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최병일 법무부 2009 통상법률 Vol.- No.87
Korea and the United States have yet to ratify the Korea-US FTA('KORUS FTA'). Considering that the ruling party has majority seats at the National Assembly, ratification in Korea is not much contested. Rather than a matter of 'whether,' it is a matter of 'when.' In this regard, there has been a heated debate: some claimed the wisdom of ratifying ahead of the U.S., while others have argued for a 'wait and see' approach due to the uncertainty of the U.S. ratification of the KORUS FTA. Whereas the new Obama administration places high value on the KORUS FTA in terms of enormous economic opportunities, strengthening of the Korea-US alliance, and improving the leverage of the U.S. in the North East Asia, it is unlikely to move forward without addressing its concern on automobile. The Korean government made it clear that it would not renegotiate the auto provision of the KORUS FTA. It does not want to reopen the KORUS FTA, because it believes the current agreement reflects a well balanced interest between the two countries. On the other hand, the U.S. is still delaying the ratification of the KORUS FTA in search for a solution to deal with its concern on automobile. In this context, the moves of the two countries regarding the ratification of the KORUS FTA are strategically linked. If Korea fails to ratify ahead of the U.S. while it has a chance to do so, it will commit a major strategic blunder. Washington will consider it as a willingness of Korea to accommodate the U.S. request for renegotiation. Renegotiating the automobile provision is a flawed idea, in terms of economics, international code of conduct, and consequences to future negotiating leverage of Korea. Should the U.S. come to ask for a renegotiation in the automobile sector, Korea would be brought to demand concessions in other sectors, in order to maintain an equitable balance. In the course of this process, it is very likely that the debate will spill beyond the strict boundaries of technicality of trade negotiations, and fuel broader conflicts in the Korean society. The political instability in Korea may do harm to the Korea-U.S. alliance. Korea and the U.S. should refrain from renegotiations. Instead, they should look for a mutually acceptable course of action, because saving the KORUS FTA is in the interests of Korea and the U.S. The benefits Korea could get from an early ratification are three-fold: first, Korea will send a strong message to the world community by translating into action a perception shared by world leaders that the return to protectionism is a foil to be avoided at all costs in the search of a way to overcome the current global economic crisis, second, Korea could put an end to the domestic debates nurtured by partisan groups that seek to take undue political advantage by caviling at the KORUS FTA, third, it could put a substantial strain on a potential U.S. demand for renegotiations in the automobile sector. Washington will be less inclined to demand for renegotiations, more inclined to look for other options. The strategic approach to a way forward for the KORUS FTA has three main components: first, Seoul should seize the momentum and