전작권 전환 정상추진과 한미동맹의 비전

정경영 ( Kyung Young Chung ) 한국군사학회 2013 군사논단 Vol.74 No.-

The transition of wartime operational control and North Korea`s nuclear issue is an issue of national identity and survival. The idea to defer the transition of wartime operational control before North Korea`s nuclear issue is resolved seems like a strategy that guarantees South Korea`s national security. This opinion is similar to the logic that as long as the current North Korean regime exists, because North Korea will never abandon nuclear weapons for regime stability, securing of economic support, holding South Korea as hostage, and nuclear attack and threat, South Korea will never be able to accomplish the transition of wartime operational control. As long as wartime operational control isn`t normalized, South Korea will continue to be in a situation being dragged around by a dictatorship regime and a nuclear-armed North Korea. The transition of wartime operation control implies the following significance in terms of the fundamental changes in the national security of the Republic of Korea. First, exercising operational control over the ROK Armed Forces is essential for pursuing unification during both peacetime and wartime. Second, by recovering national identity and securing autonomous employment of military forces, South Korea will be able to deter North Korean military adventurism and promptly and decisively retaliate in the event of any provocation. The transition of wartime operational control provides a momentum for expanding South Korean diplomatic activity by demonstrating a more independent foreign policy. Those who oppose this transition insist that the implementation of the transition of wartime operation control by December 2015 will inevitably dismantle the ROK-US combined defense system and will have a severe impact on the security capability of the country. They also reason out that the implementation of the wartime operational control transition could induce US forces to pull out of the peninsula and eventually end the ROK-US Alliance. In particular, it will be more difficult for the US Government to deploy augmentation forces to the Korean Peninsula in the event of war because the transition turns the alliance into a mere cooperative relationship. Hence, there will no longer be automatic support and deployment in the event of war. Finally, the fact that the pre-planned war fighting capability project was not executed because of national defense budget constraints makes it more practical, they insist, to delay the implementation of the transition. It is for these intertwining reasons that some factions oppose the planned wartime operational control transition scheduled on December 1, 2015. However, the counter arguments to all of these are strong. The wartime operational control transition must be implemented as planned because the North Korean nuclear crisis and OPCON issues should be managed separately from each other. Moreover, the North is exploiting the South`s heavy dependence on the US. North Korea views the South as having no authority to command its own forces. Pyongyang therefore would rather push for a bilateral talk with Washington instead of dealing with Seoul. This is a vulnerability for South Korea and is continuously being exploited by Pyongyang. Furthermore, even though the transition pushes through as planned, the US will continue to have a presence on the Korean Peninsula because of the threat posed by China in the region. The US will want to exercise USFK strategic flexibility in dealing with potential Chinese threats. Also the US War Power Act enables the US President to mobilize forces to be deployed in the Korean theater without prior approval from the US Congress. Finally, the vulnerable ROK war-fighting capability could be integrated by the US bridging capabilities. The North Korean nuclear and missile threat that continues to be the reason why some people oppose the implementation of wartime operation control transition should be resolved by the US extended deterrence and South Korea`s own comprehensive strategies. During and after the Key Resolved Combined Exercise last Spring, the US has demonstrated its resolve and commitment to defend the Republic of Korea against the nuclear and missile threats posed by the North, mainly through power projection. The US power projection was exhibited through sending B52 and B2 bombers, as well as F22 fighter jets and a Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier from Okinawa, Guam and even from as far as the continental United States. All of these should erase any doubt against the US commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea should continue to develop preemptive action to prevent any disaster resulting from a nuclear attack. The Kill-Chain System as well as the Korean Air Missile Defense System should be established. Seoul needs to acquire Global Hawk and develop ballistic missiles to neutralize North Korea`s missile capability. Moreover, a diplomatic track should also be explored by institutionalizing the trilateral strategic talks among Seoul, Washington and Beijing in order to prevent further military provocations from Pyongyang. It could also be a venue to induce North Korea to become a responsible member of the community of nations in the region. Further, South Korea should actively join international consortium for Cross-border Regional Economic Development with China, North Korea and Russia as partners. Our two countries have made every effort for the preparation of the wartime operation control transition in accordance with Strategic Alliance 2015, such as the ROK-JCS Military Structure reorganization, reinforcement of ROK war fighting capability, and a joint war plan and strategic directives that will be applicable to ROK-US Combined Forces after the transition of wartime operation control. An evaluation team will report the results to the 2015 Security Consultative Meeting. Eventually, by the 1st of December 2015, the transition of wartime operation control will be executed. There were critical agreements and joint communiqu? between the two governments. First, the ROK Chairman of JCS and the USFK Commander signed a joint operation plan against North Korean provocation on March 22nd. Second, during Park Geun-hye`s visit to Washington, both presidents proclaimed a join communiqu? on the 60th Anniversary of the ROK-US Alliance. President Obama made it clear that the transition of wartime operation control should be implemented as planned. Third, the Defense Ministerial Talks between the US and ROK, which was held in Singapore on May 31, 2013 reconfirmed the preplanned implementation of the transition, including the review of ROK-US theater command to be commanded by the ROK Chairman of the JCS supported by USFK Commander as deputy commander. These imply a strong determination from both governments to implement the mutually agreed wartime operation control transition. Finally, the President of South Korea should initiate quarterly wartime operation control transition preparedness conference. This is to facilitate bipartisan and public support. A synchronized effort by the presidential leadership will enable South Korea to smoothly implement the transition of wartime operation control as planned by December 1, 2015. This historical epochal event, the transition of wartime operation control, indicates that South Korea is taking off as a strong and rich nation. This would deter the North from ever challenging the resolve of the country again through provocations. The ROK-US Alliance will be a great model by achieving industrialization and democratization, followed by self-reliant defense of the Republic of Korea.

