우루과이라운드 농산물협상과 한국의 전략적 대응에 관한 연구 : 수정된 투레벨게임의 관점에서 = Korea's Tying Hands Strategy vis-a-vis the Multi-party Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study attempts to evaluate Korea's strategic responses and reactions in the process of the multi-party agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round from the two-level game perspective. It is assumed that the national bargaining process is likely to proceed on the two levels, i,e., the international level on one hand and the domestic level on the other hand. The logic of the two level game is that any internation negotiation requires a ratification procedure in which the relevant domestic interest groups tend to play a crucial role.
While confirming the utility of Putnam's approach, this study also tries to contribute to its further development. A couple of important revisions of Putnam's approach deserve attention. First of, all the state does not need to be regarded as a honest broker, but as a semiautonomous actor that has its own vision of nation interests. Moreover, the disagreement point of the bargaining situation should be understood as a minus point, rather than a zero point, for it will be likely to impose some severe damage on a weak bargaining partner.
Based on the new two level game assumptions, this study divides the Korean strategies with regard to the Uruguay Round negotiations into the four phases. The salient feature of the first phase can be characterized as a typical level one game. While some impromtu efforts were made by the Korean government to respond to the outside pressure toward opening the agricultural market, domestic actors including the farmers remained ignorant about the importance of the Uruguay Round negotiations. As the negotiations proceeded, however, the peasants and other relevant social groups began to be mobilized against the opening of the domestic rice market. Meanwhile, the government, confronted by the increasing demands from the U. S. and other rice-exporting countries, had to make some remarkable concessions, although it continued to proclaim its political willingness to protect the rice market at any cost. Finally, the government found itself unable to stick to its close door policy and was forced to issue a public apology for opening the market, which aroused deep anger and frustrations among the farmers.
In conclusion, this study argues that the limits of Korea's tying hand strategy during the Uruguay Round negotiations demonstrate the utterly asymmetrical power relationships in the negotiation process. It is worth noting that the Korean government might be symbolized as an impatient buyer, while the US and EC as a patient seller.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. 문제의 제기
• II. 이론적 관점
• III. 우루과이라운드 농산물협상의 전개과정과 한국의 대응전략
• IV. 결어