ratify the agreement ahead of Washington, second, Seoul needs to rally the supporters of the KORUS FTA in the U.S. so that they convey the unequivocal message to Washington that renegotiations on auto is a recipe for disaster, third, Seoul should clinch the Korea-EU FTA at the earliest possible time so that Washington comes to recognize the ever-increasing cost of delaying the ratification of the KORUS FTA. These strategic moves will substantially diminish the likelihood of the U.S. request for renegotiation and pave the way for a more amicable solution. While the complaints of the Congress and auto industry push the U.S. government to take a more aggressive stance, Washington will also have to make a room to maneuver for Seoul. The outcome of international negotiations between sovereign nations reflects the balance between the interests of domestic stakeholder and foreign counterpart. One needs to be reminded that the additional negotiations of the NAFTA eventually failed to materialize the extreme demand of the U.S. labor and environment group. The strategic moves mentioned above will remove a major roadblock for the ratification of the KORUS FTA. As a result, the enforcement of the KORUS FTA may be in sight. 한미FTA가 발효되기 위한 한국과 미국에서의 비준이 아직 이루어지지 않고 있다. 비준동의안은 현재 한국에서는 외교통상통일위원회를 통과하고 국회 본회의에서의 표결을 남겨두고 있다. 한미FTA를 지지하는 여당이 다수당인 상황에서 비준동의안 통과보다는 그 시기가 문제이다. 한국 정치권은 한미FTA의 비준시기에 대해 격론을 벌여왔다. 한국이 먼저 비준하여야 한다는 '선비준론'과 비준을 미루고 미국의 움직임을 주시하자는 '관망론'이 대립되어 왔다. 미국은 한미FTA의 경제적 기회, 한미동맹강화, 동북아시아에서의 미국의 입지강화에 긍정적인 영향을 인식하면서도 자동차분야의 불만 때문에 현재 체결된 한미FTA를 그대로 수용하는 것에는 부정적이다. 한국정부의 공식적인 입장은 "자동차분야 재협상은 없다"는 것이다. 한국정부는 현재 체결된 한미FTA를 그대로 발효시키길 희망한다. 미국은 아직까지는 어떠한 방식으로 그들의 불만을 해소할 수 있을지에 해법을 찾아내지 못했다. 이런 상황에서 한국과 미국의 비준은 전략적으로 연계되어 있다. 한국이 먼저 비준할 수 있는 기회가 왔을 때 이를 전략적으로 활용하지 않는다면, 미국은 자동차 문제 해법의 하나로 기존 협정문을 수정하는 재협상도 적극적으로 고려할 것이다. 자동차 분야 재협상은 논리적으로나, 국제협상의 관례로 보나, 향후 국제협상에서의 한국의 입지를 고려해 볼 때, 심각한 문제점들을 내포하고 있다. 한국과 미국은 재협상을 차단하면서 한미FTA를 살릴 수 있는 길을 모색해야 한다. 한국이 먼저 비준함으로써 얻게 되는 효과는 세 가지이다. 첫째, 21세기 최초의 글로벌 경제위기를 극복하기 위해서는 보호주의로 회귀해서는 안 된다는 세계지도자들의 공통된 인식을 한국이 행동으로 보여준다. 둘째, 한미FTA를 흠집 내서 정치적인 반사이익을 챙기려는 집단에게 국내적으로 한미FTA논쟁은 종결되었음을 선언하고 정부는 다른 중요한 국정과제에 집중할 수 있게 된다. 셋째, 한미FTA의 자동차 분야를 변경하자는 미국의 재협상 요구를 상당히 부담스럽게 만들 수 있다. 한국이 먼저 비준하게되면 한국은 명분싸움에서 미국을 압도하게 된다. 미국이 자동차 분야의 불만을 터트리는 와중에 한국이 FTA를 비준하지 않고 있다면, 미국은 한국정부가 재협상할 생각과 의지가 있다고 판단하게 될 것이다. 재협상을 원하지 않는 한국이 미국에게 나서서 재협상을 요구해달라고 초청하는 형국을 자초하는 셈이다. 미국이 자동차 분야 재협상을 요구하게 되면 협상의 균형을 맞추기 위해 한국은 다른 분야도 협상테이블 위에 올려놓고자 할 것이고 재협상 의제에 대한 논란이 다시 한국정국을 가열시키고, 정쟁의 수단으로 전락할 가능성이 크다. 비준을 미루는 경우, 한국이 챙길 경제적인 실리도 없다. 미국이 재협상을 고집하는 경우 그 파장이 어떨지 미국도 내다 볼 수 있다. 한국과 미국 모두 한미FTA를 성공적으로 비준하기 위한 전략적 접근법의 기본방향은 세 가지이다. 첫째, 한국은 미국 보다 먼저 비준할 수 있는 기회가 앞에 있을 때 적극 활용해야 한다. 둘째, 미국 내 한미FTA 지지세력을 적극 활용하여 자동차 재협상은 한미FTA를 파괴할 수 있음을 인식시킨다. 셋째, 한-EU FTA를 조속히 타결시켜 미국으로 하여금 한미FTA 비준을 계속 지연하는 경우 그들이 입게 될 손실을 확실하게 인지시킨다. 이러한 접근법은 한국이 원하지 않는 미국의 재협상요구 가능성을 약화시킬 수 있으며 미국으로 하여금 재협상이 아닌 보다 창조적인 해법을 모색하게 만들 것이다. 현재 미국 행정부는 한미FTA 협정문을 검토하면서 자동차분야 불만해소방안을 다각도로 고심 중이다. 미국 의회와 업계의 불만이 그들을 공격적으로 만들지만, 한국정부의 반응을 신중하게 고려하지 않을 수 없다. 국내 이해집단의 요구와 협상상대국의 요구 사이에서 국제협상의 결과는 결정되어 지기 때문이다. NAFTA의 경우에도 미국 내 노동, 환경단체들의 강경한 입장은 멕시코와의 추가협상에서 반영되지 못했음을 상기할 필요가 있다. 이런 전략적인 접근법이 실천에 옮겨진다면 한미FTA 비준의 큰 걸림돌이 제거되고 협정발효로 가는 청신호가 켜질 것으로 기대된다.