나토의 레벨-1 교리 표준화 문서에 나타난 지휘관계 검토

안성규(Sungkyu Ahn) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2022 신아세아 Vol.29 No.2

작전 지휘·통제 체계는 전쟁 승리를 위한 핵심요소다. 본 논문은 나토 레벨-1 교리 표준화 문서에 나타난 작전 지휘체계를 지휘 관계 5개 요소를 통해 분석하고 이를 현재 및 작전권 전환 뒤 한미연합사의 그것과 비교했다. 그 결과 연합사 작전 지휘체계는 동맹 정치 요소를 작전 효율성보다 더 중시하는 것으로 파악됐다. 정치 요소가 강한 세 분야는 크게 전·평시 분할, 최고 작전지휘권 제한, 미래 전시 연합사령관 국적 변경이다. 나토 최고사령관(SACEUR)은 전·평시 구분 없는 작전지휘권(OPCOM)을 갖지만 연합사령관은 전시 작전통제권(OPCON)으로 제한된다. 전시 최고사령관의 국적 변경은 지휘 연속성을 파괴하고 작전 효율성도 낮춘다. 현재의 전시작전권 전환 작업은 승리보다 동맹 정치에 치중한 무리한 조치라는 우려를 일으킨다. The operational command system is a key factor in victory in war. The paper analyzes five elements of the operational command system using NATO's level-1 doctrinal standardization document and compares it to the current system and after the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC). The study reveals that the CFC operational command system focuses more on allied political elements than operational efficiency. The three areas with strong political elements are the peacetime and wartime split of OPCON, the restriction of the supreme operational leadership, and the change of nationality of future wartime CFC commander. NATO's top commander has operational command (OPCOM) without the peacetime and wartime split, but the CFC commander has wartime OPCON. Change in the commander-in-chief's nationality in wartime disrupts the continuity of command principle and reduces operational efficiency. Therefore, the current transition of wartime operations may raise suspicions that it is focused more on alliance politics than victory.

Problems of the ROK–U.S. Combined Command Structure and Alternatives

장재규 한국국방연구원 2023 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.35 No.4

The purpose of this study was to identify the problems and causes of the ROK–U.S. combined command structure and seek alternatives in connection with the transfer of wartime operational control, which will be an inflection point for the ROK– U.S. alliance. The current ROK–U.S. combined command structure is a political product of the ROK–U.S. alliance and has a structural problem of “one theater, two theater commands,” creating a temporal and spatial separation of the operation of Korean theater. Thus, ways to solve the problem should be explored within the political mechanism of the ROK–U.S. alliance, which is the cause of the problem. The ROK–U.S. alliance has been pushing for the transfer of wartime operational control since 2006. If the problems of the ROK–U.S. combined command structure are solved in connection with the transfer of wartime operational control, there are three options: the current deputy commander of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander, the ROK’s chairman of joint chiefs of staff concurrently serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander, or the ROK’s joint forces commander concurrently serving as the future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander. Among these, the most likely and feasible solution is the last option, which presupposes the creation of the ROK joint forces command. However, the establishment of the ROK joint forces command and joint forces commander’s dual service as a future ROK–U.S. combined forces commander must break away from the strong path dependence of the ROK military structure and the ROK–U.S. combined defense system, and overcome the ROK’s internal opposition. The corresponding approach should be long-term and step-by-step, and the transfer of wartime operational control of the ROK–U.S. alliance should be used as an event of deviation from path dependence and linked to the creation of the ROK’s strategic command.

