쫑카빠의 자립논증비판에 나타난 그의 독창적 견해 - 『밀의명해』(密意明解, dGongs pa rab gsal)와 둡타(Grub mtha’) 문헌 중심으로 -

박영란 한국불교학회 2023 韓國佛敎學 Vol.108 No.-

자립논증파가 세속에서 자성적으로 성립하는 존재를 인정한다는 사상은 인도에서는 보여지지 않음에도 불구하고, 쫑카빠의 저술과 몇몇 둡타 문헌들에서 강력하게 주장된다. 이에 본고는 쫑카빠가 왜 그러한 사상을 견지하며 어떠한 사상적 배경속에서 그의 사상이 형성된 것인지를 『밀의명해』과 몇몇 둡타(Grub mtha’) 문헌을 중심으로 고찰하였다. 그 결과 그는 디그나가를 위시한 인도 불교논리학이 기반한 존재론에 의해 영향을 받은 것으로 보인다. 나아가, 그러한 사상은 자립논증식을 성립시키는 근거와 인도불교 제학파에 대한 티베트의 교상판석의 과정에서 명확하게 정착된 것으로 추정된다. 먼저 논증법에 있어서 자립논증식이 타당하게 성립하기 위해서는 바른 인식에 근거해야 한다고 보았다. 다시 말해 논의되는 주제가 객관적인 상태로 존재해야만 두 대론자에게 공통적으로 인식이 이루어질 수 있기 때문에 대상이 자성적으로 혹은 자기측면에서 성립하는 것일 수 밖에 없다는 결론에 이르게 된다. 이와 같이 자립논증의 추론식이 성립하기 위한 근거로서 대상의 자성적 성립이라는 사상이 자연스럽게 도출되었을 것으로 여겨진다. 또한 중관학파의 하위분파에 관한 체계적인 분류는 인도에서 성립되지 않았지만, 이후 티베트 쫑카빠와 그의 사상을 계승한 후대 학설가들에 이르러 확립되었다는 점은 주지의 사실이다. 그들은 인도논사들에 대한 사상분석과 체계적인 학파분류과정에서 자립논증파가 세속에서 자성을 갖고 성립하는 존재를 인정한다고 특정지으면서 귀류논증파와의 사상적 차별을 두고 있다. 따라서 자립논증파가 자성적으로 성립하는 세속의 존재를 인정한다는 사상은 티베트인들이 인도 중관사상을 이해하기 위하여 인도 중관사상에 대한 면밀한 사상분석의 결과로 도출되어진 티베트 쫑카빠의 독자적인 중관사상이라고 평가할 수 있다. The idea that the Autonomy School (Svātantrika­Mādhyamika) accepts that conventional phenomena are established by way of their own character is described on Tsongkhapa’s own writing, Illumination of the Thought (dGongs pa rab gsal) and several Grub mtha’ literatures although it is not found in Indian Mādhyamika School. This paper investigates why TsongKhapa maintains such an idea and explores the philosophical background in which his view was formed. In conclusion, he seems to have been influenced by an ontology based on the Indian Buddhist logic of Dignāga. Furthermore, his idea seems to have been clearly established in the rationale of autonomous syllogism (svātantra­anumāna) and in the process of the Tibetan classification of the teachings of Indian Buddhist Schools. First, in order for autonomous syllogism to be reasonably established, it should be based on the valid cognition. In other words, subjects of debate must exist in an objective state in order to be perceived in common by the two interlocutors, this leads to the conclusion that the object is bound to be established by way of its own character. In this way, the idea that the object is established by way of its own character or nature is naturally derived as a requirement for establishing autonomous syllogism. In addition, it is reported that the systematic classification of sub­ divisions of the Mādhyamika School was not established in India but was established by Tsongkhapa and his successors later in Tibet. In the process of close analysis of Indian Mādhyamika theory and systematic classification of Indian Buddhist schools, they concluded that the Autonomy School accepted the object which was established by way of its own character conventionally. In this respect, they also distinguished Autonomy School from Consequence School (Mādhyamika­Prāsaṅgika). Therefore, the idea that the Autonomy School accepts the object existing by way of its own nature conventionally, inherent existence, can be evaluated as a distinctive view of Tsongkhapa and Tibetan Buddhism.

vijñāna에 관한 논변

이종철(Lee Jong-Cheol),우제선, 박인성 불교학연구회 2000 불교학연구 Vol.1 No.-

  In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its epistemological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu"s thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmako?a to the Vy?khy?yukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu"s discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmako?a all the way down to his later Yog?c?ra-vij??nav?da inclination period.<BR>  Through various debates with Indian schools such as the S?mkhya, the Vai?e?ika, and the Vaiy?kara?a, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the "subject responsible for action" or as the "subject of cognition". According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu"s theory of consciousness - based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (an?tman) - in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions.<BR>  Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiy?kara?a, which are introduced in the Abhidharmako?a and the Vy?khy?yukti(Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vy?khy?yukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions.

vijñāna에 관한 논변

이종철 불교학연구회 2000 불교학연구 Vol.1 No.-

In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its episte- mological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu's thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmakośa to the Vyākhyāyukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu's discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmakośa all the way down to his later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda inclination period. Through various debates with Indian schools such as the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Vaiyākaraṇa, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the “subject responsible for action” or as the “subject of cognition”. According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness ― based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (anātman) ― in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions. Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiyākaraṇa, which are introduced in the Abhidharmakośa and the Vyākhyāyukti (Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vyākhyāyukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions.