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    기후변화와 자유무역 – EU의 CBAM을 중심으로 – = Climate Change and International Free Trade: Regarding Initiation of CBAM in the EU

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A108966213

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    From October 1, 2023, the EU began implementing CBAM. In a situation where the climate change crisis is accelerating, CBAM is an additional policy to achieve the European Green Deal goals along with the EU's ETS. The purpose of CBAM is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by imposing a carbon tax on products imported into the EU, and to prevent 'carbon leakage', which causes companies within the EU to shift production to countries with less stringent carbon emissions standards, increasing global carbon emissions. However, unlike ETS, which is a free contract method of trading carbon in the market, CBAM is a more restrictive measures for international trade through mandatory import tariffs.
    The EU CBAM may violate Article I of GATT due to the possibility of differential treatment of imported goods according to the carbon pricing system of their country of origin and the fact that it is designed in a way that the industries covered by the CBAM have a greater impact on the exports of certain countries.
    The increase in additional financial costs due to the purchase of CBAM certificates is a violation of the existing EU concession obligations under GATT Article II, and the change in the tariff concession schedule that increases tariff rates is also judged to be in conflict with the principle of trade liberalization. The cost of the obligation to purchase and submit a CBAM certificate imposed by the EU is a discriminatory financial burden on the importer, and the importer's obligation to submit a CBAM report and certification materials and apply for CBAM declarant approval are related to laws and regulations and their application. This may constitutes violation against GATT Article III.
    Of course, such violations can be justified under GATT Article XX. Regarding the justification requirement, the satisfaction of the necessity requirement is questionable in that ‘less restrictive’ alternatives, i.e. more market-friendly measures, can be considered rather than mandating the purchase and submission of CBAM certificates. Suspicions still remain that the EU is imposing disguised protectionist trade regulations for industries covered by CBAM.
    The EU did not choose to directly implement more intensive carbon emission reduction policies within the EU or to strengthen international cooperation within the existing UNFCCC system. Rather, the EU unilaterally introduced CBAM under the justification of using the purchasing power of the huge EU market as a weapon and promoting the reduction of carbon emissions in countries outside the region that export carbon-intensive products to the EU. However, in order to harmonize the CBAM of the WTO and the EU, it is necessary to institutionalize CBAM within a multilateral, free trade framework through negotiations and revision of the agreement in the WTO.
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    From October 1, 2023, the EU began implementing CBAM. In a situation where the climate change crisis is accelerating, CBAM is an additional policy to achieve the European Green Deal goals along with the EU's ETS. The purpose of CBAM is to reduce green...

    From October 1, 2023, the EU began implementing CBAM. In a situation where the climate change crisis is accelerating, CBAM is an additional policy to achieve the European Green Deal goals along with the EU's ETS. The purpose of CBAM is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by imposing a carbon tax on products imported into the EU, and to prevent 'carbon leakage', which causes companies within the EU to shift production to countries with less stringent carbon emissions standards, increasing global carbon emissions. However, unlike ETS, which is a free contract method of trading carbon in the market, CBAM is a more restrictive measures for international trade through mandatory import tariffs.
    The EU CBAM may violate Article I of GATT due to the possibility of differential treatment of imported goods according to the carbon pricing system of their country of origin and the fact that it is designed in a way that the industries covered by the CBAM have a greater impact on the exports of certain countries.
    The increase in additional financial costs due to the purchase of CBAM certificates is a violation of the existing EU concession obligations under GATT Article II, and the change in the tariff concession schedule that increases tariff rates is also judged to be in conflict with the principle of trade liberalization. The cost of the obligation to purchase and submit a CBAM certificate imposed by the EU is a discriminatory financial burden on the importer, and the importer's obligation to submit a CBAM report and certification materials and apply for CBAM declarant approval are related to laws and regulations and their application. This may constitutes violation against GATT Article III.
    Of course, such violations can be justified under GATT Article XX. Regarding the justification requirement, the satisfaction of the necessity requirement is questionable in that ‘less restrictive’ alternatives, i.e. more market-friendly measures, can be considered rather than mandating the purchase and submission of CBAM certificates. Suspicions still remain that the EU is imposing disguised protectionist trade regulations for industries covered by CBAM.
    The EU did not choose to directly implement more intensive carbon emission reduction policies within the EU or to strengthen international cooperation within the existing UNFCCC system. Rather, the EU unilaterally introduced CBAM under the justification of using the purchasing power of the huge EU market as a weapon and promoting the reduction of carbon emissions in countries outside the region that export carbon-intensive products to the EU. However, in order to harmonize the CBAM of the WTO and the EU, it is necessary to institutionalize CBAM within a multilateral, free trade framework through negotiations and revision of the agreement in the WTO.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 류병운, "국제법" 형설출판사 2023

    2 G. Goh, "The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustment at the Border" 38 (38): 395-, 2006

    3 Peter Van den Bossche, "The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials" 545-546, 2013

    4 P. Low, "The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues" WTO 2011

    5 Martinus Melinda, "The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Implications for ASEAN-EU Relations" 2023

    6 B. Smulders, "The EU and the WTO: Ever the Twain Shall Meet, Ch. 10" Wolters Kluwer 2023

    7 D. Boklan, "Rethinking, Repackaging and Rescuing World Trade Law in the Post-Pandemic Era" 2021

    8 Steven Nathaniel Zane, "Leveling the Playing Field : The International Legality of Carbon Tariffs in the EU" 34 : 199-, 2011

    9 박효민, "EU 탄소국경조정메커니즘(CBAM)의 WTO TBT 협정 합치성-환경, 기술, 그리고 TBT협정 간 관계 모색-" 696 : 2022

    10 Paul-Erik Veel, "Carbon Tariffs and the WTO : An Evaluation of Feasible Policies" 12 : 749-, 2009

    1 류병운, "국제법" 형설출판사 2023

    2 G. Goh, "The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustment at the Border" 38 (38): 395-, 2006

    3 Peter Van den Bossche, "The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials" 545-546, 2013

    4 P. Low, "The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues" WTO 2011

    5 Martinus Melinda, "The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Implications for ASEAN-EU Relations" 2023

    6 B. Smulders, "The EU and the WTO: Ever the Twain Shall Meet, Ch. 10" Wolters Kluwer 2023

    7 D. Boklan, "Rethinking, Repackaging and Rescuing World Trade Law in the Post-Pandemic Era" 2021

    8 Steven Nathaniel Zane, "Leveling the Playing Field : The International Legality of Carbon Tariffs in the EU" 34 : 199-, 2011

    9 박효민, "EU 탄소국경조정메커니즘(CBAM)의 WTO TBT 협정 합치성-환경, 기술, 그리고 TBT협정 간 관계 모색-" 696 : 2022

    10 Paul-Erik Veel, "Carbon Tariffs and the WTO : An Evaluation of Feasible Policies" 12 : 749-, 2009

    11 Joost Pauwelyn, "Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments Under WTO Law 1"

    12 Matthew C. Porterfield, "Border Adjustments for Carbon Taxes, PPMs, and the WTO" 41 (41): 1-, 2019

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