선행연구, 주요국의 원칙, 작전환경 변화 등을 고려한 육군 임무형지휘 원칙 적용성 탐색

이훈 ( Lee Hun ) 한국군사학회 2024 군사논단 Vol.118 No.0

Mission command is a comprehensive military idea and command method based on the mission that was born in the Prussian army in the early 19th century and has been inherited and developed by the German army. The Army defines and applies mission command as the ‘military command philosophy’ as a command and control approach that leads the changing situation by strengthening the delegation and decentralization of decision-making authority in subordinate units. This expresses a willingness to apply more broadly and in-depth than Germany, which first developed mission command, or the United States, which currently actively promotes mission command. However, there is a limit to the application and use of ‘mission command’ in the battlefield. To solve this problem, the purpose of this study is to find a way to apply mission command in the battlefield. To this end, the purpose of this study is to check the contents of previous studies and the application status of developed countries to see if there is any need for improvement in the principles that the Army has developed so that mission-type command can be activated. In addition, it is intended to explore whether the principle of mission command is applicable to the changing operational environment. In order to act on the principle of mission command in accordance with the purpose created by the Army, sub-elements must be developed, measured, and evaluated. Through this study, I would like to approach it a little bit.

미・일 지휘통제체계 개편과 미일동맹 협의체 변화 분석 ― 제도설계 이론의 관점에서 ―

장형익 한일군사문화학회 2025 한일군사문화연구 Vol.45 No.-

This study analyzes the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance’s command and control structure from the perspective of Institutional Design Theory. The key analytical dimensions are: ①centralizatio, ②flexibility-bindingness balance, and ③institutionalization level. Japan established a Joint Operations Command to exercise unified command over its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. As a result, Japan now possesses an "integrated operations system" similar to that of the U.S. military. When cooperating parties have similar internal structures, bilateral coordination costs decrease. U.S. Forces Japan(USFJ) currently holds only administrative authority, while operational command rests with the Indo-Pacific Commander. This represents a case of "decentralization" on the centralization spectrum. The United States is pursuing a transition toward "regional centralization" by restructuring USFJ into a "Joint Force Headquarters" with operational command authority. The Alliance Coordination Mechanism(ACM) and Bilateral Planning Mechanism(BPM) exhibit unique institutional design characteristics from the "flexibility-bindingness balance" perspective. Unlike NATO’s standing integrated military committee, these are "loosely coupled" coordination mechanisms that secure "flexibility" by preserving each nation’s policy autonomy while ensuring minimum "bindingness" by specifying coordination procedures from peacetime through contingencies. The U.S.-Japan alliance is evolving not toward a combined forces command structure like the ROK-U.S. alliance, but rather toward strengthening interoperability and connectivity while maintaining independent chains of command. This represents a strategic choice to secure the alliance’s adaptability and sustainability through the deepening of "functional integration" rather than "unification of command." The restructured USFJ and the newly established Japan Joint Operations Command are expected to serve as the core pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance, building an increasingly close cooperative framework in the years ahead.

