企業買受의 防禦手段에 關한 法的 硏究

강병옥 建國大學校 大學院 2002 국내석사

By early 1990, the concept of M&A was unfamiliar to Koreans. Although there were lawyers who were experts in M&A in Korea, most of the M&A had been done in the form of affiliate mergers of conglomerates or bankrupt enterprises These mergers, controlled by the government, were not accomplished based on fair competition like m Western developed countries. In a period of economic hardship, Korea was receiving aid from the International monetary Fund (IMF) in 1997. Our economic environment required many changes Included in these changes was an open-door policy of our stock market to foreigners This change permitted domestic companies to give a chance to take over their rights of management to the foreign companies for a cheap price. Due to the foreign currency crisis, the value of our companies fell extremely low and there had been no preparation for equal competition with the companies of countries. It is clear that an increase in efficiency of our national economy, and the strengthening of competition among companies through M&A, are a prerequsite for economic globalization; and, this goal can be realized. However, if M&A are misused and risks are taken for short term, marginal profits, or if they create excessive anxiety about management rights of the existing board of directors, it can lead to negative results for the nation's economy as well as the nights of stockholders. The same holds true if misuse lowers sound business incentives. The most important thing in controlling M&A is to treat both equally; both the acquiring company and the merging company in respect of fairness in the M&A market By abolishing foreigners' stock trading limitations on listed companies, M&A may be accomplished easily This is especially applicable, and without any limitations, for hostile M&A against an existing board of directors. As an advantageous institutional foundation may be arranged by the acquiring company, the merging company should be prepared for proper reactions against that. Preparations for appropriate actions against such a situation should be place for the fundamental premise of fan play. Among various methods for setting up a foundation and engaging fair trading, it has been strongly suggested that common stock repurchases by the issuing company play an effective role as a protective measure Generally, common stock repurchases may result in the following: First, a common stock repurchases makes it difficult for buyers to purchase the required shares of stocks for acquiring managerial rights in floating stocks. Second, a common stock repurchase increases stock prices on the stock market and the acquiring company needs more money than expected to buy the objective company. Third, by a common stock repurchase, the company can reduce the cash in capital as much as the buying pride The financial status of the company being taken over may be unattractive to the hostile, acquiring company. Fourth, by selling the holding stock to an amicable third company, a common stock repurchase can increase the stabilization rate of stocks, and may be used against a hostile M&A. But in this matter, because the voting right is not permitted in the company's own stock, the effectiveness of a common stock repurchase as a defensive measure, is controversial. In Korea, a common stock repurchase is prohibited according to article 341 of the commercial law; although there are five exception clauses common stock repurchases might result in damage to substantial capital, stockholders' equality, distortion of management, manipulation of stock prices, insider trading, and promoting stock cornering. By the way, since 1994, The Security Exchange Law has permitted common stock repurchases to prevent confusion in the maintenance of managerial rights This confusion was caused by the abolition of article 200 of the previous Secuirty Exchange Law. That law had prohibited listed companies from massive purchases. Investigation of this conflict, that commercial law prohibits common stock repurchases m principle, and, the fact that the Security Exchange Law permits common stock repurchases, we find that the laws lack logical consistency and deals with concerned matters arbitrarily through technical interpretation. It is difficult to amend the law immediately without full consideration. A close examination of the managed problems of this system through The Security Exchange Law is required If the negative effects resulted from common stock repurchases, then the common stock repurchases can be dealt with m order to eliminate any negative effects. It is desirable that the principles of the Commercial Law be used in order to further fairness between the acquiring and defending company under the hostile M&A situation.

