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    내부자지분율이 은행의 위험추구행위에 미치는 영향 = Managerial Ownership and Banks' Risk Taking in Korea

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104220957

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and banks' risk taking behavior after the 1997 in Korea. Managerial ownership is found to have nonlinear relationship with bank's risk taking behavior, initially having positive relationship and then negative relationship as the managerial relationship increases. Moreover, increased risk taking with the higher managerial ownership is analyzed to have been profitable, being consistent with the 'corporate control hypothesis' which states that banks take profitable risk when the banking sector is tightly regulated. Also, increase in the managerial ownership at the banks with higher franchise value are found to affect the bank's risk inversely supporting the moral hazard hypothesis.
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    This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and banks' risk taking behavior after the 1997 in Korea. Managerial ownership is found to have nonlinear relationship with bank's risk taking behavior, initially having positive rel...

    This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and banks' risk taking behavior after the 1997 in Korea. Managerial ownership is found to have nonlinear relationship with bank's risk taking behavior, initially having positive relationship and then negative relationship as the managerial relationship increases. Moreover, increased risk taking with the higher managerial ownership is analyzed to have been profitable, being consistent with the 'corporate control hypothesis' which states that banks take profitable risk when the banking sector is tightly regulated. Also, increase in the managerial ownership at the banks with higher franchise value are found to affect the bank's risk inversely supporting the moral hazard hypothesis.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 전선애, "은행의 프랜차이즈가치와 위험도" 한국산업경제학회 20 (20): 2191-2214, 2007

    2 오완근, "은행의 대형화ㆍ겸업화가 은행 리스크에 미치는 영향" 2006

    3 박광우, "은행대형화와 예금보험기금의 건전성 제고방안" 2007

    4 Salinger, Michael, "Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Concentration-Profits Relationship" (15) : 159-70, 1984

    5 Smirlock, Michael, "Tobin's q and the Structure Performance Relationship" (74) : 1051-60, 1984

    6 Lindenberg, Eric B, "Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization" 15 (15): 1-32, 1981

    7 Marcus, A. J., "The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using Option Price Estimates" (16) : 446-460, 1984

    8 Jensen M, "The Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior,잸gency Costs and Ownership Structure" (3) : 305-365, 1976

    9 Galai, d., "The Option Pricing Model and the risk Factor of Stock" (3) : 53-81, 1976

    10 Smith, C. W., "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies" (20) : 443-457, 1985

    1 전선애, "은행의 프랜차이즈가치와 위험도" 한국산업경제학회 20 (20): 2191-2214, 2007

    2 오완근, "은행의 대형화ㆍ겸업화가 은행 리스크에 미치는 영향" 2006

    3 박광우, "은행대형화와 예금보험기금의 건전성 제고방안" 2007

    4 Salinger, Michael, "Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Concentration-Profits Relationship" (15) : 159-70, 1984

    5 Smirlock, Michael, "Tobin's q and the Structure Performance Relationship" (74) : 1051-60, 1984

    6 Lindenberg, Eric B, "Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization" 15 (15): 1-32, 1981

    7 Marcus, A. J., "The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using Option Price Estimates" (16) : 446-460, 1984

    8 Jensen M, "The Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior,잸gency Costs and Ownership Structure" (3) : 305-365, 1976

    9 Galai, d., "The Option Pricing Model and the risk Factor of Stock" (3) : 53-81, 1976

    10 Smith, C. W., "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies" (20) : 443-457, 1985

    11 Chen, C.R., "Risk-Taking Behavior and쟋anagement Ownership in Depository Institutions" (Spring) : 1-168, 1998

    12 Amihud, Y., "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers" (12) : 605-617, 1981

    13 Lee, Seok Weon, "Regulation, Corporate control and Bank Risk Taking" 1 (1): 108-117, 2004

    14 Pound, J., "Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight" 237-265, 1988

    15 Ronn, E., "Pricing Risk Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option Based Model" (41) : 871-896, 1986

    16 Benston, G., "Perspectives on Safe and sound Banking: Past, Present and Future" MIT Press 1986

    17 Sanuders, A., "Ownership Structure, Deregulation and Bank Risk Taking" (June) : 643-654, 1990

    18 Cebenoyan, A. Sinan, "Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior쟣or Thrifts" 28 (28): 43-60, 1999

    19 Lee, Seok Weon, "Moral Hazard, Agency Problem and Ownership Structure" 3 (3): 116-124, 2005

    20 Agrawal, A., "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions" (42) : 823-837, 1987

    21 Ross, S. A., "Institutional Markets, Financial Markets, and Financial Innovation" 541-556, 1989

    22 Brewer Elijah III, "Franchise Value, Ownership Structure, and Risk at Savings Institutions Research Paper #9632 Federal Reserve Bank of New York"

    23 Buser, S. A., "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy and Optimal Bank Capital" (36) : 51-60, 1981

    24 Demsetz, "Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies" 29 (29): 301-313, 1997

    25 Cebenoyan, A. Sinan, "Deregulation, Reregulation, equity Ownership, and S&L Risk Taking" (Autumn) : 63-76, 1995

    26 Marcus, Alan, "Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy" (8) : 557-65, 1984

    27 Keeley, M. C, "Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking" (80) : 1183-1120, 1990

    28 Gorton G., "Corporate control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline 쟯f Banking" (December) : 1377-1420, 1995

    29 Anderson, Ronald C., "Corporate Control, Bank Risk Taking, and the Health of the Banking Industry" (24) : 1383-1398, 2000

    30 Demsetz, Rebecca S., "Banks 쟷ith Something to Lose: the Disciplinary Role of Franchise Value" 1996

    31 Galloway, T.M., "Bank's Changing Incentives and Opportunities for Risk Taking" (April) : 509-527, 1997

    32 Zeckhauser, R. J., "Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance In : Asymmetric Information Corporate Finance, and Investment" University of Chicago Press 149-180, 1990

    33 Merton, R., "An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance쟊oan Guarantees: An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory" (1) : 3-11, 1977

    34 Demsetz,Rebecca S., "Agency Problems and Risk Taking at Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper No. 9709"

    35 McConneell, J.J., "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value" 595-612, 1990

    36 Stigler, George, "A Theory of Oligopoly" (72) : 44-61, 1964

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