『사르바다르샤나상그라하 (Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha)』 제13장 「빠니니다르샤나(Pāṇinidarśana)」의 연구 (II): 마다바(Mādhava)가 논의한 스포따(sphoṭa)

박수영 한국인도학회 2025 인도연구 Vol.30 No.2

인도 언어철학사에서 “언어란 무엇인가?”란 질문에 대한 인도 문법학자들의 전통적 답변 중의 하나가 의미의 전달자(vācakatva)로서의 스포따(sphoṭa)이다. 『마하바시아』의 서론인 「빠스빠샤흐니까(Paspaśāhnika)」에서 빠딴잘리는 언어의 본질에 대하여 문제를 제기한 바 있으며, 이 질문에 대한 답이 스포따 개념으로 전개된다. 스포따 이론(sphoṭavāda)은 미만사학파, 니야야학파, 문법학파 사이에 치열한 논쟁을 거치며 전개되었으며, 바르뜨리하리의 『바끼아빠디야』에 이르러 개념이 완성된다. 본고에서는 14세기에 마다바(Mādhava)가 저술한 『사르바다르샤나상그라하』에서 논의된 스포따론을 검토했다. 16개의 학파를 베단따의 관점에서 낮은 수준에서 시작하여 점차 높은 수준으로 배열하여 기술한 『사르바다르샤나상그라하』에서는 니야야학파, 미만사학파, 문법학파를 각각 제11, 12, 13장에 배치하여 문법학파를 상대적으로 높은 경지의 학파로 여겼다. 실제로 마다바는 문법학파의 입장에서 두 학파의 반론에 대응하며 논지를 전개한다. 본 논문에서는 바르뜨리하리 언어론의 정수인 스포따론을 중세의 마다바가 어떤 입장에서 어떻게 이해하며 기술했는지에 대하여 중점적으로 검토하고자 한다. In the history of Indian linguistic philosophy, one of the traditional answers given by Indian grammarians to the question, "What is language?" is sphoṭa as vācakatva, carrier of meaning. In Paspaśāhnika, the introduction to the Mahābhāṣya, Patañjali raises the question of the nature of language, and the answer to this question is developed through the concept of sphoṭa. The theory of sphoṭa developed through fierce debates among the Mīmāṁsaka, Naiyāyika, and Vaiyākaraṇa schools, and its concept was completed in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya. In this paper, I examine the theory of sphoṭa discussed in the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha written by Mādhava in the 14th century. In the Sarvadarśanasangraha, which describes sixteen schools of thought from a Vedānta perspective, starting from the lowest and arranging them in progressively higher levels, the Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, and Grammatical schools are placed in chapters 11, 12, and 13, respectively, with the Grammatical school being considered a relatively higher school. In fact, Mādhava develops his argument from the perspective of the Grammatical school, responding to the objections of the two schools. This paper will focus on examining how Mādhava understood and described the Sphoṭa, the essence of Bhartrihari's linguistic theory, from what perspective.

vijñāna에 관한 논변

이종철(Lee Jong-Cheol),우제선, 박인성 불교학연구회 2000 불교학연구 Vol.1 No.-

  In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its epistemological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu"s thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmako?a to the Vy?khy?yukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu"s discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmako?a all the way down to his later Yog?c?ra-vij??nav?da inclination period.<BR>  Through various debates with Indian schools such as the S?mkhya, the Vai?e?ika, and the Vaiy?kara?a, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the "subject responsible for action" or as the "subject of cognition". According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu"s theory of consciousness - based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (an?tman) - in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions.<BR>  Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiy?kara?a, which are introduced in the Abhidharmako?a and the Vy?khy?yukti(Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vy?khy?yukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions.

vijñāna에 관한 논변

이종철 불교학연구회 2000 불교학연구 Vol.1 No.-

In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its episte- mological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu's thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmakośa to the Vyākhyāyukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu's discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmakośa all the way down to his later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda inclination period. Through various debates with Indian schools such as the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Vaiyākaraṇa, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the “subject responsible for action” or as the “subject of cognition”. According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness ― based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (anātman) ― in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions. Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiyākaraṇa, which are introduced in the Abhidharmakośa and the Vyākhyāyukti (Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vyākhyāyukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions.

