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      미국 회사법상 적대적 M&A 상황에서의 강화된 경영판단의 원칙-델라웨어 州 회사법을 중심으로 - = The Enhanced Business Judgment Rule in Hostile M&A Situations under Delaware’s Corporate Law

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104717513

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”In the past, the board of directors at target merger and acquision (M&A) corporations have been recognized as being able to exercise the maximum M&A defense under the protection of the business judgment rule. However, since the mid 1980s, new rules began to be formulated under U.S. corporate law for directors in hostile M&A situations, particularly in Delaware.
      The “enhanced business judgment rule” was established over the general business judgment rule. Starting in 1985, notable precedents began to emerge from the State of Delaware and the Unocal, the Moran, and the Revlon cases, all of which were settled by 1986, accelerated the imposition of the revised rule.
      However, according to the author, the revised business judgment rule cannot be considered a business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, the enhanced business judgment rule changes the foundation of the business judgment rule because of the absence of presumption rule and the transition of the burden of proof.
      Second, the two rules are fundamentally different in that the business judgment rule considers the motive of the behavior while the enhanced business judgment rule also takes into account the extent of the behavior.
      Third, the enhanced business judgment rule is a strengthened version of the director’s fiduciary duty.
      In addition, the author believes that the enhanced business judgment rule is not really “enhanced” because of the following reasons:First, the burden of proof has been transferred to the board of directors through the transition of burden of proof, but the problem lies in the fact that it is actually easy to prove.
      Second, once the proof is easily obtained, the next step should be the implementation of the business judgment rule. Therefore, in practice, the enhanced business judgment rule does not really “enhance” the business judgment rule.
      As such, the enhanced business judgment rule cannot even be considered a business judgment rule, much less an “enhanced” one. The enhanced business judgment rule, however, can be an appropriate prototype for an ideal business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, it has the potential to be developed further as it places the burden of proof on the directors.
      Second, it is possible to increase the responsibility of the directors by assessing their behavior.
      Third, it may be possible to strengthen duty of loyalty, which has often been overlooked in the existing business judgment rule due to “reasonableness” factor and the imposition of duty as an “auctioneer.”
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      The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”In th...

      The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”In the past, the board of directors at target merger and acquision (M&A) corporations have been recognized as being able to exercise the maximum M&A defense under the protection of the business judgment rule. However, since the mid 1980s, new rules began to be formulated under U.S. corporate law for directors in hostile M&A situations, particularly in Delaware.
      The “enhanced business judgment rule” was established over the general business judgment rule. Starting in 1985, notable precedents began to emerge from the State of Delaware and the Unocal, the Moran, and the Revlon cases, all of which were settled by 1986, accelerated the imposition of the revised rule.
      However, according to the author, the revised business judgment rule cannot be considered a business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, the enhanced business judgment rule changes the foundation of the business judgment rule because of the absence of presumption rule and the transition of the burden of proof.
      Second, the two rules are fundamentally different in that the business judgment rule considers the motive of the behavior while the enhanced business judgment rule also takes into account the extent of the behavior.
      Third, the enhanced business judgment rule is a strengthened version of the director’s fiduciary duty.
      In addition, the author believes that the enhanced business judgment rule is not really “enhanced” because of the following reasons:First, the burden of proof has been transferred to the board of directors through the transition of burden of proof, but the problem lies in the fact that it is actually easy to prove.
      Second, once the proof is easily obtained, the next step should be the implementation of the business judgment rule. Therefore, in practice, the enhanced business judgment rule does not really “enhance” the business judgment rule.
      As such, the enhanced business judgment rule cannot even be considered a business judgment rule, much less an “enhanced” one. The enhanced business judgment rule, however, can be an appropriate prototype for an ideal business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, it has the potential to be developed further as it places the burden of proof on the directors.
      Second, it is possible to increase the responsibility of the directors by assessing their behavior.
      Third, it may be possible to strengthen duty of loyalty, which has often been overlooked in the existing business judgment rule due to “reasonableness” factor and the imposition of duty as an “auctioneer.”