적대적 기업매수·합병(M&A)의 방어에 관한 법적 연구

이영순 이화여자대학교 대학원 1998 국내석사

오늘날 급변하는 국제 정세속에서 자본주의를 기초로 하는 경제사회는 세계화, 개방화에 따른 무한경쟁시대에 대응하기 위하여 변신을 거듭하고 있다. 따라서 기업도 이와 같은 변화에 신속히 대처해야만 살아남을 수 있다는 위기감이 업종을 불문하고 팽배하고 있는 현실에서 각 기업들은 여러 가지 생존전략의 수집과 실현에 고심하고 있다. 1990년대에 들어서면서 그 중에서도 기업생존 전략차원에서의 M&A(mergers and acquisitions ; 이하에서 M&A로 약칭)라는 기업거래가 활발히 전개됨으로써 이에 대한 연구와 관심이 급증하고 있다. M&A 즉 기업매수합병이란 개인, 단체 또는 회사가 특정회사의 주식이나 자산을 직접 또는 간접으로 취득하여 지배권을 획득하는 거래를 말한다. 이 중 적대적 M&A라는 것은 M&A가 대상회사 경영진의 의사에 반하여 행해지는 경우이다. M&A는 기업경영전략의 중요한 일부로 이용되는데 전통적으로 기업매수합병을 달성하기 위한 형식으로는 영업양도, 경영위임 등이 보편적인 수단으로 활용되어 왔다. 이와같은 기업매수합병은 피매수회사 또는 그 경영진과의 직접적인 계약에 의해 이루어 지므로 피매수회사의 의사에 반하는 경영권취득은 있을 수 없다. 그러므로 일반적으로 적대적 M&A는 주식매수를 통해서 이루어지게 되고 가장 대표적인 것이 주식의 공개매수이다. 우리나라에서도 영미만큼 활발하지는 않지만 공개매수제도가 인정되면서 기업매수가 행해지고 있고 그 중에는 적대적 기업매수도 행해지고 있다. 일반적으로 기업매수가 행해지면 대상회사의 이사 즉 경영진은 경영지배권을 유지하거나 회사와 주주의 이익을 보호하기 위하여 다양한 방어행위를 하게 되는데 이러한 방어행위가 법률적으로 정당한 것인지, 허용된다면 대상회사의 경영자에게 어느정도까지 방어행위를 허용할 수 있는가가 문제된다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 문제를 연구하는데 우리나라의 법제도와 미약하나마 사례의 연구에도 관심을 두었다. 본 논문의 구성은 다음과 같다. 제2장에서는 M&A에 관련된 각국의 법제도를 고찰한다. M&A의 방어를 목적으로 하는 별도의 입법례가 있는 것은 아니므로 각국의 법제도 중에서 M&A의 방어와 관련되는 제도를 살펴본다. 제3장에서는 경영진의 방어행위를 인정할 것인지에 대한 논의를 외국의 경우와 우리나라의 경우로 나누어 살펴보고 방어행위의 적법성판단기준을 고찰한다. 미국의 판례법에서 채택하고 있는 기준이 유익한 단서를 제공하리라 생각되어 미국판례법상의 판단기준과 이사의 수임인으로서의 선관주의의무에 의거한 우리법상의 판단기준을 살펴본다. 제4장에서는 다양한 M&A 기법에 대응하여 활용되고 있는 수많은 방어수단 중에서 우리나라의 법제도 아래에서 적용될 수 있는 방어수단과 적용과정에서 고려되어야 할 문제점을 고찰한다. 우리나라에서 적용 가능한 수단으로는 주식의 양도제한, 우선주 및 전환사채의 발행, 제3자배정증자, 자기주식취득, 종업원지주제의 활용, 정관의 신설 또는 변경 등이 대표적이다. 구체적으로 이들의 적용방법과 우리나라에서의 적용사례 등을 연구한다. 제5장에서는 경영진이 구체적으로 방어행위를 하는 과정에서 방어권의 남용으로 문제될 수 있는 부분을 고찰한다. 제6장에서는 앞에서 논의한 내용을 간략히 정리하였다. Hostile M&A have been the most popular device for acquiring control of the other company. In case of hostile M&A, it is common for the board of directors of the target company to employ various defensive tactics against the M&A to retain its control over the company or to protect the investors of the company. In Korea the legal rules related to M&A are somewhat insufficient for the protection of shareholders of the company, so that the legislative measures in this regard is necessary. The purpose of this study is to suggest objective and fair rules to protect a target company as well as its shareholders and other related parties. The contents of this study are as follows. Chapter 1 considers the purpose and the scope of this thesis. Chapter 2 describes the relevant regulations of the hostile M&A in leading countries. Chapter 3 discusses the legality of the defensive tactics in detail. In this regard, it surveys related theories and secondly considers a standard of legality for the defensive tactics utilized by the managers of the target company. Chapter 4 considers the possible methods adaptable to our country and some issues arising out of defensive tactics. The suggested methods are as follows : 'the restriction of stock transfer', 'the issuance of preference stock and convertible debenture', 'the third lock-ups', ‘defensive stock repurchase', 'the use of ESOP', 'shark repellent amendment'. Chapter 5 deals with the misuse of the defensive tactics. Chapter 6 is the summary and conclusion.