지역사회 통일교육 현황과 활성화 방안: 광주광역시를 중심으로
김재기 한국동북아학회 2012 한국동북아논총 Vol.17 No.3
The purpose of this article is to review a state of affairs and point out the question at activation and present condition in the field of regional society unification education. The unification education in Korea has functioned as a part of political education, which is influenced from the legacy of the cold war. It means that the unification education of Korea has focused on the unilateral political education system reflecting antagonistic political system and thoughts between the two Koreas. As a result, the unification education of Korea established a rigid policy line to compete with the North-Korea political system. In other words, on the basis of such political dimension and environment, the main theme of unification education of the South-Korea was consisted of counter-measures against North-Korea policy. Korea’s unification education of the present-day is evolving with international political environment which transformation and resilience of the relationship between the two Koreas. Therefore, the new concept of the Korea unification education should consider not only methods and processes to reunify the Korean peninsular but also alternatives to minimize a great deal of problems after the unification. An important asset in Gwangju region to discuss Korea unification in Korean Association of Northeast Asia is composed of nationwide scholars. Korean Association of Northeast Asia is periodically held for Korea unification problems, and the order in Northeast Asia Conference of the Society as a nationwide scale, a lot of information to the local people and newspapers In conclusion, the unification of education in the Gwangju region, above all, there must be a change in the government's policy toward North Korea. There is a need to Gwangju type peaceful unification of education to develop a model utilizing the characteristics of Gwangju City of democratic and peace. From May movement to Korea unification be required as a slogan that can be practiced vigorous discussion at the local community level. 지역사회 구성원들이 민주시민으로서 살아가는데 있어서 남북통일문제를 이해하고 논의하는 과정에 참여하는 것은 시민정치교육 측면에서 매우 중요한 일이라고 할 수 있다. 한국에서 민주시민교육의 도입은 제2차 세계대전이후 분단 된 서독에서 성공적으로 진행된 것을 한국에 적용하고자하는 것이었다. 서독이 민주시민교육 차원에서 진행한 정치교육은 제2차 세계대전이 끝나고 국가가 동독과 서독으로 분단된 이후, 시민정치교육을 실시하기위해 연방정부와 16개 주정부에 ‘정치교육센터’를 설립하고 이를 통해 학교와 시민사회단체, 정당재단에 다양한 지원을 하고 있다. 한국에서 냉전시대의 통일교육은 북한에 대한 적대감을 고조하는 반공교육에 초점을 맞추었다. 1980년대 탈냉전을 맞아 반공교육이 쇠퇴하고 통일 방안에 대한 내용이 보강된 통일·안보 교육으로 전환하였다. 김대중 정부 이후 지난 10년은 평화공존과 화해협력을 강조하는 통일교육에 중점을 두었다. 현 정부는 통일교육에 안보교육을 강화하여 진행하고 있다. 광주지역사회에서 진행되고 있는 통일교육센터나 민주평통 등 공공 사회교육기관의 통일교육 과정과 내용은 기존의 내용에 안보교육이 새롭게 들어가 진행되고 있다. 두 기관의 프로그램은 거의 대동소이하며 경직되고 획일적 내용이 주를 이루고 있다고 평가할 수 있겠다. 반면 민간사회교육기관의 경우는 대북지원사업의 중단, 현 정부의 지원 배제와 재정이 열악하여 활발한 통일교육을 못하고 있는 실정이다. 지역에서 통일교육의 활성화를 위해서는 우선적으로 정부의 대북정책에 변화가 있어야 한다. 지방정부의 지원 속에 지역통일교육 단체들이 참여하는 ‘거버넌스’를 구축할 필요가 있다. 지방정부와 대학, 통일교육센터, 통일운동 시민단체, 언론 등이 유기적으로 연계하는 '협력적 거버넌스'(collaborative governance)협의체를 구축하여 지역 통일논의 활성화에 적극 나서야 한다. 민주인권평화도시를 지향하는 광주광역시는 광주형 평화통일교육모델을 개발할 필요가 있다.