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 김정호, "회사법" 法文社 2010

      2 최병규, "회사법" 박영사 2009

      3 송종준, "한국형 포이즌 필의 법리 해석과 몇 가지 입법과제 -2010년 상법일부개정법률안상 신주인수선택권을 중심으로-" 한국증권법학회 11 (11): 255-303, 2010

      4 강택신, "정부의 포이즌 필 관련법안에 대한 보완방안" 연세대학교 법학연구원 글로벌비즈니스와 법센터 3 (3): 2011

      5 맹수석, "적대적 M&A와 이사의 역할" 충남대학교 법학연구소 15 (15): 2004

      6 김정호, "적대적 M&A에 있어 방어행위의 적법요건 - Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 사건을 중심으로 -" 한국경영법률학회 19 (19): 229-263, 2009

      7 김병연, "이사의 충실의무와 영미법상 신인의무(Fiduciary duty)" 한국상사법학회 24 (24): 61-82, 2005

      8 손창일, "영미법상의 司法政策的 관점에서 본 경영판단 원칙의 변화단계 연구 - 미국 델라웨어 州 판결의 역사를 중심으로 -" 한국경영법률학회 20 (20): 27-65, 2010

      9 김광록, "미국의 최근 판례를 통해 본 경영판단의 원칙" 한국법학회 (32) : 243-267, 2008

      10 손창일, "미국법상 경영판단의 원칙에 관한 비판적 소고 - 주주와 회사 이익 보호의 관점에서 -" 한국상사판례학회 22 (22): 3-39, 2009

      1 김정호, "회사법" 法文社 2010

      2 최병규, "회사법" 박영사 2009

      3 송종준, "한국형 포이즌 필의 법리 해석과 몇 가지 입법과제 -2010년 상법일부개정법률안상 신주인수선택권을 중심으로-" 한국증권법학회 11 (11): 255-303, 2010

      4 강택신, "정부의 포이즌 필 관련법안에 대한 보완방안" 연세대학교 법학연구원 글로벌비즈니스와 법센터 3 (3): 2011

      5 맹수석, "적대적 M&A와 이사의 역할" 충남대학교 법학연구소 15 (15): 2004

      6 김정호, "적대적 M&A에 있어 방어행위의 적법요건 - Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 사건을 중심으로 -" 한국경영법률학회 19 (19): 229-263, 2009

      7 김병연, "이사의 충실의무와 영미법상 신인의무(Fiduciary duty)" 한국상사법학회 24 (24): 61-82, 2005

      8 손창일, "영미법상의 司法政策的 관점에서 본 경영판단 원칙의 변화단계 연구 - 미국 델라웨어 州 판결의 역사를 중심으로 -" 한국경영법률학회 20 (20): 27-65, 2010

      9 김광록, "미국의 최근 판례를 통해 본 경영판단의 원칙" 한국법학회 (32) : 243-267, 2008

      10 손창일, "미국법상 경영판단의 원칙에 관한 비판적 소고 - 주주와 회사 이익 보호의 관점에서 -" 한국상사판례학회 22 (22): 3-39, 2009

      11 정봉진, "미국법상 Poison Pill에 의한 경영권 방어의 적법성 판단 기준으로서의 “강화된 경영판단의 법칙”" 법학연구소 19 (19): 135-171, 2011

      12 임재연, "미국기업법" 박영사 2009

      13 권상로, "미국․독일법상의 경영판단의 원칙 도입여부에 관한 연구" 한국법학회 (33) : 241-265, 2009

      14 윤성승, "미국 판례상 임원에 대한 경영판단의 원칙 적용여부" 한국상사판례학회 19 (19): 289-313, 2006

      15 주기종, "미국 판례상 경영판단의 원칙의 수용 논의" 미국헌법학회 18 (18): 5-5, 2007

      16 김재범, "대출결정시 금융기관 이사의 주의의무와 경영판단의 원칙 -대상판결 : 대법원 2006.11.9. 선고 2004다41651, 41668 판결-" 한국상사판례학회 21 (21): 3-35, 2008