6‧25전쟁 초기 전쟁 전략의 변화와 군수지원 체제의 구축

이상호 국방부군사편찬연구소 2023 군사 Vol.- No.128

부산군수사령부의 역사는 초기 6·25전쟁의 성격을 결정한 낙동강방어선 전투와 인천상륙작전의 배경을 이해할 단초를 제공한다. 즉 부산군수기지사령부에서 부산군수사령부로의 전환은 작전 변경에 따른 사령부의 구조 변화이다. 따라서 부산군수사령부의 운영과 역할, 그리고 이에 대한 전반적인 역사를 분석하는 것이 이 논문의 목표이다. 1950년 7월 13일 예상외로 빠른 북한군의 남진과 미 제24사단의 대전지역의 참패가 맥아더로 하여금 전술상의 변화를 이끌어 내었다. 즉 미 제1기병사단을 활용하여 인천에 상륙 북한군의 남침을 저지하려는 맥아더의 전쟁 초기 구상인 블루하츠(Blue-hearts) 구상이 좌절되었다. 이는 미 제24사단을 주축으로 이루어진 주한미군사령부를 지원하는 소규모의 부산기지사령부의 역할을 변경하도록 하였다. 그때까지 지휘 및 지원을 담당했던 기지사령부를 군수사령부로 개편하게 되었고, 부산기지사령부는 부산군수사령부로 변경되었다. 부산군수사령부는 B형 군수사령부로 편성되었다. 부산군수사령부는 또한 대량 피난민 처리, 전쟁포로 수용 및 보급, 그리고 마산, 울산, 포항 및 군산항과 같은 보조항의 운영을 책임지고 있었고, 1950년 9월 중순에는 서해안에 있는 제3군수사령부에 대한 감독과 한국의 원산에 있는 미 제10군단에 대한 보급임무를 추가로 맡게되었다. 1950년 9월 19일 부산군수사령부는 전투부대의 증가에 따른 군수 지원의 책임이 증가됨에 따라 C형의 군수부대인 제2군수사령부로 개칭되었다. The history of the Pusan Logistical Command provides a clue to understanding the background of the Battle of the Nakdong River Defense Line, which determined the nature of the early Korean War, and the Operation Chromite that followed. In other words, the transition from the Pusan Base Command to the Pusan Logistical Command is a structural change of the command following a change in operations. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to analyze the operation and role of the Pusan Logistical Command and its overall history. On July 13, 1950, the unexpectedly rapid advance of the North Korean army and the crushing defeat in the Daejeon area of the US 24th Division led MacArthur to change tactics. In other words, MacArthur's initial plan of the war, the Operation Blue-hearts, to block the invasion of the South by the North Korean army landing at Inchon using the US 1st Cavalry Division was frustrated. This changed the role of the small Pusan Base Command, which supported the USFK Command, which was mainly composed of the US 24th Division. The Base Command, which had been in charge of command and support until then, was reorganized into the Logistical Command, and the Pusan Base Command was changed to the Pusan Logistical Command. The Pusan Logistical Command was organized as a B-type Logistical Command. The Pusan Logistical Command was also responsible for handling mass refugees, receiving and supplying prisoners of war, and operating auxiliary ports such as Masan, Ulsan, Pohang, and Gunsan ports. It was assigned an additional supply mission to the US 10th Corps in Wonsan, on the east coast of Korea. On September 19, 1950, the Pusan Logistical Command was renamed the 2nd Logistical Command, a C-type logistical unit, as the responsibility for logistics support increased with the increase in combat units.

작전술 제대의 편성구조와 군수체제 비교분석

도응조 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2018 전략연구 Vol.25 No.2

This paper focuses on the military strategic evaluation on the relations between operational logistics and organizational structure of the operational echelon through historical background of divisions, corps, field army and theory of operational logistics. The organizational structures that we compare are the current field armies' which has logistics capability and the land operational command's which does not have logistics capability. To compare these structures, this paper analyses three aspects as follow. First, the flexibility of using supply routs. Second, the flexibility to conduct an operational maneuver. Third, the force restoration and sustainment of the tactical echelons under these operational structures. Using the historical cases of Napoleon, German campaign in 1940, Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan War, it tried to explain the validity of the paper's points. This paper concluded that the organizational structure of land operational command that ROKA will estabilish has strategic danger to be vanquished, because it has weaknesses of supply flexibility, conducting and operational maneuver, and vulnerability of sustainment to subordinate echelons. To overcome the vulnerabilities, this paper recommends that the divisional organizations need to reduce their size to brigade lever. Also, suggests that further strategic efforts making the organization like modulation system as the US transformation should be done. 본 논문은 사단, 군단, 야전군의 관계에 대한 역사적 배경과 이론을 기초로 작전술 제대의 편성구조와 군수체제를 작전적 군수 측면에서 비교하고, 군사전략적으로 분석하여 향후지휘구조의 발전에 유용한 정보를 제공하기 위해 작성하였다. 비교한 두 가지 구조는 현재의 사단-군단-야전군 그리고 미래에 창설될 사단-군단-지작사의 편성구조이다. 본 논문에서 중점으로 다룬 비교 분야는 위 두 가지 구조가 갖는 보급로 사용의 융통성, 작전적 기동의 융통성, 전투력유지와 작전지속성의 문제에 두었다. 이를 분석하기 위한 사례는 1940년프랑스 전역, 걸프전 및 이라크 전 등이다. 이 논문에서는 위 세 가지 비교 분야를 고려했을 때, 지작사를 편성하고 그 예하에 자체군수지원 기능을 보유한 군단을 편성하여 군단 단위로 전투를 수행하겠다는 개념은 보급로 사용, 작전적 기동 및 전투력복원 등에 문제점을 야기할 수 있으므로 군사전략적으로위험할 수 있다고 평가하고 있다. 특히, 역사적 사례를 기초로 할 때, 이러한 구조는 치명적인 군사 전략적 취약점을 가질 수 있음을 경고한다. 만일 이러한 편성구조를 그대로 유지하고자 한다면, 적어도 사단 편성구조는 여단급으로 축소 편성되어야 한다고 판단하고 있으며, 보다 작전적인 융통성을 지니기 위한 군사전략적 대책을 강구해야 한다고 결론내리고 있다.