두보(Bo Tu)(涂, 波) 한국국회학회 2022 한국과 세계 Vol.4 No.2
自金正恩成为北韩最高领导者后,北韩持续地进行了核试验并试射导弹,此举不仅加深了各利益相关国对韩半岛安全局势的担忧,还进而引发了一系列连锁效应。韩国在2017年也经历了朴槿惠政府因“崔顺实门”丑闻被弹劾下台,和共同民主党文在寅就任新总统等“大事件”。随着北韩在核问题上越走越远,原本志在继承和发扬“阳光政策”的文在寅新政府的安保外交立场在一定期间内也逐渐发生战略性变化,不仅加强了同美国的“传统”同盟关系,还在一定时期针对北韩在北核问题上的强硬态度,选择性地加强了韩美同盟和美日同盟的战略合作。但随后文在寅利用“平昌奥运会”的机会对北韩释放出了积极信号并获得了回应,两国拉开了以“平昌奥运会”为契机的南北对话序幕,扭转了南北关系的态势。本文以韩国安保外交的战略性变化对韩半岛的局势影响为研究目的,采取了文献研究方法进行分析。本文捕捉到了在北韩核导挑衅达到最高潮时,韩国文在寅政府安保外交政策出现了虽然短暂却明显的战略性变化。不过韩国认识到了单靠巩固军事同盟并不是解决韩半岛核问题的合理选项,转而加强对北韩的对话协商,带动韩半岛局势走向了缓和和对话,进而有望推动韩半岛实现最终的和平和繁荣。 After becoming North Korea s leader, Kim Jongen conducted nuclear tests and missile launches, which not only deepened the relevant countries’ concern about the security situation in the Korean peninsula, but also caused the South Korea to introduce THAAD system from the US, causing a series of knock-on effects. After going through Park Geunhae government’s “Choi Sunsil scandal”, Moon Jaein became the new president of South Korea. As North Korea walked to more extreme on the nuclear issue, Moon government, which originally wants to inherit and carry forward the Sunshine Policy , has gradually changed security strategic diplomatic stance by not only strengthening the traditional alliance with the United States, but also by discussing necessity of enhancing Korea-US and US-Japan alliance. However Moon government knew the “violence to violence” method might help improve the military deterrence against North Korea, but it’s not conductive to ease the situation. This paper adopted literature research method to analyze the influence of South Korea security diplomacy’s strategic change and its influence on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea realized that strengthening military alliance is not a rational choice, but insisting conversation and peace negotiation can find the way out of the dilemma. By doing this, South Korea performed a “sports diplomacy” to North Korea and brought Korea peninsula back to a relatively peaceful and consultative atmosphere.
한일회담 단절을 통해서본 한국의 독도등대설치와 일본-일본의회 독도관련 속기록을 중심으로, 1953~54-
곽진오 한국일어일문학회 2011 日語日文學硏究 Vol.76 No.2
The suspension of the Korea-Japan conference was a burdensome incident to both countries. The Japanese Diet's internal record on Dokdo is an important source that shows Japan's responsive policies to Korea at that time. During the process of the Korea-Japan conference, oral arguments over the right of claim led to suspension of the conference. It took four years and six months to restart the Korea-Japan conference, and during the suspension, The Japanese Diet discussed a variety of policies regarding the Korean peace line and Dokdo issue. There were strong voices claiming that Korea's peace line issue should be solved by military power, and the Dokdo issue by the ICJ. The Korea-Japan conference suspension, however, was not the problem of only Korea and Japan,but also the problem of the U.S. which had deep interest relations in East Asian security issues within the Cold War system. Thus, the Japanese Diet's policies toward Korea do not progress as planned, and the decreased importance of the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs due to the discontinuity of Korea-Japan conference is one cause of this poor progress. As communication between Korea and Japan becomes difficult due to the cease of the conference, the Japanese Diet claims that Japan take the Dokdo issue to the ICJ and form a stronger claim over Dokdo sovereignty. This research paper is constituted of the following four chapters. The first chapter explains this research's difference from previous ones and this research's contribution to the academic field. The second chapter analyzes the Korea-Japan conference suspension and the Japanese Diet's response, and the third chapter analyzes the Korean lighthouse establishment in Dokdo and the Japanese Diet's response and limits. Finally, the fourth concluding chapter analyzes why Dokdo is Korea's territory, and the limits of Korean Dokdo policies according to the Japanese Diet.
김주리 한국외국어대학교 EU연구소 2018 EU연구 Vol.- No.50
In this study, the export competitiveness of Korea's 20 largest export items in the EU market and the global market is compared and analyzed using the RCA and CAC index in order to analyze the cause of the Korea's Trade Deficit with EU after the Korea-EU FTA. As a result of the RCA-CAC analysis, Korea-EU trade showed a typical trade pattern among developed countries with a capital-intensive export product structure. In terms of technology -intensive items, Korea was in a relatively inferior position compared to the EU, and Korea's export competitiveness in the capital-labor mixed export items was superior to the EU. In particular, the comparative advantages in the EU market since the entry into force of the Korea-EU FTA were automobiles and parts, steel products, oil and cosmetics, and knitting, among which oil and cosmetics were more competitive in export in the EU market than in the international market. Meanwhile, the EU's competitive advantage in the Korean market was automobiles and parts, machinery, ships, and copper products. The European machinery, which has improved its competitiveness in the Korean market since the FTA took effect, has contributed to the increase in Korea's EU imports. Especially, the increase in imports of machinery, which is equivalent to the EU's comparatively inferior export, is the result of the importation of parts and intermediate goods imported from Japan into EU products. Therefore, Korea should identify the cause of its declining competitiveness after the Korea-EU FTA. In the capital-labor mixed export item group, self-help measures should be prepared to strengthen the constitution from price competitiveness to quality competitiveness. In addition, Korea should take a two-sided strategy to enhance import suppression and promote exports through quality differentiation strategies in product groups that are improving competitiveness simultaneously in mutual markets. And the government should actively respond to the EU's safety guard survey on Korean steel products, which are improving their competitiveness in the EU market. 이 연구에서는 한-EU FTA 체결 이후 발생하고 있는 한국의 대EU 무역역조 현상의 원인을 분석하기 위하여 20대 수출품목의 대EU 및 대세계 수출경쟁력을 RCA, CAC지수를 이용하여 비교 분석하고 있다. RCA-CAC분석 결과, 한-EU 무역은 유사한 자본집약형 수출상품구조를 띤 전형적인 선진국 간 무역패턴을 보였고, 기술집약적 품목군에 있어서 한국은 EU에 비해 비교열위 상태이며, 자본-노동 혼합형 수출품목에서는 한국의 수출경쟁력이 EU보다 비교우위를 점하고 있었다. 특히, 한-EU FTA 발효 이후 EU 시장에서 경쟁력이 개선된 비교우위 수출품은 자동차&부품(87), 철강제품(73), 정유/화장품(33), 편물(60)이었고, 그중에서 정유/화장품(33)은 국제시장보다 EU 시장에서의 수출경쟁력이 더 높았다. 한편, 한국시장에서 경쟁력이 개선된 EU의 비교우위품목은 자동차&부품(87), 기계류(84), 선박(89), 구리제품(74)이었고, 기계류(84)도 FTA 발효 이후 한국시장에서 경쟁력이 개선되면서 한국의 대EU 수입 규모를 증가시키는 원인으로 작용하였다. 특히 EU의 비교열위 수출품에 해당하는 기계류(84)의 수입증가는 일본으로부터 수입하던 부품 소재와 중간재 등의 수입이 EU 제품으로 전환된, 한-EU FTA로 말미암는 무역전환 효과의 귀결이라 하겠다. 따라서 한국은 한-EU FTA 체결 이후 대EU 비교열위 상태가 심화되고 있는 수출품목에 대한 원인 규명과 경쟁력 향상방안을 재검토하고, 자본-노동 혼합형 수출품목군에 있어서는 가격경쟁력에서 품질경쟁력으로의 체질 강화를 위한 자구책을 조속히 마련해야 할 것이다. 그리고 상호시장에서 동시적으로 경쟁력이 개선되고 있는 자동차&부품(87) 등의 제품군에 대해서는 품질 차별화 전략을 통해 수입억제력을 제고시키는 동시에 수출촉진을 도모하는 양동 전략을 강구하여야 할 것으로 보인다. 특히, FTA 발효 이후 EU 시장에서 경쟁력이 개선되고 있는 한국산 철강제품에 대한 EU의 세이프가드 조사에 대응하여 정부 차원의 적극적인 대응책이 모색되어야 할 것이다.