敵對的 企業買受와 防禦的 自己株式取得에 관한 硏究

이규철 弘益大學校 大學院 2001 국내석사

敵對的 企業買受는 미국 등지에서 중요한 경제활동의 하나로 자리잡고 있다. 이러한 기업매수의 활성화는 기업의 경쟁력 강화 등 경제적 가치의 증가 등을 가져오지만 반면에 기업의 경쟁력보다는 단기적 이익이나 경영권보호에 치우칠 염려가 있기 때문에 공정한 제도적 장치의 마련이 중요한 과제라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 적대적 기업매수에 대한 방어수단 중에서 自己株式取得은 浮動株를 감소시켜 매수자가 지배권을 확보하는데 필요한 수의 주식을 취득하는 것을 곤란하게 할 수 있고, 보유한 自己株式을 우호적인 제3자에게 매각함으로써 주식안정화의 비율을 높일 수도 있기 때문에 유력한 방어수단으로 작용할 수 있다. 현행상법은 自己株式取得을 원칙적으로 금지하고 있지만 증권거래법은 허용하고 있는데, 우선 株式非上場法人게도 敵對的 企業買受의 방어의 필요성은 있기 때문에 이를 인정할 필요가 있고, 取得目的에 제한이 없는 것은 기업경영의 필요상 타당한 입법이라고 할 수 있다. 다만 自己株式의 處分과 관련해서는 6월의 제한을 폐지하는 것이 타당하다고 본다. 防禦行爲의 濫用에 대한 理事의 責任과 관련해선ㄴ 義務基準이 문제되는 데 미국판례에서 채택하고 있는 기준이 유익한 단서를 제공할 수 있을 것이다. 특히, 적대적 기업매수에 대한 방어행위는 理事와 株主의 利害對立을 가져오기 때문에 立證責任의 전환이 필요할 것이다. Activity of hostile take over increase in efficiency of our nation economy and economic value. However, if hostile take over is misused and risks are taken for short term, marginal profits, it can lead to negative results for the national economy as well as the rights of shareholders. Therefore, to treat both equally is the most important thing in controlling take over. Among various defensive tactics, it has been strongly suggested that own share repurchases by the issuing company play an effective role as a defensive tactics. That is, a own share repurchase makes it difficult for buyers to purchase the required shares for acquiring managerial rights in floating shares. The Korean Commercial Law prohibited a own share(article 341 of the Commercial Law), but Security Exchange Law has permitted since 1994. Also unlisted company has necessity of defence against hostile take over. So own share must be permitted in unlisted company. And disposal term of own share, six month, must be abolished. In connection with responsibility for protecting misuse, case Law in U.S.A would be helpful to such problems. Specially, because of conflict of director and shareholder's benefit, defense against hostile take over needs the diversion of the burden of proof.