국제법상 국군에 대한 작전지휘권 환수에 따라 제기되는 법적 문제에 관한 연구

김명기(Myung-Ki Kim) 대한적십자사 인도법연구소 2014 人道法論叢 Vol.- No.34

1950년 이래 한반도의 안전은 작전지휘권의 이양이라는 법적 조치에 의해 유지되어 왔다. 작전지휘권의 이양은 2원적 과정을 거쳐 이양되었다. 그 하나는 주한 국제연합군과의 관계에서 작전지휘권의 이양이고, 다른 하나는 주한 미군과의 관계에서 작전지휘권의 이양이다. 전자의 당사자는 대한민국과 국제연합이고, 후자의 당사자는 대한민국과 미국이다. 작전지휘권의 환수에 의해 제기되는 법적 제문제는 다음과 같다. (ⅰ) 대한미국에 대한 “정전협정”의 효력단절 문제: 국군에 대한 작전지휘권을 통해 “정전협정”의 효력은 한국군에 미쳤으나 작전지휘권의 환수에 의해 “정전협정”의 한국에 대한 효력은 단절되게 된다. (ⅱ)한국의 통일을 위한 법적기초의 상실 문제: 국제연합군의 한국에 있어서의 사명의 하나는 1950년 10월 7일의 국제연합총회의 결의에 의거 통일, 독립, 민주 한국정부의 수립이다. 한국군은 동 결의에 따라 국제연합군의 작전지휘에 따라 북한군이 재남침시 38선을 넘어 북진할 수 있었으나 작전지휘권의 환수에 의해 이 법적 근거는 상실되게 된다. (ⅲ) “추가의정서”의 규정을 위반한 미군의 형사책임 문제: 미국은 “추가의정서”의 체약당사자가 아니므로 미군이 “추가의정서”를 위반해도 “추가의정서”상 형사책임을 지지 아니했으나 작전지휘권의 이양으로 한국사령관의 작전지휘하에 있게 되는 미군은 “추가의정서”를 위반한 경우 형사책임을 지게 된다. (ⅳ)한미연합사의 기구개편 문제: 작전지휘권의 환수로 국제연합군사령관인 미군사령관이 한미연합사를 지휘할 수 없게 되어 한미연합사의 기구개편문제가 제기된다. Since 1950 the security of the Korean Peninsula has been maintained by means of legal measures, that is, the transfer of operation command authority. The operation command authority of the Republic of Korea Forces has dual dimensions. The one is the operation command related between the Republic of Korea Forces and the United Nations Forces dispatched to Korea in accordance with the Security Council resolution of June 27 and July 7, 1950 and the other is between the Republic of Korea Forces and the Unites States Forces stationed in Korea in accordance with the provision of Article 4 of Korea and the United States. Therefore the parties of the former are the Republic of Korea and the United Nations. And those of the latter are the Republic of Kore and the United States. The Legal Problems occurred by the recovery in international law are as following. (ⅰ) the Problem or loss or the Legal effect of the Armistice Agreement to the Republic of Korea Forces. The recovery of operation command authority brings the legal effect of the Armistic Agreement on the Republic of Korea, through the command authority would be intercepted. (ⅱ) The Problem of ineffectiveness of the legal basis for the unification of Korea. One of the missions of the United Nations Forces is to establish unifed, independent and democratic government in Korea. The mission was authorized by the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950. The Republic of Korea Forces under control of the operation command authority of th United Nations Command could cross 38th parallel regally to defend against future reagression of the North Korea Army. But by the recovery, the Republic of Korea Forces could not cross the 38th parallel legally. (ⅲ) The Problem of immunity of the criminal responsibility of the United States soldiers violated the stipulation of AP is excluded. (ⅵ) The Problem of the reorganization of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. (ⅴ) The Problem of Korean Peninsula maintained by the operation command authority would be ended.