      17 권재열, "경영판단의 원칙 -도입여부에 관한 비판적 검토-" 한국비교사법학회 6 (6): 1999

      18 양동석, "경영판단원칙의 수용가능성" 한국기업법학회 7 : 2001

      19 김효신, "경영판단원칙과 선관주의의무의 재정립" 중앙법학회 13 (13): 449-476, 2011

      20 원동욱, "경영판단 원칙의 최근 동향과 향후 전망 - 미국의 사례를 중심으로 -" 한국상사법학회 29 (29): 85-128, 2010

      21 김정호, "경영권 방어와 비례의 원칙 -대판 2009.1.30. 2008다50776 판결의 평석을 겸하여-" 한국경영법률학회 21 (21): 1-36, 2011

      22 賈政埈, "美國法上 理事의 責任과 義務 - Fiduciary Duty를 중심으로 -" 한국비교사법학회 14 (14): 1-22, 2007

      23 최완진, "經營判斷의 原則의 새로운 動向과 韓國商法受用論" 안암법학회 (26) : 249-277, 2008

      24 John Armour, "Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? -The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation" 95 : 1727-, 2007

      25 "Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)"

      26 Martin Gelter, "The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy" 1-, 2012

      27 Joel Seligman, "The New Corporate Law" 59 : 1-, 1993

      28 Dale Arthur Oesterle, "The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court" 72 : 117-, 1986

      29 Henry Hansmann, "The End of History for Corporate Law" 89 : 439-, 2001

      30 nk H. Easterbrook, "The Economic Structure of Corporate Law" Harvard University Press 1991

      31 Krishnan Chittur, "The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future" 10 : 505-, 1985

      32 Cally Jordan, "The Conundrum of Corporate Governance" 30 : 983-, 2005

      33 Michael J. Kennedy, "The Business Judgment Syllogism-Premises Governing Board Activity" 1316 : 285-, 2002

      34 Albert O. Chip Saulsbury, "The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies" 37 : 115-, 2012

      35 "Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)"

      36 "Smith v. Pratville Manufacturing Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857)"

      37 "Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)"

      38 Joan MacLeod Heminway, "Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives" 10 : 225-, 2005

      39 "Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)"

      40 Thomas Lee Hazen, "Principles of Securities Regulation" Thomson West 2005

      41 "Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986)"

      42 "Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984)"

      43 "Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829)"

      44 "Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)"

      45 Margaret M. Blair, "Ownership and Control –Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century-" The Brookings Institution 1995

      46 "Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)"

      47 Stephen M. Bainbridge, "Mergers and Acquisitions" Foundation Press 2009

      48 "Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 141"

      49 Tyler Theobald, "Hostile Takeovers and Hostile Defenses: A Comparative Look at U.S. Board Deference and the European Effort at Harmonization" 15 : 60-, 2006

      50 "Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312"

      51 "Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191"

      52 William T. Allen, "Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standard of Review in Delaware Corporation Law" 26 : 859-, 2001

      53 Harry G. Hutchinson, "Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability / Authority Paradigm" 36 : 1111-, 2005

      54 Mark J. Roe, "Delaware's Politics" 118 : 2491-, 2005

      55 Mark J. Roe, "Delaware's Competition" 117 : 558-, 2003

      56 Mohsen Manesh, "Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy" 52 : 189-, 2011

      57 Addison D. Braendel, "Defeating Poison Pills through Enactment of a State Shareholder Protection Statute" 25 : 651-, 2000

      58 Lewis D. Solomon, "Corporations –Examples and Explanations-" Aspen Law & Business 1999

      59 Charles R.T. O’Kelley, "Corporations and Other Business Associations –Cases and Materials" Aspen Law & Business 1999

      60 Jeffrey D. Bauman, "Corporations Law and Policy -Materials and Problems-" Thomson West 2007

      61 James D. Cox, "Corporations" Aspen 2003

      62 Franklin A. Gevurtz, "Corporation Law" Westgroup 2000

      63 Stephen M. Bainbridge, "Corporate Law" Foundation Press 2009

      64 Arthur R. Pinto, "Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations" 46 : 317-, 1998

      65 "Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)"

      66 "Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964)"

      67 "Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)"

      68 D. Gordon Smith, "Business Organizations - Cases, Problems, and Case Studies" Aspen 683-, 2004

      69 J. Hinsey, "Business Judgment and the ALI's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality" 52 : 609-, 1984

      70 "Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962)"

      71 "Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)"

      72 William M. Lafferty, "A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors under Delaware Law" 116 : 837-, 2012

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