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Using the simplest logit-form contest success function, I analyze the endogenous timing in contests with three players. They have different valuations for the prize. Firstly, they announce publicly when they will expend their effort, and then based on this timing, choose their effort levels. I show the effort levels and expected payoffs in every subgame. The contestant with the highest value of the prize always expends the positive effort in every subgame. I focus on the orders of contestants’ effort timing and find out that the contestant with the lowest value of the prize chooses to expend his effort in the first stage. If the players’ valuations for the prize are close to the others’, expending effort in the first stage is the only subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, the contestant who has the highest valuation evaluates the prize so high, he chooses to expend his effort in the second or third stage but the contestants who have the lowest and intermediate valuation choose to expend their effort in the first stage. In this case, the choice of expending effort in the second stage by the highest contestant becomes the subgame-perfect equilibrium, but that in the third stage depends on how high the contestant who has the lowest valuation values it. Finally I examine the meaning of the subgame-perfect equilibria.
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