전시작전통제권 전환정책의 변경요인 분석과 대안:한·미의 국가이익을 중심으로

김재철 한국동북아학회 2013 한국동북아논총 Vol.18 No.4

The changing factors of wartime operational control authority from the decision of ‘wartime operational control authority transfer’ by the Roh Mu-hyun regime – delay of transfer schedule by Lee Myung-bak regime and ‘suggestion of re-delay by Park Geun-hye regime focus on the matter of autonomy, restraint against North Korea and efficiency of the ROK-US alliance strategy. When such factors were analyzed from the national interest, it was analyzed as improper of ‘wartime operational control authority transfer in December 2015’ under the security environment of the Korean peninsula after the 3rd nuclear experiment of North Korea. In order for an alternative set by Park Geun-hye regime to gain national consensus, ‘promotion philosophy based on national interest’, ‘transfer condition’ and ‘new commanding structure’ must be clearly suggested. As for the promotional philosophy of wartime operational control authority, firstly, it must aim at peace and stability of the Korean peninsula preventing any military conflicts between the South and the North. Secondly, conditions must be weighed higher than period and target period must be set clearly. ‘Conditional focusing deferment theory’ might lead to ‘infinite deferment theory.’ Accordingly, it is desirable to set target period as 2020 in link with the National Defense Innovation 2020. Thirdly, the transfer of wartime operational control authority must be decided based on the objective analysis of national interest rather than political factors. As for conditions of wartime operational control authority transfer, it includes the Korean peninsula’s security environmental assessment, responding capacity assessment of Korean against North Korea’s nuclear missile, the capacity of the ROK armed forces and North ROK armed forces in wartime operational control authority transfer and the warranty of support of the US armed forces to the ROK armed forces. As for commanding structure of wartime operational control authority transfer, it must accomplish two objectives of performance of ‘ROK-US alliance strategy’ and warranty of ‘autonomy of Korea’ simultaneously. For this purpose, the ROK armed forces must be in its center and it is necessary to establish alliance armed force commanding headquarter incorporated with major function of the US armed forces whose command-in-chief would be taken by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK armed forces. And the role of the United Nations Command must be reinforced. 2013년 10월 2일 제45차 SCM에서 한미양국은 ‘조건에 기초한 전작권 전환’ 추진을 협의해 가기로 하였다. 노무현 정부의 ‘전작권 전환결정’-이명박 정부의 ‘전환일정 연기’-박근혜 정부의 ‘재연기 제안’에 이르는 전작권 전환정책의 변경요인은 정치·군사적 자주성, 대북억제능력, 북한의 핵미사일 개발, 한미동맹의 지속성, 한미연합작전의 효율성 등으로 집약되었다. 이러한 요인들을 국가이익 차원에서 분석해본 결과, 북한의 3차 핵실험 이후의 한반도 안보환경 하에서 ‘2015년 12월 전작권 전환’은 부적절한 것으로 분석되었다. 향후 박근혜 정부가 마련해야 할 새로운 대안이 국민적 공감을 얻기 위해서는 국가이익에 기반을 둔 ‘추진기조’와 ‘전환조건’ 그리고 ‘새로운 지휘구도’를 명확히 제시해야 한다. 전작권 전환의 추진기조는 첫째, 전작권 전환이 남북 및 한중 간 대립으로 연결되지 않도록 남북관계 개선 및 한중협력관계 증진과 병행하여 추진되어야 한다. 둘째, 시기보다는 조건을 중시하되, 목표시기를 반드시 설정해야 한다. ‘조건중심 연기론’은 자칫 ‘무기연기론’에 빠질 수 있다. 따라서 ‘국방개혁2020’과 연계시켜 2020년을 목표시기로 설정하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 셋째, 전작권 전환은 정치적 요인을 배제하고 순수 국가이익 차원에서 객관적 분석을 통해 결정되어야 할 것이다. 전작권 전환조건 평가시 고려해야 할 사항은 한반도 안보환경 평가, 북한 핵미사일에 대한 한국 측의 대응능력 평가, 전작권 전환 당시 북한군의 능력 vs 한국군의 능력 비교, 주한미군의 한국군 지원보장 등이다. 향후 전작권 전환 시 새로운 지휘구조는 ‘한미연합작전’ 수행과 ‘한국의 자주권’보장이라는 두 가지 목적을 동시에 달성할 수 있어야 할 것이다. 이를 위해 한국군을 주축으로 하면서 미군의 주요 기능이 편성된 새로운 연합전구사령부를 창설하고 사령관은 한국군 합참의장이 맞도록 하되, 유엔사의 역할을 강화하도록 설계할 필요가 있다.