敵對的 企業買收의 防禦策에 關한 硏究

박찬호 東國大學校 大學院 1997 국내석사

In today' s highly economic society of capitalism, a company has to meet the challeges of ongoing internationalization and the changing economic situation of its society. The goal of this study is to examine the defensive tactics against Hostile Takeover. As a first way of study, it will be focused on the law system of America, Japan, Germany in which various defensive maneuvers are developed. And it will be examined whether the defensive tactics developed in America can be used in our country. As a second way of syudy, it will be focused on The Corporate Law and The Securities Exchange Act in our country. Occuring of M&A is not a new economic phnomenon recently but already appeared by exchanging an enterprise itself is regarded as a measure in England, America and so on since late of 19c. In America, one of the most important debates of current corporate law practice and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management cofronted with a takeover. And the controversy turns on the identification of a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tactics. In our country, it is the reason why a company control structure is patriarchal and closed, why the capital market policy can not bring to divide possesion from management, why an industrial rationality policy for reinforcement of competitive power. There exist a legal uncertainty different from America, that makes defensive tactics against Hostile Takeover difficult for domestic companies. In our country, managemental appoaches are widely applied to these problems, whereas legal studies are lacking. In order to defend against M&A(esp. Tender Offer)of domestic companies from foreign companies after complete opening of the stock market, a device to protect the right of the management of domestic companies has to be considered in terms of our laws. But, the reason of main factor is why there was a article of The Secuities Exchange Act §200 ① about forbidden of holding stocks in large quantities, it secures certainly the right of management of target company from Hostile Takeover. The above mentioned clause, in principle, prevented a control share holders from acquiring rate of possesion of a stock exchange at listed times and general investors will not exceed acquiring stocks more than 10percents. But, the above mentioned article was abolished for increasing efficiency of stock buying and selling exchange after April, 1997. So the firm which can be a target of Hostile Takeover can lose a safety device for protect the right of the management, therefore they need to consider various defensive tactics. In our country, at now, Hostile Takeover some happen(a case of HANWHA and MIDOPA), and it will be easily to look for Hostile Takeover. This thesis consist of 5 Chapters. Chapter 1 considers the purpose and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 which focuses on Hostile Takeover, describes the concept of M&A, the economic functions and type of M&A. M&A is generally applied to all types of transactions which have the purpose of acquiring the control of a company. Hostile Takeover is defined as the acquisition of control of management of a target company without the agreement of board directors. Chapter 3 which focuses on Business Judgement Rule of defensive tactics against Hostile Takeover, is describes Delaware Case(Cheff, Unocal, Revlon, Time, etc.), Corporate Governance, The First Generation Statutes, CTS·MITE Case, and The Second Generation Statutes. Chapter 4 considers Defensive Tactics and Type of Hostile Takeover and further describes various defensive tactics developed by board of directors in the America to defend against Hostile Takeover. Especially, Lock-up is an arrangement or transaction by which the target corporation in a contested takeover gives one purposed acquirer a competitive advantage over other bidder or prospective bidders. Usually, a Lock-up involves granting the favored suitor("The White Knight") an option to buy shares or assets of the target. The most common form of Lock-up, the Stock Lock-up is an agreement or option to purchase treasury shares or authorized. In our country, "Stock Lock-up" and "Stock Repurchase" have become an increasingly popular defensive tactics. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of this study.

企業買收.合倂(M and A)를 통한 海外直接投資方案에 관한 硏究

이하선 東亞大學校 經營大學院 1994 국내석사

Nowadays enterprises must cope with the rapid situation of economic change in free trade and capital. They are limited by the internal growth of economy. Because of international business circumstance and featured by the internationalization of firm, the grobalization of industry and intensification of region economy, as a counter measures of these circumstances, suggestion of vision on M&A is needed. The purpose of this study is to introduce and utilize foreign direct investment by M&A. For the method of this study, We refered to all sorts of original and internal texts which were concerned with M&A study. The scope of study is to investigate theory about motive and cause of apperance of the firm M&A and signification of M&A as a management method. We do not only select, compose and analyze the meaningful things such as the firm M&A environment of major country firms, compared direct firm establishment with M&A but also find a suggestion of background, tendency and prospect of the ''M&A" of korean firms. Recently the absolute scale of economy and the need of the foreign business development of introduced and utilized M&A is going, they are as below : Improve the hight recognition of M&A, needed to strengthening of the utility factor of monetary facilitles brokerage, Needed to activation of raising funds, Improve the utility of merger strategy, Relax the legel restictions, Improve the utility of poet-merger strategy.

