = 95
• 1. Introduction = 95
• 2. The Chemical Weapons Convention : Organizational Arrangements = 96
• 3. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 : Policy-Based Deviations from CWC : Non-Constitutional Conflicts Between the CWC and the Implementation Act = 99
• 4. The CWC : Resolving Potential Constitutional Problems of Compliance = 104
• A. Constitutional Protection Against Takings = 104
• B. Constitutional Protection Against Self-Incrimination = 109
• 5. Constitutional Protection of Privacy Rights - Search and Seizure = 111
• A. Exigency = 114
• B. Special Needs = 116
• C. Pervasively Regulated Industries = 117
• D. National Security = 119
• 6. Compliance Through the Judiciary : Administrative Versus Criminal Warrants = 122
• 7. The Delegation of Federal Authority : A Constitutional Issue? = 127
• 8. Summary and Conclusion = 131
• Chapter 6. The Instance of Collective Security Regimes / D.A. Jeremy Telman = 133
• 1. Collective Security Regimes and War Powers : An Overview of Issues = 133
• 2. The U.N. Charter and the Security Council = 137
• 3. The North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Council = 139
• 4. The Allocation of War Powers Under the U.S. Constitution and Federal Law = 140
• 5. The Least Active Branch : War Powers and Judicial Restraint = 148
• 6. The War Powers Resolution : Potted Plant or Conversation Piece? = 149
• 7. Problems of Delegation : Can Congress Delegate Its War Powers Through a Treaty? = 153
• 8. Problems of Automaticity : Can the North Atlantic Council Obligate the United States to Go to War? = 160
• 9. Odysseus and the Mast : Legal Restraints on States' Recourse to Force = 162
• 10. Instances of Collective Security and the Allocation of War Powers = 165
• 11. Conclusion = 170
• Chapter 7. Instances of International Criminal Courts / Kristen Boon = 171
• 1. Introduction = 171
• 2. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) : An Overview = 173
• 3. The International Criminal Court (ICC) : An Overview = 175
• 4. The Relationship Between International Tribunals and American Courts : The Constitutionality of International Criminal Jurisdiction = 178
• 5. Constitutional Issues Pertaining to Regime Adherence = 181
• 6. Constitutional Issues Pertaining to Compliance with Regime-Based Obligations = 184
• 7. Specific Obligations : Arrest and Surrender of Persons to the ICTY and ICTR = 187
• 8. Arrest and Surrender of Persons to the ICC = 191
• 9. Provisional Measures : Arrest and Detention Under the ICTY and ICTR = 192
• 10. Provisional Measures : Bail Under the ICTY and ICTR = 194
• 11. Provisional Measures : The ICC = 195
• 12. Gathering Evidence : ICTY and ICTR = 195
• 13. Gathering Evidence : The ICC = 197
• 14. Requests for Evidence : Due Process and the Ad Hoc Tribunals = 197
• 15. Unimplemented Obligations to Cooperate : Search and Seizure and Enforcement of Judgments = 199
• A. Search and Seizure : The ICTY and ICTR = 200
• B. Search and Seizure : The ICC = 200
• C. Fourth Amendment Obstacles = 201
• D. Tenth Amendment Obstacles = 202
• 16. U.S. Courts' Obligation to Defer to the ICTY and ICTR = 203
• 17. U.S. Courts' Obligation to Defer to the ICC = 204
• 18. Non Bis In Idem and the Tenth Amendment = 205
• 19. Conclusion = 206
• Chapter 8. Instances of Human Rights Regimes / Nina Schou = 209
• 1. Introduction = 209
• 2. The Treaty Regimes : A General Overview = 210
• A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) = 211
• B. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) = 211
• C. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) = 212
• 3. Treaty Obligations and Delegation of Sovereignty in General = 215
• A. ICCPR and CAT = 215
• B. VCCR = 217
• 4. General Provisions Regarding Reservations to Human Rights Treaty Obligations = 217
• 5. General Obligations Regarding Implementation = 219
• A. ICCPR = 219
• B. CAT = 220
• C. VCCR = 220
• 6. U.S. Ratification and Implementation of Human Rights Treaties = 221
• A. Compatibility of U.S. Domestic Law with Human Rights Treaty Obligations = 221
• B. U.S. Concerns Pertaining to Individual Rights Under the New Regimes = 224
• ⅰ. Individual Rights : The ICCPR = 225
• ⅱ. Individual Rights : The CAT = 227
• ⅲ. Implementation of Human Rights Treaty Obligations in Conflict with Constitutional Rights = 228
• C. Constitutionally Protected States' Rights - State Police Power = 230
• ⅰ. The Example of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment = 231
• ⅱ. Death Penalty = 234
• 7. Implementing the Human Rights Regimes in a Federal System = 236
• A. The ICCPR and the CAT Obligations = 236
• B. The VCCR Obligations = 237
• C. How Much of an Obstacle to Implementation Is Federalism? = 241
• D. Federal Action Implementing CAT Obligations : Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, Asylum, and Extradition = 246
• 8. Executive Order 13107 : A New Implementation Strategy? = 251
• 9. Conclusion = 253
• Chapter 9. Treaty Implementation in Great Britain After "Devolution" / Sir Franklin Berman, KCMG, QC = 255
• Chapter 10. Constitutional Implications of German Participation in Treaty Regimes / Georg Nolte = 261
• 1. Introduction = 261
• 2. Comparing U.S. and German Constitutional Law = 262
• 3. War Powers = 263
• 4. Federalism = 264
• 5. Human Rights = 265
• 6. Exclusion of Self-Executing Character of Treaty Norms = 266
• 7. Effect of Unconstitutional Treaties = 267
• 8. Delegation of Sovereign Powers = 267
• 9. Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons and Under the EC Competition Law Regimes = 269
• 10. Protection of Fundamental Rights Against the Exercise of Delegated Powers = 270
• 11. The Meandering Case Law of the German Constitutional Court = 271
• 12. The Maastricht Decision = 273
• 13. The Banana Dispute = 274
• 14. The Selective Sensitivity for Rights = 276
• 15. Conclusion = 276
• Chapter 11. A French Constitutional Perspective on Treaty Implementation / Alain Pellet = 279
• INDEX = 295