유엔사의 역할 변화에 대한 법적 쟁점과 과제

안준형(Jun-hyeong AHN) 서울국제법연구원 2019 서울국제법연구 Vol.26 No.2

현재 대한민국 방위의 근간은 한미동맹에 기초한 한미연합방위체제로서, 한미연합사령부(CFC)를 주축으로 하여 미군 4성장군인 연합사령관(유엔군사령관 겸임)이 전시작전통제권을 행사하는 구조로 설계되어 있다. 그러나 2018년 10월 31일 제50차 한미안보협의회의(SCM)에서 한미 양국 국방부장관이 전작권 전환 및 미래연합사 편성에 관한 4개의 핵심 전략문서에 서명함에 따라, 추후 전작권 전환 이후에는 한국군 4성장군이 미래연합사령관으로서 한국작전전구(KTO) 내에서 작전을 주도하게 된다. 전작권 전환은 곧 기존의 한미연합사를 새로운 연합지휘구조로 개편함을 의미하는 것이므로, 이와 연계하여 유엔군사령부의 역할과 기능상의 변화 역시 불가피할 것으로 전망된다. 이와 별개로 최근에는 2018년 4.27 판문점 선언을 계기로 정전협정의 평화협정으로의 대체가 논의되면서 유엔군사령부의 존속 여부에 대한 논란이 불거지기도 하였다. 따라서 향후 평화체제로의 전환이나 전작권 전환과 연계하여 전·평시 유엔군사령부의 임무와 기능이 어떻게 정립되어 나갈 것인지, 유엔군사령부와 미래연합사 및 한국 합참 간의 관계가 어떻게 설정될 것인지, 이에 따른 동맹 지휘구조는 어떻게 변화될 것인지 등에 대하여 심도 깊은 논의가 필요한 실정이다. 이에 따라 본고에서는 유엔군사령부의 역할 변화 경험을 토대로 향후 유엔군사령부의 대안적 역할을 가늠해 보고, 유엔군사령부의 존속 또는 해체시 다루어져야 할 법적 쟁점과과제를 살펴보았다. Currently, the basis of defense in Korea is the ROK-US Combined Defense System based on the ROK-US alliance, and is designed in a structure centered on the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) where the Allied Commander (adjunct to the United Nations Command), a US 4 star general, exercises Wartime Operational Control. However, at the 50th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting on October 31, 2018, as ROK-US Defense Ministers signed four key strategic documents on the formation of the Wartime Operation Control Transition and the Future Alliance Command, After the Wartime Operation Control Transition in future, the 4 star general of the ROK military will lead the operation within the ROK Korea Theater of Operation (KTO) as a Future Alliance Commander. Since the Wartime Operation Control Transition means reorganizing current ROK-US Combined Forces Command into a new alliance command structure, in this connection, changes in the role and function of UNC are also expected to be inevitable. Apart from this, recently, as a result of the April 27 Declaration of Panmunjeom, as the substitution of the Armistice Agreement with the Peace Agreement was discussed, the controversy over the existence of the UNC headquarters was also arising. Therefore, In depth discussion is needed on how the mission and function of UNC headquarters at a war time or in time of peace will be established in connection with the transition to peace regime or Wartime Operation Control Transition, how the relationship will be established between UNC, Future Alliance command, and ROK Joint Forces, and how the alliance command structure will change accordingly, etc. Thus, based on the experience of changing the role of the United Nations Command, this paper assessed the future role of the United Nations Command, and explored the legal issues and challenges to be addressed in the survival or dismantling of UNC.