敵對的 企業買受·合倂(M&A)에 관한 硏究

박용렬 朝鮮大學校 大學院 1995 국내박사

Enterprises are deploying business tactics for growth by corresponding to the changes of the management environment. M&A is one of the management tactics for the enterprises to seek growth by recruiting outside resources, the Merger and Acquisition of the enterprises. As methods of M&A there are Mergers, corporate take-overs, stock acquisitions, Solicitations Proxy, and TOB(Take-over bid). These motives that causes M&A have such advantages as the extension of business scope, the saving of time, the efficiency of cost, and the easiness of securing manpower. In our country the hostile M&A in its actual meaning has not yet been activated by the growth-centered government policy which have protected the managers excessively. It is expected the hostile M&A against certain enterprises would be prevalent because Security Exchange Act the 200th will be abrogated in 1997. In the past there were no ways for the hostile M&A except direct business deals with great stockholders such as Solicitations Proxy, TOB, etc. But now the hostile corporate takeovers can be possible because of the abrogation of the system of limiting the possession of stocks. Especially the possibility of their success will be high if a large number of stocks can be secured before Solicitations Proxy and TOB are to be carried out. And in case that various defensive methods against hostile M&A can be secured hereafter, the all the three methods mentioned above will be utilized at the same time. In our country the regulations related to M&A are somewhat insufficient for the protection of investors compared to those of America, so that the legislative complement of it is necessary. The purpose of this study is to suggest objective and steadfast laws to defend target corporations and bidders as well as shareholders and investor against Solicitations Proxy of the Securities Exchange Law and TOB impartially. The contents of this study are as follows. Chapter 1 describes the purpose and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 considers the general definition of M&A to help make the regulations, defense processes and methods of M&A understood. namely, this chapter considers control of a company which is the most important in M&A and the patterns of hostile M&A introductorily, and the motive, effect and process of development of M&A as well. Chapter 3 attempts to find the solutions to get over the obstacles and problems of Solicitations Proxy by analysing the obstacles and problems of it after surveying the systems of hostile M&A by Proxy Contest and by surveying the American regulations of the letter of attorney which provide almost perfect legal regulations. Chapter 4 discusses TOB system which is currently used most widely in America and in Korea and its harms and the necessity of its regulations. To induce these problems, American tender offer regulation which is the prototype of Korean TOB, Williams Act which is one of the Federal laws and State anti-takeover statutes are considered by turns. And then the related laws of America, England and France, The proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on EC company law are comparatively considered to show the problems of TOB system of the Securities Exchange Law and induce an appropriate bill of legislation. Chapter 5 considers Business Judgment Rule as a standard of judgment for the defensive tactics utilized by the managers of the target companies. Also the defensive tactics against the hostile M&A are considered centering around related cases, upon which possible methods applicable to our country are suggested. The suggested methods are as follows: 1. Shark Repellent Amendment which make the bidders difficult to bid by enacting a special provision before the occurrence of M&A, 2. Poison Pill which makes stockholders purchase stocks additionally in low price in case that the undertaking of hostile purchase happens by allotting preferred stocks to stockholders who have the right of recourse, the right of conversion and so on, 3. Defensive Stock Repurchase which makes the possibility of failure of bidding high, by increasing the rate of stocks held by managers and White knights and to make bidders raise the price of bid or give up bid itself by raising the price of targets above TOB price, 4. the third Lock-ups which induct White knights into bid competition by making Target Company managers give relatively remunerative terms to White knights rather than to bidders, 5. the use of ESOP in which a company makes employees organize a union for 'stock sharing' and let the union purchase the stocks of its own company, and then the company accepts the union as a stable stockholding organization. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of this study and suggests the ways to solve in the light of the legislative the problems dealt with in chapter 3, 4, and 5, viewpoint.

