출자총액제한제도의 이론과 현실

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

  This paper concerns the regulation that puts ceiling on the total amount of shareholding of member companies of a large business group called chaebol. In particular, it examines how well the regulation could serve its purposes in principle and how effectively the regulation has served its purposes in practice. The paper demonstrates that the regulation could only repress the economic power concentration in a very limited sense. It also confirms that the regulation has hardly been an effective constraint on the chaebol"s choice over ownership structure.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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