한일기본조약과 북한 문제: 유일합법성 조항과 그 현재적 함의
이원덕 한국정치외교사학회 2010 한국정치외교사논총 Vol.31 No.2
If the claims issue between North Korea and Japan remains unresolved when the Korean peninsula reunifies, North Korea’s property and claim rights toward Japan will obviously be inherited to the reunified Korea. Although Korea opposed to the North Korea-Japan amity when the Basic Treaty was signed in 1965 and denied North Korea’s claim rights toward Japan, such position politically stemmed from particular situations. However, ever since the 7.7 declaration, Korea has changed its policy to recognize North Korea as a lawful government through a series of arrangements. In addition, Korea has considered North Korea’s claim rights toward Japan as a legal and justifiable demand. It is regarded that the reunified Korea’s claim rights toward Japan is justifiable and reasonable according to the international law as well. If absorptive unification by Korea happens, the legal rights and obligations that North Korea has possessed will certainly be inherited to the reunified Korean government. 북일 국교정상화가 달성되기 이전에 한반도에서 통일이 이뤄진다면 통일 한국정부는 북한의 대일 재산 청구권 권리를 승계 받게 될 것이다. 그 주장의 근거는 다음의 네 가지 요소에 의해 성립된다. 첫째, 1965년 한일기본조약에서 일본은 한국의 유일합법 조항을 승인하였음에도 불구하고 한반도의 북쪽에 현실적으로 존재하는 북한 정권의 실체를 인정하는 입장을 취했다. 둘째, 1990년대 이후에 이루어진 북일 수교교섭 과정에서도 일본은 북한의 대일청구권 요구를 당연한 권리로 인정하는 자세를 견지해 왔다. 셋째, 한국은 비록 1965년 한일협정 체결 당시 한국이 한반도의 유일합법정부이며 한국의 대일 청구권 자금이 한반도 전역을 대표하여 제공받은 것이라는 입장을 취했지만 이러한 입장은 1988년 7.7선언 이후 180도 전환되었다. 넷째, 통일 한국의 대일 청구권 주장은 국제법적으로도 보더라도 법적 권리의 승계라는 점에서 정당하고 타당한 것으로 간주된다.
한국전쟁 시기 북한의 대(對)중국 번역 기획 - 북한의 대외 홍보 기관지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』 연구
등천 한국문학연구학회 2023 현대문학의 연구 Vol.- No.79
The purpose of this study is to comprehensively investigate the activities for the translation of New Korea, a Chinese monthly journal published in North Korea in the 1950s, and to examine the translation of North Korean literature during the Korea War. New Korea (Saejoseon), which is North Korea’s public relations organization, was founded in January 1950 as a Russian version by Saejoseon Prehistory, and the Chinese version was published from January 1951. From January 1951 to December1953, New Korea contained a total of 50 novels and poems based on the Korean War, establishing a unique genealogy of translation of war literature. Due to the urgent situation of war and the strict limitation of the literary column, the translators of New Korea were able to move on to rewriting the original work through intentional mistranslation and significant corrections. This ‘rewrite’ is also another proof of the association of national ideology. The literary works translated through New Korea consist of three types: the narratives of war heroes, the narratives of suffering and resistance, and the narratives of friendship among North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The three narrative types show similarities to North Korean literature translated and introduced by contemporary China, but reveal subtle differences in the proportion of each type, text selection, and specific translation methods. This difference is most clearly embodied in the narratives of friendship between North Korea and China. By using New Korea as a case to study North Korea’s translation activities, this study attempts to offer a fresh perspective for scholars both in China and South Korea. It examines the complex relationship between war and literature, as well as that between ideology and translation activities. It reevaluates the communication between China and North Korea concerning translation in the 1950s, when Cold War discourses were formed, including their collaborations and disagreements. 