企業買收.合倂時 對象企業 價値評價에 관한 理論과 實際 : S電子와 S半導體通信의 合倂事例를 中心으로

유명순 西江大學校 1991 국내석사

기업합병 관련 세무회계에 관한 연구

이갑재 국민대학교 대학원 2004 국내석사

본 논문은 빈번히 발생되고 있는 기업합병에 있어서 세무상의 제도를 점검하고 발생되는 문제점을 사례연구를 통하여 살펴보았다. 상장법인의 경우에는 합병시에 소액투자자 보호를 위하여 증권거래법에서 합병비율 산정과 관련하여 엄격한 규제를 하고 있으며, 특히 상장법인이 비상장법인을 합병하여 상장법인이 되는 경우에는 합병비율의 건전성에 관하여 독립된 외부평가기관의 평가를 받도록 하는 등 그 규제가 심하다. 따라서 상장법인이 상장법인을 합병하거나 비상장법인을 합병할 경우 발생가능한 조세문제를 살펴보는 것이 필요하리라 판단하여 합병법인은 상장법인으로 산정하였고 피합병법인은 상장법인인 경우와 비상장법인인 경우로 나누어 사례연구를 해보았으며 연구결과로는 합병비율이 기업합병시의 과세요건 충족여부에 있어서 중요한 역할을 한다는 것인데 사례연구 결과는 아래의 표와 같다. ◁표 삽입▷(원문을 참조하세요) 이를 통하여 검토된 기업합병과 관련된 현 과세규정 상의 문제점 및 개선방안을 정리하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 세법 규정간의 논리의 비일관성을 들수 있겠다. 상기 표에서와 같이 두 사례 모두 증여의제 세액은 나타나지 않으나 의제배당세액과 청산소득에 관하여는 상이한 결과를 보이고 있는데 상장법인 (증권거래법 상 상장법인이나 협회등록법인)의 경우에는 증권거래법에 따라 합병비율을 산정하고 동 법이 정한 의무에 따라 신고의무를 다할 경우에는 상속세및증여세법에 따른 증여의제에 해당하지 않게 되나 의제배당액이나 청산소득금액이 발생할 경우에는 법인세법이나 소득세법에 의하여 과세를 당하게 된다. 상장법인이나 협회등록법인이 비상장법인을 합병할 경우에 의무적으로 증권거래법에서 정한 합병비율을 따라야 하므로 이의 합병비율이 상속세및증여세법 상의 합병비율과 차이가 발생함으로 인하여 증여의제세액이 발생하였으나 2002년 12월 10일 동법 개정으로 인하여 상장법인이 다른 법인이나 비상장법인을 합병하는 경우 증권거래법 상 일정 규정을 준수하면 특수관계자간의 부당한 합병으로 보지않게 되어 증권거래법 준수로 인하여 발생하는 증여의제의 문제가 해결된 점은 바람직하다 하겠다. 다른 법규를 의무적으로 준수하는 과정에서 납세의무가 발생한다는 것은 납세자입장에서는 부당하기 때문이다. 하지만 상장법인이나 협회등록법인 이라 하더라도 아직도 증권거래법을 준수하여 합병비율을 산정하여도 피합병법인의 주주는 의제배당이나 청산소득과세의 부담을 떠안게되는 경우가 생긴다. 동일한 규정을 따라 합병비율을 산정하였음에도 불구하고 의제배당에 대한 소득세 및 법인세와 청산소득에 대한 법인세는 과세하고 증여의제에 의한 증여세는 과세하지 않는 점은 증여세과세문제와 비교하여볼 때 부당하다 하겠다. 특히 청산소득에 대한 법인세를 과세당하는 것은 합병으로 인하여 피합병법인은 청산절차 없이 소멸되긴 하지만 해당 사업이 소멸되는 것이 아니라 합병법인에게 이월되어 계속된다는 점을 감안하면 부당하다 하겠다. 이에 대하여는 의제배당에 대하여는 처분시까지 과세를 이연하고, 청산소득에 대하여는 합병법인의 청산시까지 과세를 유예하는 등 과세당국의 보다 일관성 있는 조세정책이 요구된다 하겠다. 둘째, 상속세및증여세법의 운용상 탄력성이다. 상기사례에서는 합병비율이 모두 상속세및증여세법에 따르는 것이므로 증여의제가 나타나지 아니하나 특수관계자간 합병시에는 상속세및증여세법에서 정한 합병비율을 따라 합병하지 않을 경우에는 그 차이가 동법의 일정기준을 충족할 경우에는 증여의제에 해당하여 과세당하게 된다. 그러나, 동 증여의제와 관련한 상속세및증여세법 상 평가규정이 지나치게 탄력성이 부족하여 비상장법인간 합병시에는 증여세문제 때문에 합병비율을 상속세및증여세법에 따라 정하게 되는 것이 현실이다. 그러나, 동 법률의 평가규정이 무척 경직적이다. 즉, 주식가치를 법률상 정해진 산식대로 평가하지 않을 경우 증여의제에 해당하여 과세당할 수 있다는 것이다. IMF이후에는 이전과 달리 독립된 제3자간의 합병사례가 빈번해진 것은 사실이나 아직도 비상장법인간의 합병은 모회사가 자회사를 합병하는 등 특수관계자들간에 합병하는 경우가 빈번히 이루어진다. 부분적이나마 1999년 상속세및증여세법 개정 시 순손익가치 계산을 위한 1주당 최근3년간 순손익액의 계산시 2이상 신용평가전문기관 또는 회계법인이 재정경제부령이 정하는 기준에 따른 1주당 추정이익의 평균가액을 사용할 수 있도록 개정되었으나 이를 적용하기 위한 요건 또한 법률에 정해져 있다. 상속세및증여세법이 점차 다양해지는 경제상황에의 대처가 늦어짐에 따라 경제실체들이 본의아니게 피해를 입는 경우가 발생할 수 있다는 것이다. 따라서, 상속세및증여세법이 경우에 따라서는 합병을 저해할 요인이 될수 있다는 점이다. 따라서, 비상장주식 평가 규정을 보다 현실적으로 변화하는 경제상황을 반영할 수 있도록 법률을 보완할 필요가 있겠다. 이상과 같이 이론연구 및 사례연구를 통하여 기업합병관련 과세제도의 문제점을 파악하고 개선책을 제시하여 보았다. 본 논문의 연구목적 달성을 위하여는 보다 다양한 합병사례분석을 통하여 과세제도에 있어서 문제점 및 개선방향을 연구하는 것이 타당하겠으나 실제 과세사례를 수집하기가 용이하지 않아 두가지 형태의 합병사례 연구만으로 만족할 수 밖에 없었다는 것이 한계로 남겠다.