바르뜨리하리(Bhartṛhari)의 재조명 - 인도사상사에서의 위치와 역할 -

박수영 한국외국어대학교 인도연구소 2019 남아시아연구 Vol.25 No.1

Bhartṛhari is known as a thinker who has widely accepted various ideas of his times without rejecting or criticizing specific thoughts. So he is considered to reflect the spirit of tolerance in the Gupta Dynasty, which represents the golden age of the classical civilization of India. However, in Vākyapadīya, where the spectrum of various ideas is found, the first thing to appear on the surface is the many Vaiśeṣika terms. And what is revealed when we confronts his ideas in detail is the homogeneity with the advaita-vedānta idea. Furthermore, the theory of śūnyatā-vāda of Nāgārjuna is widely found in the text, like the texts of Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, who are criticized as secret Buddhists by the opposition. It is the Vaiśeṣika that positively extended the ontology of Buddhism such as Sarvāstivāda which developed precise ontology for the first time in the history of Indian philosophy. On the contrary, it is Nāgārjuna's theory of śūnyatā-vāda that sought to reveal Buddha's core idea by eliminating the non-Buddhist elements of Sarvāstivāda which seems to acknowledge the concept of substance. In this paper, I try to re-examine the idea of Bhartṛhari, who combines two contradictory ideas through the concept of śakti. Bhartṛharian concept of śakti, which redefined the concept of padārtha of Vaiśeṣika, became a device to reconcile the unity of the One and diversity of the world. And Bhartṛharian concept of Sattā, which is the supreme universal in his ontology, becomes a device to sublate the contradiction of the unmovedness of the One and the dynamics of the world. By Bhartṛhari, Vaiśeṣika found a way to incorporate itself into āstika, and at the same time, he became the pioneer of Advaita-vāda. 바르뜨리하리는 인도 고전문명의 황금기를 대표하는 굽따 왕조 시대의 관용 정신을 반영하여 특정 사상을 배제 또는 비판하지 않고 다양한 사상을 폭넓게 수용한 사상가로 알려져 있다. 그런데 다양한 사상의 스펙트럼이 발견되는 그의 주저 문장단어론(Vākyapadīya) 에서도 표면적으로 가장 먼저 드러나는 것은 다수의 바이셰시까 용어들이다. 그리고 그의 사상을 본격적으로 대면할 때 드러나는 것은 아드바이따 베단따 사상과의 동질성이다. 더 나아가 반대파에 의해 “비밀불교도”라 비판받은 가우다빠다, 샹까라처럼 나가르주나의 이제론적 공사상이 폭넓게 발견된다는 것이다. 본고에서는 인도철학사상 최초로 정밀한 존재론을 전개한 유부 등 부파불교의 존재론에 대하여 브라흐마니즘 측에서 오히려 긍정적으로 확장하여 대응한 바이셰시까의 존재론, 그리고 실체성을 인정하는 듯한 부파불교 존재론의 비불교적 요소를 일소하여 붓다의 본의를 드러내고자 한 나가르주나의 공이론이라는 서로 모순되는 사상을 샥띠 개념을 통하여 지양·종합한 바르뜨리하리의 사상을 재조명하고자 한다. 바이셰시까의 빠다르타(padārtha)를 재정의한 샥띠(śakti) 개념은 유일자의 일원성과 현실 세계의 다양성이라는 모순을 지양하는 장치가 되었고, 그의 존재론에서 최고의 보편인 삿따(sattā) 개념은 브라흐만의 부동성과 현실 세계의 역동성이라는 모순을 화해하는 장치가 된다. 그에 의하여 바이셰시까는 정통(āstika) 사상에 편입될 수 있는 방법을 찾았고, 동시에 그는 아드바이따 베단따의 선구가 되었다.

바르뜨리하리의 행위(kriyā)와 존재(sattā) 개념

박수영(Park, Sou-Young) 한국인도학회 2018 印度硏究 Vol.23 No.2

바르뜨리하리(Bhartṛhari)에 따르면 세계는 모든 것의 씨앗(질료인)인 유일자 샤브다브라흐만이 언어원리를 통하여 현현한 것이므로, 언어와 실재는 결코 분리되지 않는다. 그는 브라흐만의 일원성과 세계의 다양성이라는 모순을 해결하기 위하여 샥띠(śakti) 개념을 도입한다. 바이셰시까의 다원론적 실재인 6범주를 재정의하며 정립된 샥띠를 통하여, 브라흐만은 세계 다양성의 원인이 되면서도 동시에 자신의 일원성을 확보할 수 있게 된다. 바르뜨리하리는 그의 주저 『문장단어론』의 제3권인 “빠다깐다”에서 방향, 수단, 행위, 시간 등 네 가지의 주요 샥띠를 다룬다. 방향과 시간은 모든 행위를 추동하는 샥띠(동력인)이자 인식의 토대이지만, 유일자로부터 세계가 전개되게 하는 과정의 중심에는 항상 행위가 있다. 그러므로 행위에 대한 그의 이론은 필연적으로 존재론과 더불어 전개된다. 본고에서는 “빠다깐다”의 ‘행위편’에 기술된 내용을 중심으로 바르뜨리하리의 행위와 존재 개념을 다룬다. 먼저 행위의 정의, 인식, 표현을 검토하고, 이어 계사(繫辭)에 불과한 상태 동사 어근 √as가 모든 행위를 포괄하는 보편적 개념이 되는 과정을 검토한다. 그리고 √as의 추상 명사에 불과한 사따(sattā)가 최고의 보편 또는 최고의 존재의 의미를 갖게 되어, 브라흐만이라는 구체적 호칭을 대체하게 되는 근거도 분석한다. 이를 통하여 그의 행위론이 형이상학적 존재론으로 귀결되는 과정을 밝히고자 한다. According to Bhartṛhari, the phenomenal world is manifested through the language principle of Śabdabrahman, the seed of everything (sarvabīja), so language and reality are never separate. He introduces the concept of śakti to solve the contradiction between the unity of Brahman and diversity of the world. Through Bhartṛhari’s redefinition of the six categories (padārtha) of Vaiśeṣika, Brahman can become a cause of world diversity and at the same time secure its own unity. Bhartṛhari deals with four major śaktis, that is, direction (dik), means (sādhana), action (kriyā), and time (kāla), in the Padakāṇḍa, the third volume of his main work, Vākyapadīya. Direction and time are the basis of recognition, which is the driving force for all actions, but there is always action at the heart of the process of making the world evolve from the One. Therefore, his theory of action necessarily evolves with ontology. In this paper, I focus on the contents of ‘Kriyāsamuddeśa’ of the Padakāṇḍa and Bhartṛhari’s concepts of action and being. First, I examine the definition, recognition, and expression of action, and then examine the process in which the verb root √as, which is only a copula, becomes a universal concept covering all acts. And I analyze the reason that sattā, which is only an abstract noun of √as, has the meaning of the Universal or Supreme Being, and substitutes the specific title of Brahman. Through these analyses, I intend to reveal the process in which Bhartṛhari’s theory of action results in a metaphysical ontology.