이 연구는 북한에서 발행한 대(對)중국 홍보 기관지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』을 학계 최초로 검토하고, 한국전쟁 기간 북한 번역주체가 기획한 자국문학의 중국어 번역 작업을 고찰하는 것을 목표로 삼는다. 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 북한 번역자가 중국어로 번역하고 중국 독자들이 수용하는 독특한 성격을 지닌 대외 홍보 미디어다. 1951년 1월 창간호부터 1953년 12월까지 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 6·25전쟁을 소재로 삼은 소설과 시가를 총 50여 편 수록함으로써 전쟁문학 번역의 독특한 계보를 구축했다. 이 작품들은 인민군의 전투 과정에 집중한 영웅서사, 북한 인민을 형상화한 수난·저항서사, 조소·조중의 친선 관계를 다룬 우호서사의 세 가지 유형으로 구성된다. 『새조선(新朝鮮)』 번역주체는 3대 서사를 체계적으로 번역함으로써 ‘조국해방전쟁’의 정당성을 재삼 역설하고 북한·소련·중국의 동맹관계를 공고히 하여 전쟁의 승리를 확보하는 데 선전지로서의 역할을 충실히 수행했다. 전쟁이라는 급박한 상황과 문예란의 엄격한 지면 제한으로 『새조선(新朝鮮)』의 번역주체는 ‘의도적 오역’과 대폭적인 첨삭을 통해 원작에 대한 ‘다시 쓰기’로 나아갈 수 있었다. 이런 ‘다시 쓰기’는 ‘조국해방전쟁’ 문학이 가진 ‘내부적 결속력’을 중국 독자의 공감을 일으킬 수 있는 ‘외부적 연대력(連帶力)’으로 전환시키는 중요한 수단이다. 한국전쟁 기간 동안 북한 작가들의 다양한 문학적 시도와 이로 인한 북한 문학장의 역동성을 중국 독자에게 전달했다는 점에서 『새조선(新朝鮮)』은 중요한 문학사적인 의미를 지니고 있다. 이에 대한 연구를 통해 전쟁과 문학, 이데올로기와 번역 실천이 맺고 있는 복합적인 층위를 체계적으로 규명할 수 있다.
송정현 한국일본근대학회 2023 일본근대학연구 Vol.- No.82
The G2 friction ignited by the U.S. tariff imposition on China in 2016 gradually intensified, causing the reorganization of the existing global supply chain, and the concept of economic security using economic means to secure its own security is drawing keen attention. Accordingly, this study conducted three analysis of trade trends by item: 1)Korea-Japan trade trends after 2000, 2)trade trends before and after the Korea-Japan trade dispute in 2019, and 3)trade trends by item. The results of this study are as follows. First of all, in the case of Korea-Japan trade trends since 2000, the trade volume between Korea and Japan more than doubled compared to 2000, and the trade deficit more than doubled compared to 2000 as exports and imports increased at the same time. 2)In the case of trade trends before and after the 2019 Korea-Japan trade dispute, it can be seen that Korea's exports to Japan increased and imports to Japan decreased after the Korea-Japan trade dispute. However, considering that logistics movement between countries was limited due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, the above results are unlikely to be a clear basis for the negative impact of the Korea-Japan trade dispute on Korea-Japan trade.3)In terms of trade trends by item, the top 10 items of import and export in 2000, 2012, and 2022 were similar. In particular, the top three items of import and the top two items of export were major trade items between Korea and Japan. The significance of this study is as follows. First of all, it analyzes the post-war trade structure trends of Korea-Japan semiconductor export regulations that occurred in 2019. With the importance of economic security increasing, it is very important to understand the impact of the implementation of trade regulation policies of a specific country on trade between the implementing country and the target country. The second point is an analysis of trade trends by item between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan trade has benefited both countries through interdependence. However, the global trade landscape has changed, especially in the era of economic security, and since each trade item will have different ripple effects on the country's military security and economic sectors, it is expected to be used as a basic analysis survey in establishing trade policies and foreign policies.