企業買收·合倂(M&A)을 통한 우리나라 企業의 海外投資 促進方案에 관한 硏究

전미향 東亞大學校 敎育大學院 1994 국내석사

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss expected problems and solutions associated with overseas investment through merge and acquisition by Korean enterprises. The world has a tendency to internationalize and throw open a door to foreign countries in every field. All the enterprises must strengthen their ability to cope with various kinds of problems and difficulties in order to survive. According to this situation, Korean enterprises has realized the importance of Merge and Acquisition by overseas investment. They are getting more interested M&A in order to find a large market abroad and deal with a trade barrier. Internationalization and open-door government will promote M&A of overseas corporations to domestic ones. This paper suggests some strategies of overseas investment. First, Korean enterprises must have a large-scale production system so as to increase the production efficiency. Second, they must have a systematic. institutional and legal foundation in order to make higher value added. Third, they must get rid of inefficiency in case there is a different aim between manager and investor. Fourth, there is a growing difficulty to import technological know-how from overseas. Therefore, they must establish a stronghold in marketing and production. And they must accelerate the transfer of technology. Overseas M&A is to be accomplished by imparting technology from advanced countries, overcoming a trade barrier, expanding foreign markets, securing raw materials and diversified management. The advantages of M&A are as follows. 1. the effect of time saving 2. the easiness of securing human resources 3. prornpt transfer of commercial rights and the territory of purchased enterprise. All these effects should be aimed at attaining the reinforcement of international competition strength and the improvement of industrial structure. Korean enterprises that plan to take over foreign corporations must take these facts into consideration. Accordingly, a large number of satisfactory research materials should come out by positive analyses and experiments for the sake of Korean enterprises.

우리나라 企業의 企業買收.合倂(M&A)에 관한 硏究 : 事例分析을 中心으로

최승규 延世大學校 1992 국내석사