구해우 한국몽골학회 2011 몽골학 Vol.0 No.30
National strategies including Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a high priority have emerged as an important agenda for Korea since 2006 when U.S.-Korea FTA was started to be seriously negotiated. Particularly, as U.S.-Korea FTA will be ratified by national assemblies in each country this year, FTA once again becomes a controversial issue in Korea. Along the same line, it seems it is right time to examine political and economic meanings of FTA with Mongolia. Under the collapse of Soviet Union, as Mongolia transformed its socialist system into reform and open policy, it has established a new diplomatic ties with western countries such as United States. Besides, in the form of the increased world competition for energy resources, various countries, for say, Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and European countries, express strong interest in Mongolia's natural resources; Mongolia recently possesses great strategic value. Mongolian agriculture and farming are also expected to play a critical role in Korea's food security. For Korea, this trade and cooperation with Mongolia would not just remain as it is, but it would perform a significant base for extended further cooperation with central Asian countries and Russia and China. Thus, it is worth examining what Korea-Mongolia FTA means from political and economic perspectives; then, based on this research, the Korea-Mongolia FTA should be developed. Although Mongolia is rich in natural resources and has excellent potential in political and economic sense, cooperation between Korea and Mongolia has been below the level expected. First of all, it has to be examined what the characteristics of Mongolian economy are. This is summarized as seven features in the paper. Then, considering current cooperation between these two countries, it is necessary to assess their relations up to date. Comprehensive analysis for Korea-Mongolia relationship would develop the future prospects. In terms of economic implications, there are four ways to increase Korea-Mongolia economic cooperation. First, Korea and Mongolia should break the tradition that focused all the investments on the restaurant and service businesses. Korean companies that make good use of Mongolian local mineral resources and raw materials to do manufacturing should enter the Mongolian market. Second, Korea and Mongolia should strengthen their cooperation in the energy and resources areas. Third, Korean construction companies should go into Mongolian housing and construction market. Fourth, Korean government and private companies should work together to understand the local demands for development in agriculture, farming and tourist industry, which seems very promising business for Mongolia. Political implications of Korea-Mongolia FTA are also important. There seems three means to enhance their bonding. First, Korea and Mongolia have to come to an agreement on visa waivers; it is the task that should be done once Korea-Mongolia FTA is accomplished. Second, Korea should set up research institutions in Mongolia. Collaborative academic work between Korea and Mongolia will lead tight, long-term cooperation in other fields. Third, Korea has to review more ODA towards Mongolia. Korea and Mongolia seem to start their relations after establishing diplomatic ties in 1990; indeed, they have more intense relations since ancient times. This is why they are understood as brother countries. Moreover, international relations surrounding by world powers, United States, China, Japan, and Russia, for Korea and Mongolia put them into the relatively similar situation. Thus, Korea-Mongolia FTA will contribute to not only both countries' political and economic benefit but also peace in northeast Asia.
Jo Sung gu J-INSTITUTE 2018 Protection Convergence Vol.3 No.2
At the present, South Korea ’s security is as urgent as North Korea’s denuclearization because North Korea’s espionage is very active. The core to espionage in Korea is that, since the Korean War following the invasion of North Korea, most terrorist activities and espionage activities have been executed by North Korea, anti communist investigation has targeted the North Korean regime. However, while South Korea underwent a democratic regime transfer, some regimes have been friendly to North Korea according, and counter intelligence agency dealing with intelligence on North Korea caused rapid changes to power transfer, reduction of organization, and personnel, so it is not possible to pursue the policy of counter intelligence activities coherently. Therefore, in this study, I have examined the security strategy of the Korean counter intelligence agency against North Korean espionage activities for college students majoring in security at Korean universities at the present time starting with the incident of a North Korean female spy, who was disguised as an employee for a cafe located in Gyeongsan-shi, Gyeongbuk and who was arrested after handing over the intelligence gathered on North Korean defectors to North Korea in 2014. First, South Korea’s counter intelligence manpower should be increased. Second, the legal grounds for South Korea’s counter intelligence activities should be further expanded. Third, it is necessary to develop various techniques of counter intelligence activities in South Korea. Fourth, the scope of counter intelligence activities should be expanded in Korea. Fifth, South Korea’s counter intelligence education should be expanded. Sixth, South Korea’s counter intelligence agencies should expand investigative cooperation. As a result of the study, I was able to derive such results and have presented directions for North Korea’s espionage activities based on the political environment in Korea.